rectors, officers, and employés, and the said John Chetwood, Jr., his agent and servants, and each and every of their said attorneys, solicitors, and counselors, be forever restrained and enjoined from denying the rights of your orator to the said office of agent of said banking association, and from denying his right as such to the exclusive control of the assets of said bank, as above set forth, and from commencing any further litigation against him as such agent, and from prosecuting or defending any action heretofore brought by them or either of them against your orator, as such agent, touching his right to said office, and touching his exclusive right, as such agent, to collect the assets of said bank, except the suit, now pending in this court, brought by them as aforesaid against your orator on the 12th day of November, 1895, and which suit your orator hereby especially exempts from the operation of any injunction that may hereafter be granted herein, and that the said bank, its board of directors, officers, and employés, and the said defendant Chetwood, his agents and servants, and each and every of their said attorneys, solicitors, and counselors, be forever restrained and enjoined from commencing any further suits to colect any outstanding debts due the said bank, whether the same be evidenced by an open account, bill, note, or judgment, and particularly from attempting in any manner to collect the judgment heretofore recovered for said bank against the said Richard P. Thomas, and herein before referred to, and from further prosecuting the suit brought by them in the superior court of Alameda county to place a receiver in charge of the Standard Soap Company, as herein before set forth"; for an order to show cause why an injunction should not issue, and a temporary restraining order; and for general relief.

The circuit court on February 24, 1896, entered the following order:

"It is now ordered, adjudged, and decreed that until the further order of this court, or of the judge thereof, the defendants, the California National Bank of San Francisco, its directors, officers, and employés, and said John Chetwood, Jr., his agents, servants, attorneys, solicitors, or any other representative, are hereby restrained and enjoined from commencing any further litigation against the complainant, as agent of said bank, and from commencing any further suits to collect any outstanding debts due said bank, whether the same be evidenced by open accounts, bills, notes, or judgments, or otherwise, or from in any way whatever taking or attempting to take any control or possession of any of the funds or assets or property of the said bank, and from settling and allowing, or attempting to settle or allow, any attorneys' charges, or any other fees, expenses, or costs, growing out of, or which it may be claimed grew out of, any past litigation in this matter, and from in any way disposing of or incumbering any

of the assets, money, or property of said bank; but the defendants are not hereby enjoined from prosecuting or defending to final determination any actions in this matter now pending in the supreme court of the state of California, or in this court."

In September, 1896, petitioner gave notice, and attempted to move in his action in the superior court of San Francisco for an allowance for fees and costs, whereupon Stateler moved in the circuit court to punish petitioner and his counsel for so doing, and, some days later, moved for a further order punishing petitioner, and his counsel, as well as one Vanderslice, *claiming to be president of the bank, and Thompson, his counsel, for being concerned in suing out each of the writs of error in cases now numbered 673 and 674 on the docket of this court. Rules to show cause were entered. As to the matter of the motion in the state court for an allowance, it appeared that petitioner had withdrawn his application, and the circuit court adjudged the punishment of costs only, as it held the violation of its order had been merely technical.

As to the other rule to show cause, the court on the 19th of November, 1896, entered an order which, after discharging Vanderslice and Thompson, thus continued:

"(3) That at the time of applying for a writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, in the name of the defendant bank, to review the action of the supreme court of the state of California in reversing the judgment recovered by John Chetwood, Jr., in the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, against Richard P. Thomas, in the action of John Chetwood, Jr., Plaintiff, v. The California National Bank of San Francisco et al., Defendants, the said E. G. Knapp was ignorant of the fact that an injunction had issued out of this court in this case on the 24th day of February, 1896, enjoining the defendants herein and their attorneys from using the name of the bank in any of the litigation referred to in the amended bill in this action, and that by reason thereof the said E. G. Knapp is not guilty of any contempt of this court in applying for said writ of error, and that said order to show cause, as regards the action of the said E. G. Knapp in applying for said writ of error, is hereby discharged as to the said E. G. Knapp.

"(4) That at the time of applying for a writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, in the name of the defendant bank and John Chetwood, Jr., the defendants here, to review the action of the supreme court of the state of California upon the appeal taken by the complainant here from an order of the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, in the action of John Chetwood, Jr., Plaintiff, v. The California National Bank of San Francisco et al., Defendants, made by said superior court on the 8th day of July, 1895, refusing to turn over to the complainant here, as the agent of the bank, a certain fund of money on deposit in

said superior court to the credit of said action, and which said fund then belonged and now belongs to said bank, and which said fund the complainant here, as the agent of said bank, was then entitled and is now entitled to receive and have in his custody, to the end that it may be distributed among the shareholders of said bank, under the advice and direction of this court, as provided by law, and which said writ of error was applied for and obtained for the purpose of raising in that action the question of the validity of the election and qualification of the complainant as the agent of said defendant bank, and for the purpose of preventing said fund from coming into the hands of the complainant, as agent of said bank, so that it might be used by the said defendant, John Chetwood, Jr., for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by him in the litigation referred to in the amended bill herein, and in prosecuting the writ of error referred to in paragraph 3 hereof, the said E. G. Knapp well knew that an injunction had duly issued out of this court in this action on the 24th day of February, 1896, enjoining the defendants herein and their attorneys from any further litigation in and about said fund outside the supreme court of the state of California, and from using the name of the bank in any further litigation in and about said fund, or the matters referred to in the amended bill herein, and well knew that it had been adjudged by this court in this action that this court had the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter of winding up said defendant national bank, and had the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the question as to whether or not said complainant was the duly elected and qualified agent of said bank, and that in applying for said last-named writ of error the said E. G. Knapp has been guilty of a contempt of this court.

"(5) That the applications for both of the writs of error hereinbefore referred to were made by the said E. G. Knapp, claiming to be counsel for said bank; that the said E. G. Knapp did not then represent, and never has at any of the times* herein referred to represented, said bank as its attorney, and did not then, and never has at any of the times herein referred to, represented said bank as its attorney, and did not then and never has had authority to make either of said applications in its name, and that both of said applications were made by the said E. G. Knapp at the instance and request, and with the full knowledge and approval, of the defendant John Chetwood, Jr., and that in making both of said applications the said defendant John Chetwood, Jr., has been guilty of a contempt of this court.

"(6) It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendant John Chetwood, Jr., and said E. G. Knapp pay the costs of this proceeding, and that in prosecuting the writ of error referred to in paragraph 3 hereof, and which said writ of error was obtained in the name of the defendant bank, they altogether refrain

from further using the name of said bank; and they are hereby forbidden to use the name of said bank, in any way, manner, or form, in the further prosecution of said writ of error.

"(7) It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendants herein, and E. G. Knapp, the attorney for said defendants, dismiss in the supreme court of the United States the writ of error referred to in paragraph 4 hereof, obtained from the chief justice of the state of California, to review the action of the supreme court of the state of California on the appeal of Thomas K. Stateler, complainant herein, from the order made on the 8th day of July, 1895, by the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco, state of California, in the action entitled 'John Chetwood, Jr., Plaintiff, v. The California National Bank of San Francisco et al., Defendants,' and which said writ of error was made returnable before the supreme court of the United States on the 15th day of December, 1896, and which said proceeding in said supreme court of the United States is entitled "The California National Bank of San Francisco and John Chetwood, Jr., Representative Stockholder Thereof, Plaintiffs in Error, v. T. K. Stateler (Agent), S. P. Young (Receiver), Robert A. Wilson, Rich ard R. Thompson, and Richard P. Thomas, Defendants in Error'; that said writ of error be dismissed free of all cost to said complainant; and that the defendants herein have and produce evidence of the dismissal thereof before this court within twenty (20) days from the date hereof."

It appeared that Chetwood had commenIced suit in the circuit court directly attacking the validity of Stateler's election, and also that it was claimed that the bank had regularly maintained a board of directors, and that officers had been elected, pending the receivership and the subsequent agency. The petition alleged that petitioner and Knapp were authorized to appear on behalf of the bank, and that they had been employed by the president and the vice president of the bank and certain other shareholders to appear on behalf of the bank and prosecute the writs of error, and had given security that they would so prosecute said writs and make their pleas good; and attached to the petition was the affidavit of Vanderslice, in the superior court of Sau Francisco, subscribed and sworn to (ctober 24th, to the effect that he was the president of the California National Bank of San Francisco, and that "said corporation has, through him and the authority given him by the board of directors, retained and em ployed E. G. Knapp, an attorney and counselor at law, as attorney to represent it in this court and in the supreme court of this state and of the United states, if necessary."

The record contains very many matters not above set forth, but the foregoing are deemed sufficient, so far as the questions determined by the court are concerned.

Section 5234 of the Revised Statutes provides that on refusal of any national bank to pay its circulating notes, and its consequent default, "the comptroller of the currency may forthwith appoint a receiver, and require of him such bond and security as he deems proper. Such receiver, under the direction of the comptroller, shall take possession of the books, records, and assets of every description of such association, collect all debts, dues, and claims belonging to it, and upon the order of a court of record, of competent jurisdiction, may sell or compound all bad or doubtful debts, and, on a like order, may sell all the real and personal property of such association, on such terms as the court shall direct, and may,* if necessary to pay the debts of such association, enforce the individual liability of stockholders. Such receiver shall pay over all moneys so made to the treasury of the United States, subject to the order of the comptroller, and also make report to the comptroller of all his acts and proceedings."

By the act of June 30, 1876 (19 Stat. 63, c. 156), the authority of the comptroller to appoint a receiver was given, under the circumstances enumerated, and, among them, whenever the comptroller became satisfied, on examination of its affairs, that the bank was insolvent.

The substitution of an agent for the receiver is provided for by the act of June 30, 1876, as amended by the act of August 3, 1892 (27 Stat. 345, c. 360). When the comptroder has paid the debts of the particular bank, not including shareholders who are creditors of such association, and all expenses, and the redemption of the bank's circulating notes shall have been provided for as prescribed, the comptroller calls a meeting of the shareholders, at which they determine by a majority vote whether the receiver shall be continued to wind up the affairs of the bank, or an agent shall be appointed for that purpose. "In case the said meeting shall by a vote of a majority of the stock in value and number of shares determine that an agent shall be elected, the said meeting shall thereupon proceed to elect an agent, voting by ballot, in person or by proxy, each share of stock entitling the holder to one vote, and the person who shall receive votes representing at least a majority of stock in value and number shall be declared the agent for the purposes hereinafter provided, and whenever any of the shareholders of the association shall, after the election of such agent, have executed and filed a bond to the satisfaction of the comptroller of the currency, conditioned for the payment and discharge in full of each and every claim that may thereafter be proved and allowed by and before a competent court, and for the faithful performance of all and singular the duties of such trust, the comptroller and the receiver shall thereupon transfer and deliver to such agent all

the undivided or uncollected or other assets of such association then remaining in the hands or subject to the order and control of said comptroller and said receiver, or either of them; and for this purpose said comptroller and said receiver are hereby severally empowered and directed to execute any deed, assignment, transfer, or other instrument in writing that may be necessary and proper, and upon the execution and delivery of such instrument to the said agent the said comptroller and the said receiver shall by virtue of this act be discharged from any and all liabilities to such association, and to each and all the creditors and shareholders thereof. Upon receiving such deed, assignment, transfer, or other instrument, the person elected such agent shall hold, control, and dispose of the assets and property of such association which he may receive under the terms hereof, for the benefit of the shareholders of such association, and he may in his own name, or in the name of such association, sue and be sued, and do all other lawful acts and things necessary to finally settle and distribute the assets and property in his hands, and may sell, compromise, or compound the debts due to such association, with the consent and approval of the circuit or district court of the United States for the district where the business of such association was carried on, and shall at the conclusion of his trust render to such district or circuit court a full account of all his proceedings, receipts, and expenditures as such agent, which court shall, upon due notice, settle and adjust such accounts and discharge said agent and the sureties upon said bond."

A. B. Browne, for petitioner. Robert Brent Mitchell, for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The writs of error removed the original suit, in both its branches, to this court, and whether or not jurisdiction may be entertained of both or either of them it is for this court to determine when the question properly arises.

And so, if there be controversy in respect of the form of the writs, parties, citation, and service, or otherwise, these are matters for the disposition of this court without interference from any other.

We find it impossible to accept any ground suggested for the assumption by the circuit court of jurisdiction to compel Chetwood to desist from using the name of the bank on the writ of error in the case against Thomas, and to dismiss absolutely the writ of error in the case involving Stateler's effort to obtain control of the funds.

It is true, as stated in Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 181, 13 Sup. Ct. 785, that "no rule is better settled than that, when a court has appointed a receiver, his possession is the pos

session of the court, for the benefit of the parties to the suit and all concerned, and cannot be disturbed without the leave of the court, and that if any person, without leave, intentionally interferes with such possession, he necessarily commits a contempt of court, and is liable to punishment therefor." But we do not regard these proceedings as falling within that rule.

As neither the bank's officers or directors, nor the receiver, nor the comptroller, would, on demand, bring suit, Chetwood's suit, on behalf of himself and other stockholders of the California National Bank of San Francisco, to recover judgment in the bank's favor for the alleged wrongful acts of the managing agents of the corporation, must be assumed, on this record, to have been properly instituted; and it is not contended that this was ever challenged by the receiver, or by Stateler, claiming as his successor. The receiver was made a party defendant thereto, but took no steps to remove the cause to the federal court, and as is averred, assumed an attitude of hostility to the prosecution of the suit, and did nothing to aid in securing judgment against the officers of the bank whose alleged breach of trust and liability therefor was the sole foundation for the action. Nor is it questioned that the suit was rightly brought in the state court. Whittemore v. Bank, 134 U. S. 527, 10 Sup. Ct. 592. The receiver was appointed by the comptroller of the currency January 14, 1889, and Chetwood commenced his suit July 19, 1890. The receiver was not the officer of any court, but the agent and officer of the United States, as ruled by Mr. Justice Gray, on circuit, in Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. 506, and by Mr. Justice Jackson, then circuit judge, in Armstrong v. Trautman, 36 Fed. 276. And see Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479, 13 Sup. Ct. 1008; Platt v. Beach, 2 Ben. 303, Fed. Cas. No. 11,215; Frelinghuysen v. Baldwin, 12 Fed. 395; Armstrong v. Ettlesohn, 36 Fed. 209.

It has been so often decided that the authority vested in the comptroller to appoint a receiver of a defaulting or insolvent national bank, or to call for a ratable assessment upon its stockholders, is not open to objection because vesting that officer with judicial power in violation of the constitution, that we have recently declined to reexamine that question. Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684, 17 Sup. Ct. 209.

The receiver acts under the control of the comptroller of the currency, and the moneys collected by him are paid over to the comptroller, who disburses them to the creditors of the insolvent bank. Under section 5234 of the Revised Statutes, when the receiver deems it desirable to sell or compound bad or doubtful debts, or to sell the real and personal property of the bank, it devolves upon him to procure "the order of a court of record of competent jurisdiction," but the funds arising therefrom are disbursed by the

comptroller, as in the instance of other collections.

The circuit court did not have the assets or property of this bank in its possession on July 19, 1890, nor was the leave of that court necessary in order that the receiver might be made a party defendant to the action instituted by Chetwood on that day.

In the bill filed by Stateler in the circuit court, January 4, 1896, to enjoin Chetwood and the bank, the averment is made that on February 21, 1889, the receiver filed an application in the circuit court entitled "In re Application of Receiver of the California National Bank for the Sale of Personal Property"; and the bill asserts, as a conclusion of law, that thereby "the said receiver submitted himself and the affairs of said bank-, ing association to the jurisdiction of this honorable court." The application thus referred to is not made part of the return to the rule, but from the averments of the bill in regard to it, and from the terms of the national banking law itself, we think it plain that no such result followed its presentation. Our attention has been called to no case in which it has been held that the filing of such petitions by national bank receivers in the federal courts operates to make the receiver an officer of the court, or to place the assets of the bank within the control of the court, in the sense in which control is acquired where a receiver is appointed by the court.

As we have said, Chetwood's right to bring the suit in the state court against the officers of the bank must be held as not open to dispute on this record, and the bank was properly made a party.

Whether the bank's name was necessarily or rightly used in the prosecution of the writs of error, we are not now called on to decide.

The suit was properly brought in the state court, proceeded to judgment, and was carried to the supreme court of California on appeal. These courts undeniably had jurisdiction over the suit and the parties. About four years after the suit was commenced, Stateler was elected agent to succeed the receiver, and the usual assignment by the comptroller and receiver, to him as such, was executed. The legality of Stateler's election, though controverted, must be conceded for the purposes of this application. But did the substitution of an agent for the receiver oust the jurisdiction of the state court? Certainly not. He was no more an officer of the circuit court in the first instance than the receiver was. The agent proceeds in the settlement with like authority to that conferred upon the receiver, although at the conclusion of his duty he is required to render to the circuit or district court of the United States for the district where the business of the bank is carried on "a full account of all his proceedings, receipts, and expenditures as such agent, which court shall, upon due notice, settle and adjust such accounts

and discharge said agent and the sureties upon said bond"; and thus he and his bondsnien are protected by the final order of the federal court upon the performance of the conditions imposed. But there is nothing in the language of the statute from which it can be inferred that it was the intention that the jurisdiction of state courts of competent and concurrent jurisdiction, first obtained, should be interfered with by restraining orders issued by federal courts on the application of such an agent. The agent may indeed intervene in a case in the state court, and receive the fruits of the litigation to be administered subject to the final approval of the federal court; and accordingly Stateler, as agent, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the state courts, and applied for an order turning over to him the fund, so far as realized. Nevertheless the agent must abide the result, and cannot control it through the interposition of another independent and concurrent jurisdiction.

The doctrine is firmly established that where the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court, and that, where property is actually in the possession of one court of competent jurisdiction, such possession cannot be disturbed by process out of another court of concurrent jurisdiction. Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 14 Sup. Ct. 1019, and cases cited. And by section 720 of the Revised Statutes the granting of injunctions to stay proceedings in any court of a state is prohibited in express terms. It it unnecessary here to point out such exceptions or limitations as may exist.

Obviously the circuit court could not restrain the prosecution of this suit in the state courts, and we are equally clear that, if federal questions arose, the circuit court could not prevent this court, or a justice thereof, or the presiding judge of the state court, from granting writs of error, by restraining the parties from applying therefor; nor could it properly direct their dismissal, having been granted. Cases transferred to this court must be dealt with by this court. Of course, it is quite possible that the litigation had gone far enough after the state supreme court had passed upon it, but parties cannot be deprived of the right to prolong it, if the right exists, in this manner and under such circumstances.

Considered apart from the construction placed upon it by the circuit court, we should say that the injunction order of February 24, 1896, was not intended to restrain either Chetwood or the bank, or both, from prosecuting the writs of error from this court. The concluding words of the order are, "but the defendants are not hereby enjoined from prosecuting or defending to final determination any actions in this matter now pending in the supreme court of the state of Califor

nia or in this court." According to the practice in this court, a writ of error has been treated rather as a continuation of the original litigation than the commencement of a new action. Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195, 205; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 410. But, in any view, we should not have thought that writs of error were included within the scope of the order, or that the circuit court designed to interfere in such a way with the prosecution of the principal controversy as to arbitrarily stop the case on the judgment of the supreme court of the state, if it proved adverse to the bank and its interested stockholders, and leave them, if such order were lawful, wholly without further remedy, if such they had, or to preclude one of the parties from attempting to obtain a review of the judgment in the matter of the rights of Stateler, however that might be determined in the state supreme court, whose decisions on both appeals were rendered after the entry of the restraining order.

The circuit court, however, has otherwise construed the order, and has adjudged petitioner and his counsel guilty of contempt in its violation, as thus construed. And it has directed petitioner to dismiss one of the writs of error, and to desist from using the name of the bank in the other, in advance of what we may determine as to either of these matters when coming on to be disposed of.

As, in our opinion, the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in thus proceeding, we are constrained to make the rule absolute.

By section 14 of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 81, c. 20), carried for ward as section 716 of the Revised Statutes, this court and the circuit and district courts of the United States were empowered by congress "to issue all writs, not specifically provided for by statute, which may be agreeable to the usages and principles of law"; and, under this provision, we can undoubtedly issue writs of certiorari in all proper cases. American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co., 148 U. S. 372, 380, 13 Sup. Ct. 758. And although, as observed in that case, this writ has not been issued as freely by this court as by the court of queen's bench in England, and prior to the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c. 517), had been ordinarily used as an auxiliary process mere ly, yet whenever the circumstances imperatively demand that form of interposition the writ may be allowed as at common law, to correct excesses of jurisdiction, and in furtherance of justice. Tidd, Prac. *398; Bac. Abr. tit. "Certiorari."

Judgments in proceedings in contempt are not reviewable here on appeal or error (Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 573, 15 Sup. Ct. 900; Id., 159 U. £. 251, 15 Sup. Ct. 1039), but may be reached by certiorari in the absence of any other adequate remedy.

The writ of certiorari will be allowed to