LIEN-continued. 18. One cannot avail himself of a lien the discharge of which he has fraudulently prevented. Carey v. Brown, 92 U. S. 171. 19. A release fraudulently obtained from one of two joint contractors will not invalidate a lien for work which has already attached. South Fork Canal Co. v. Gordon, 6 Wal. 561. 20. The jurisdiction of a court of equity, invoked to enforce a statutory lien, rests upon the statute, and cannot extend beyond it. 16. Banker's Lien on Deposits for Advances Trust-money. See TRUST CESTUI QUE TRUST, 11-13. Banker's Lien on Stock of Bank's Debtor. See BANK, 13-15. Bankruptcy - How it affects. See BANKRUPTCY PRIOR TRANSAC TIONS. Carrier's Lien See CARRIER - LIEN. Seller's Lien for Purchase-money Delivery. See SALE WHAT CONSTITUTES, 40. Statute Lien on Railroad in Favor of Laborers, See JUDGMENT MERGER, 1. Taxes-Lien therefor not displaced by Sale under Prior Judgment. See TAX-COLLECTION, 20. Vendor's Lien for Purchase-money. VEN Vessel-Purchaser from Master, etc.— Takes clear of Liens. See SHIPPING-OWNERSHIP, 2. Vessel for Advances constitutes Insurable In See INSURANCE Vessel for Supplies or Repairs - Master may create When. See SHIPPING-MASTER, 14 et seq. LIGHT-HOUSES - Secretary of the Treasury Purchase of Supplies. See TREASURY DEPARTMENT. LIFE ESTATE—In general. Priority Dis See LANDLORD and Tenant, 28 et seq. Maritime Lien · - In general. See MARITIME LIEN. LIMITATION— continued. Running of Statute Runs against whom. When it begins See LIMITATION STATUTES. Statutes, Validity and Construction. See LIMITATION LIMITATION STATUTES. ADVERSE POSSESSION-What constitutes Adverse Possession - Possession under Claim of Right· Constructive Pos session, Ouster, etc. See pl. 1-31. Presumption of Grant What justifies See pl. 32-42. Who may or may not acquire Adverse Pos session. See pl. 43-56. 5. The making of a fence or other improvement is not essential to an adverse possession; any visible and notorious acts of ownership under claim of right are sufficient; and the nature of such acts must depend on the uses to which the land was fitted. Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41. 6. Thus, the exclusive and notorious use of a valuable sandbank, by sale and use of the sand, such being the use to which the owner of the land would naturally put it, constitutes a legal adverse possession. Ib. 7. The uninterrupted payment of taxes for more than twenty-four years, held to be strong evidence of a claim of right. lb. 8. If land be occupied and cultivated in such manner as the owners of such lands usually occupy and cultivate, the possession is adverse. Reed v. Merrimac River Canals Proprietors, 8 How. 274. 9. Entry and possession under a tax deed giving color of title are sufficient evidence of an adverse seisin under the statute. Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472. 10. In Missouri, a purchase of land from an administrator, and possession for more than Color of Title-What constitutes - What twenty years, will sustain a plea of the statute of gives. limitations, in the absence of any special circumstances taking the case out of the statute. Long v. O'Fallon, 19 How. 116. 11. A step-father and guardian, who took from a third person and procured to be recorded a - Various deed of land of which he took the profits, and parts of which he afterwards sold, was held to have a sufficient adverse seisin to set up the statute of limitations against his step-children and wards, who claimed in the right of their mother, who had owned the land and conveyed it to such third person. Mercer v. Selden, 1 How. 37. 1. -What constitutes Adverse Possession -Possession under Claim of Right Constructive Possession, Ouster, etc.] Possession under a claim of the fee is evidence prima facie of ownership and seisin; but mere possession, unaccompanied by circumstances showing the extent and quality of the interest claimed, is evidence of no more than the bare fact of present occupation by right. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59. 2. Although a disseisor cannot, in qualification of his own wrong, assert, as against his disseisee, that he is other than a disseisor in fee, yet, upon the question whether one is in by title, presumed from long possession to have been made to him by the owner, the claims by which possession is accompanied are material. Ib. 3. It is necessary to a disseisin in fee that the entry be without right; if the entry be congeable, or the possession lawful, the entry and possession will be considered as limited by the right. Ib. 4. Although enclosure is one of the acts from which an intention to assert ownership and exercise possession may be inferred, there may be a possession without it. Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412. 12. In an action on the case for obstruction in the use of a wharf, possession by the defendant under color and with claim of title will put the plaintiff to proof of a better title or of an equal right to the use. Linthicum v. Ray, 9 Wal. 241. 13. A parol agreement between the owners of adjoining lands to employ a surveyor to run the dividing line and so to establish it, will conclude the parties, if executed and if corresponding possession be had thereunder for twenty years. Boyd v. Graves, 4 Wheat. 513. 14. What is adverse possession of land is a question of law. Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402. 15. If one with title enter upon land, his seisin becomes coextensive with his title. Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, 229. 16. If without title, his seisin will be confined to his possession by metes and bounds. Ib.; Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319. 17. But if one have title to land in the seisin of several tenants who claim different parcels in ADVERSE POSSESSION con- LIMITATION LIMITATION tinued. severalty, an entry into one will not give seisin of the others; there must be an entry into each. Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, 229. 18. An actual entry on part of a tract gives a constructive seisin coextensive with title. Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213; Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet. 61; Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412; Hunnicut v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333. 19. But not if any part be in the actual possession of one having a better title. Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213; Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319; Hunnicut v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333. 20. In such case the seisin of him having the better title extends to all not actually occupied by the other. Ib. 21. An entry without title works a disseisin of only so much as is actually thereby occupied. Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213. 22. An owner of land in possession of a part has constructive possession of the residue, except so far as it is in actual possession of another. Hunt v. Wickliffe, 2 Pet. 201. 23. A possession under a junior patent which interferes with a senior patent, the lands being wholly unoccupied by any one claiming under the latter, extends by construction to the whole tract. Sicard v. Davis, 6 Pet. 124. 24. Where grants of adjoining tracts overlap, there can be no constructive possession under the junior grant of that part of the land that lies within the senior grant: to give effect to the statute there must be actual possession thereof. White v. Burnley, 20 How. 235. 25. If one claiming under a patent reside on the legal subdivision therein described, his residence will constitute possession of the whole, within the statute, and it will make no difference that he has laid it out into town lots. Gregg v. Forsyth, 24 How. 179; Dredge v. Forsyth, 2 Black, 563; Kellogg v. Forsyth, 2 Black, 571. 26. Where several adjoining tracts of wild land were surveyed in a body, with nothing on the ground to distinguish one tract from another, and conveyed to a purchaser by the state as an entirety by a single deed, and a subsequent grantee of them as a whole afterwards mortgaged them as a whole, it was held that a tenant whom the mortgagee had put in possession was in possession of the whole in right of the mortgage, although his actual possession did not extend beyond a single tract. Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wal. 519. 27. An ouster cannot be presumed in favor of possession by a mere intruder. Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480. 28. Although the purchaser derives his title from his vendor, his possession, being for himself, ousts the vendor. Ib. tinued. claim or color of right it is an ouster, otherwise a trespass only. Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41. 30. If a widow by mistake receive to her sole use rents which belong to herself and her children jointly, it does not oust the children. Reed v. Merrimac River Canlas Proprietors, 8 How. 274. 31. Although in case of trespass the owner may elect to consider himself disseised, the wrong-doer who asserts an ouster of the owner must prove it, and something more than a mere trespass. Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319. 32. Presumption of Grant-What justifies - Miscellaneous Matters.] The length of time necessary to bring a case within the legal presumption of a grant, charter, or license, to validate a right long enjoyed, is not definite, but depends on its peculiar circumstances. Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711. 33. Circumstances may justify the presumption of a grant, although the adverse possession be not such as would constitute a bar under the statute of limitations. Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41. 34. In favor of long possession it is to be presumed that everything that has been done has been done rightfully, and that whatever was necessary to be done has been done. Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410. 35. The deposit of earth on a water lot, below high-water mark, to fit it for occupation and use, followed by the erection of a wharf and warehouse thereon, with possession of the adjacent upland for more than forty years, held strong ground for presumption of title. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25. 36. The presumption of a grant, arising from lapse of time, applies to land as well as to incoporeal hereditaments; but if, in the circumstances, the possession be consistent with the presumption that an estate less than a fee was the cause of it, a fee will not be presumed. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59. 37. A legatee in the adverse possession of land alleged to belong to the estate of the testator, cannot be compelled to allow rent therefor by way of set-off to his legacy, there being no implication of an assumpsit in such a case, and the right to the land not standing for trial in such a collateral manner. West v. Smith, 8 How. 402. 38. To show the nullity of a conveyance executed by one out of possession, adverse possession may be set up against any title. Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402. 39. A purchaser without notice may join his adverse possession with the ostensible adverse possession of his grantor to make a bar under the statute. Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch, 462. 29. An entry is an ouster or not, according 40. Under the Kentucky statute, as under to the intent with which it is made; if under the English, the whole possession must be taken ADVERSE POSSESSION con- LIMITATION together. Thus, adverse possession under a survey, previous to its being carried into grant, must be connected with continued subsequent possession. Walden v. Gratz, 1 Wheat. 292. 41. Under the Texas statute of 1841, if the possession of two or more persons in succession, holding in privity with one another, under title or color of title, make out the prescribed term, the bar is complete. Christy v. Alford, 17 How. 601. 42. So under the Tennessee statute. Lea v. Polk County Copper Co., 21 How. 493. 43. Who may or may not acquire Adverse Possession.] An heir may enter and claim by title other than that of his ancestor, and by exclusive possession under such claim acquire a title valid as against his co-heirs and creditors. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59. 44. Or, entering as heir, he may afterwards disseise his co-heirs, with a like result. Ib. 45. The grantee of one who has only an equitable right, but who undertakes to convey the fee, or of a tenant in common who undertakes to convey the whole, may, if in possession under a claim to the whole, set up his possession as a bar under the statute. Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402. 46. The possession of a mortgagor is not adverse to that of the mortgagee. Higginson v. Mein, 4 Cranch, 415; Union Bank v. Stafford, 12 How. 327; New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Stafford, 12 How. 343. 47. A possession by a tenant inures to the benefit of the landlord. Gregg v. Forsyth, 24 How. 179. 48. If one who enters on vacant land without claim of title afterwards attorn to the holder of a legal title, his possession is by relation a possession for his landlord from the time of entry. Peyton v. Stith, 5 Pet. 485. 49. If the purchaser of an undivided part of a parcel of land, having but an equitable title, enter upon the whole, under such title, the holder of the legal title will thereby acquire an actual seisin, the possession being under his title. Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213. 50. Ejectment against the holder of manorial land in Pennsylvania, under a conditional warrant, to enforce payment of the purchase-money, held not barred by the statute of limitations of 1705, nor by that of 1785, for that such holding was not adverse. Kirk v. Smith, 9 Wheat. 241. 51. Possession, to constitute a bar, must have been actual, continued, and adverse; and possession by a third person will not avail the defendant if he do not connect himself with it. Doswell v. De la Lanza, 20 How. 29. 52. One in possession, without title, cannot maintain an action against one who enters under an apparently valid title from the United States. Burgess v. Gray, 16 How. 48. 53. Where a patent issued on a proper entry contained a reservation of the rights of persons tinued. claiming under the act of March 3, 1823 (3 Sts. 786), to confirm claims for lots in Peoria, the reservation was held not to prevent the statute from running in favor of the patentee as against the right of one claiming a part of the land under that act and a survey thereunder. Meehan v. Forsyth, 24 How. 175. 54. Such a reservation cannot be construed as recognizing a superior title to any part of the land, nor prevent the possession from being adverse. Ib. 55. In Virginia, possession under an entry, without either title or claim or color of title, is not adverse to the paramount title, but subservient thereto. Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wal. 328. 56. If one enter in privity with the owner, the statute will not begin to run until there is a clear, positive, and open disavowal of the owner's title brought home to the owner's knowledge. Zeller v. Eckert, 4 How. 289. 57. Color of Title -What constitutes What gives.] Color of title is that which in appearance is title, but in reality is not. Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. 50. 58. Whenever an instrument, by apt words of transfer, in form passes what purports to be the title, it gives color of title, whether the grantor acts under the authority of judicial proceedings, or otherwise. Hall v. Law, 102 U. S. 461. 59. Whether a United States patent conveys a valid title or not, if the patentee is in possession under it, he is in possession under color of title, and his possession, therefore, may be adverse within the statute of limitations. Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U. S. 149. 60. A tax title not fatally defective on its face may constitute color of title. Wright v. Mattison, 18 How. 50. 61. It is not a necessary legal inference that one in possession of land, claiming title, cannot acquire color of title by purchasing in good faith at a tax sale thereof. Ib. 62. The statute will protect an innocent grantee who enters and claims under a grant fraudulent on the part of the grantor. Gregg v. Sayre, 8 Pet. 244. 63. In Tennessee, possession under a deed for the statute period is sufficient, although the deed be unrecorded and void. Lea v. Polk County Copper Co., 21 How. 493. 64. The words, "want of intrinsic fairness and honesty," in section 15 of the Texas statute of limitations, relate to defects in the claim of title set up as color of title, and not to knowledge in the defendant of the existence of a superior title. Thus, the statute may run when there is possession under a junior title, although the elder title is on record. Davila v. Mumford, 24 How. 214. 65. A patent reserving the rights of all persons who may perfect a superior right by a survey under a prior statute is sufficient color of con- LIMITATION LIMITATION ADVERSE POSSESSION 66. In Louisiana, mere conveyance from one out of possession under a subsisting contract passing title to another on a condition subsequent, of which there has been no breach, will not give a possession with which a prescription as against the first grantee may begin. Anderson v. Bock, 15 How. 323. 67. Under that provision of the Texas statute limiting actions to recover real estate from persons in possession under title or color of title to three years, there is no color of title when there is not merely a defect in the link of the chain, but a link actually wanting. League v. Atchison, 6 Wal. 112; Osterman v. Baldwin, Id. 116. tinued. possession prior to the forfeiture, nor the time during which by the forfeiture the title is in the state, can be reckoned as part of the limitation period. [DAVIS, STRONG, and BRADLEY, JJ., dissenting.] Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 Wal. 120. 75. Time necessary to constitute a Bar -Various Statutes.] An adverse possession of fifty years, although with knowledge of a better title, is a bar to that title. Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch, 462. 76. A continuous, uninterrupted, adverse possession for the time limited by the statute, not only bars the remedy, but extinguishes the right, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder. Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U. S. 149. 77. Uninterrupted, open, visible, exclusive, and notorious adverse possession of land in the District of Columbia for twenty years under a claim of title affords a good defence to an action of ejectment. Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U. S. 773. 68. A certificate from a vendor of land stating the purchase, and acknowledging payment 78. In North Carolina, proof of possession and the right of the purchaser to a conveyance as under title for seven years or more raises a presoon as the vendor is prepared to execute one, sumption that the adverse claim is barred under not purporting in itself to convey, is not a link in the statute, and, in the absence of evidence of a chain for the purpose of color of title, within disability on the part of the claimant, it is conthe meaning of that statute. Osterman v. Bald-clusive against the existence of a paramount adwin, 6 Wal. 116. verse title. Somerville v. Hamilton, 4 Wheat. 69. The Illinois statute of 1835, which 230. makes seven years' possession of land a bar in 79. In Tennessee, a possession of seven years favor of one having a connected title deducible is a bar under the statute of 1797, explaining the from a public officer authorized to sell "such | North Carolina statute of 1715, only when held land for non-payment of taxes," does not protect under a grant, or a deed founded on a grant. a claimant under a deed void on its face for want Patton v. Easton, 1 Wheat. 475; Walker v. of compliance with the requirements of the law, Turner, 9 Wheat. 541; Powell v. Harman, 2 such compliance being necessary to confer au- Pet. 241. Overruled in Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. thority to sell. [TANEY, C. J., and CATRON and 291, to conform to the decisions of the state GRIER, JJ., dissenting.] Moore v. Brown, 11 court. [BALDWIN, J., dissenting.] How. 414. 80. Under that statute peaceable and uninterrupted adverse possession for seven years, under a grant or a deed founded on a grant, gives a perfect title to land. Piles v. Bouldin, 11 Wheat. 325; Lea v. Polk County Copper Co., 21 How. 493. 81. In Kentucky, twenty years' adverse possession will bar an equitable as well as a legal title. Lewis v. Marshall, 5 Pet. 470; Peyton v. Stith, Id. 485. 82. In California, continuous adverse possession for five years bars an action of ejectment, if the plaintiff or those under whom he claims were under no disability when the cause of action first accrued. Harris v. McGovern, 99 U. S. 161. 83. The Georgia statute of limitations of 1767 does not. require an entry within seven years after the title accrued, unless there is an adverse possession. Shearman v. Irvine, 4 Cranch, 367. 84. In Kentucky, the heirs of a non-resident patentee have ten years after the death of their ancestor in which to assert their claim against an |