The same Scripture, a long time before this, in the reign of Darius, otherwise called Ahasuerus, who succeeded the Magian, informs us, that these counsellors were well versed in the laws, ancient customs, and maxims of the state; that they always attended the prince, who never transacted any thing, or determined any affair of importance, without their advice. Interrogavit (Assuerus) sapientes, qui ex more regio ei semper aderant, et illorum faciebat cuncta consilio, scientium leges ac jura mujorum:* This last passage gives room for some reflections, which may very much contribute to the knowledge of the genius and character of the Persian government. In the first place, the king there spoken of, that is, Darius, was one of the most celebrated princes that ever reigned in Persia, and one of the most deserving of praise, on account of his wisdom and prudence: though he had his failings. It is to him, as well as to Cyrus, that the greatest part of those excellent laws are ascribed, which have ever since subsisted in that country, and have been the foundation and standard of their government. Now this prince, notwithstanding his extraordinary penetration and ability, thought he stood in need of advice; nor did he apprehend, that the joining a number of assistants to himself, for the determination of affairs, would be any discredit to his own understanding; by which proceeding he really showed a superiority of genius which is very uncommon, and implies a great fund of merit. For a prince of slender talents and narrow capacity, is generally full of himself; and the less understanding he has, the more obstinate and untractable he generally is: he thinks it want of respect to offer to discover any thing to him which he does not perceive; and is affronted, if you seem to doubt that he, who is supreme in power, is not the same in penetration and understanding. But Darius had a different way o. thinking, and did nothing without counsel and advice: Illorum faciebat cuncta consilio. Secondly, Darius, however absolute he was, and how jealous soever he might be of his prerogative, did not think he impaired or degraded it when he instituted that council; for the council did not at all interfere with the king's authority of ruling and commanding, which always resides in the person of the prince, but was confined entirely to that of reason, which consisted in communicating and imparting their knowledge and experience to the king. He was persuaded that the noblest character of sovereign power, when it is pure, and has neither degenerated from its origin, nor deviated from its end, is to govern by the laws;† to make them the rule of his will and desire; and to think nothing allowable for him which they prohibit. In the third place, this council, which every where accompanied the king (ex more regio semper ei aderant,) was a perpetual standEsth. i. 13. according to the Vulgate translation. Regimur à te, et subjecti tibi, sed quemadmodum legibus, sumus,—Plin. Paneg. Traj. ing council, consisting of the greatest men and the best heads of the kingdom; who, under the direction of the sovereign, and always with a dependency upon him, were in a manner the source of public order, and the principle of all the wise regulations and transactions at home and abroad. To this council the king transferred from himself several weighty cares, with which he must otherwise have been overburdened; and by them he likewise executed whatever had been resolved on. It was by means of this standing council, that the great maxims of the state were preserved; the knowledge of its true interests perpetuated; affairs carried on with harmony and order; and innovations, errors, and oversights prevented. For in a public and general council things are discussed by unsuspected persons; all the ministers are mutual inspectors of one another; all their knowledge and experience in public matters are united together; and they all become equally capable of every part of the administration: because though, as to the executive part, they move only in one particular sphere of business, yet they are obliged to inform themselves in all affairs relating to the public, that they may be able to deliver their opinions in a judicious manner. The fourth and last reflection I have to make on this head is, that we find it mentioned in Scripture, that the persons of which this council consisted, were thoroughly acquainted with the customs, laws, maxims, and rights of the kingdom, scientium leges ac jura majorum. Two things, which, as the Scripture informs us, were practised by the Persians, might very much contribute to instruct the king and his council in the methods of governing with wisdom and prudence. The first was, their having public registers,* wherein all the prince's edicts and ordinances, all the privileges granted to the people, and all the favours conferred upon particular persons, were entered and recorded. The second was, the annals of the kingdom, in which all the events of former reigns, all resolutions taken, regulations established, and services done by any particular persons, were exactly and circumstantially entered. These annals were carefully preserved, and frequently perused both by the kings and the ministers, that they might acquaint themselves with times past; might have a clear idea of the state of the kingdom; avoid an arbitrary, unequal, uncertain conduct; maintain a uniformity in the conduct of affairs; and, in short, acquire such light from the perusal of these books, as should qualify them to govern the state with wisdom. SECTION III. The administration of justice. To be king, and to be judge, is but one and the same thing. The throne is a tribunal, and the sovereign power is the highest au Ezra, v. 17. and vi. 2. † Ibid. iv. 15. and Esth. vi. 1. thority for administering justice. God hath made you king over his people (said the queen of Sheba to Solomon,) to the end that you should judge them, and render justice and judgment unto them. God hath made every thing subject to princes, to put them into a condition of fearing none but him. His designs in making them independent, was to give them the more inviolable attachment to justice. That they might not excuse themselves on pretence of inability or want of power, he has delegated his whole power unto them; he has made them masters of all the means requisite for the restraining injustice and oppression, that iniquity should tremble in their presence, and be incapable of hurting any persons whatsoever. But what is that justice which God hath intrusted to the hands of kings, and whereof he hath made them depositaries? Why, it is nothing else but order; and order consists in observing a universal equity, and taking care that force do not usurp the place of law; that one man's property be not exposed to the violence of another; that the common ties of society be not broken; that artifice and fraud do not prevail over innocence and simplicity; that all things rest in peace under the protection of the laws; and the weakest among the people find sanctuary in the public authority. We learn from Josephus,* that the kings of Persia used to administer justice in their own persons. And it was to qualify them for the due discharge of this duty, that care was taken to have them instructed, from their tenderest youth, in the knowledge of the laws of their country; and that in their public schools, as we have already mentioned in the history of Cyrus, they were taught equity and justice, in the same manner as rhetoric and philosophy are taught in other places. These are the great and essential duties of the regal dignity. Indeed it is reasonable, and absolutely necessary, that the prince be assisted in the execution of that august function, as he is in others; but to be assisted, is not to be deprived, or dispossessed. He continues judge, as long as he continues king. Though he communicates his authority, yet does he not resign or divide it. It is therefore absolutely necessary for him to bestow some time upon the study of equity and justice; not that he need enter into the whole detail of particular laws, but only acquaint himself with the principal rules and maxims of the law of his country, that he may be capable of doing justice, and of passing sentence with precision, upon important points. For this reason, the kings of Persia never ascended the throne till they had been for some time under the care and instruction of the Magi, who were to teach them that science, whereof they were the only masters and professors, as well as of the religion of the country. Now since to the sovereign alone is committed the right of administering justice, and that within his dominions there is no Antiq. Judaie 1. xi. e 3. other power of administering it than what is delegated by him; how greatly does it behove him to take care into what hands he commits a part of so valuable a trust; to know whether those he places so near the throne, are worthy to partake of his prerogative; and industriously to keep all such at a distance from it, as he judges unworthy of that privilege! We find that in Persia their kings were extremely careful to have justice rendered with integrity and impartiality. One of their royal judges,* (for so they called them) having suffered himself to be corrupted by a bribe, was condemned by Cambyses to be put to death without mercy, and to have his skin put upon the seat where he used to sit and give judgment, and where his son, who succeeded him in his office, was to sit, that the very place whence he gave judgment, should remind him continually or his duty. Their ordinary judges were taken out of the class of old men,† into which none were admitted till the age of fifty years: so that a man could not exercise the office of a judge before that age, the Persians being of opinion, that too much maturity could not be required in an employment which decided upon the fortunes, reputations, and lives of their fellow-citizens. Amongst them, it was not lawful either for a private person to put any of his slaves to death, nor for the prince to inflict capital punishment upon any of his subjects for the first offence; because it might rather be considered as an effect of human weakness and frailty, than of a confirmed malignity of mind. The Persians thought it reasonable to put the gool as well as the evil, the merits of the offender, as well as his demerits, into the scales of justice: nor was it just, in their opinion, that one single crime should obliterate all the good actions a man had done during his life. Upon this principle it was that Darius had condemned a judge to death for some prevarication in his office, and afterwards calling to mind the important service he had rendered both to the state and the royal family, revoked the sentence at the very moment of its going to be executed, and acknowledged, that he had pronounced it with more precipitatio. than wisdom.|| But one important and essentia rule which they observed in their judgments, was, in the first place, never to condemn any person without confronting him with his accuser to his face, and without giving him time, and all other means, necessary for defending himself against the articles laid to his charge: and, in the second place, if the person accused was found innocent, to inflict is very same punishment upon the accuser, as the other was to have suffered, had he been found guilty. Artaxerxes gave a fine example of the just rigour which ought to be exercised on such occasions. One of the Ibid. 1. vii. c. 194 Herod. 1. i. c. 137. || Γνοὺς ὡς ταχύτερα αὐτὸς ἢ σοφώτερα ἐργασμένος εἴη, εἴλυσε, Diod. l. xv. p. 333-336. king's favourites, ambitious of getting a place possessed by one of his best officers, endeavoured to make the king suspect the fidelity of that officer; and, to that end, sent informations to court full of calumnies against him, persuading himself that the king, from the great influence he had with his majesty, would believe the thing upon his bare word, without farther examination. For such is the general character of calumniators. They are afraid of evidence and light; they make it their business to bar up from the innocent all access to the prince, and thereby put it out of their power to vindicate themselves. The officer was imprisoned; but he desired of the king, before he was condemned, that his cause might be heard, and his accusers ordered to produce their evidence against him. The king did so, and as there was no proof but the letters which his enemy had written against him, he was cleared, and his innocence fully justified by the three commissioners that sat upon his trial; and all the king's indignation fell upon the perfidious accuser, who had thus attempted to abuse the favour and confidence of his royal master. The prince, who was well informed, and knew that one of the true signs of a wise government is to have the subjects stand more in fear of the laws than of informers,* would have thought, that to act otherwise than he did, would have been a direct violation of the most common rules of natural equity and humanity; it would have been opening a door to envy, hatred, calumny, and revenge; it would have been exposing the honest simplicity of good and faithful subjects to the cruel malice of detestable informers, and arming the latter with the sword of public authority: in a word, it would have been divesting the throne of the most noble privilege belonging to it, namely, that of being a sanctuary for innocence and justice, against violence and calumny. There is upon record a still more memorable example of firmness and love of justice, in another king of Persia, before Artaxerxes; in him whom the Scripture calls Ahasuerus, and who is thought to be the same as Darius, the son of Hystaspes, from whom Haman had, by his earnest solicitations, extorted that fatal edict, which was calculated to exterminate the whole race of the Jews throughout the Persian empire in one day. When God had, by the means of Esther, opened his eyes, he made haste to make amends for his fault, not only by revoking his edict, and inflicting an exemplary punishment upon the impostor who had deceived him; but, which is more, by a public acknowledgment of his error, which should be a pattern to all ages, and to all princes, and teach them, that far from debasing their dignity, or weakening their authority thereby, they procure to them both the more respect. After declaring, that it is but too common for calumniators to impose, by their misrepresentations and craftiness, on the goodness of their princes, whom their *Non jam delatores, sed leges timentur. Plin in Paneg. Traj. Princeps, qui delatores non castigat irritat. Sueton. in vit. Domit. c. ix. |