He may appear to occupy a unique position of authority and independence, and yet he can narrate a chapter full of the troublous experiences in the daily performance of his judicial office. He is in touch with a small army of lawyers, any of whom at one time or another will use every fair art, and sometimes unfair, to secure from him a result that some other with equal art is trying to prevent, and with an issue, perhaps, that may probably be reviewed with disaster and discomfort by an Appellate Court. In a large part of his work he is obliged to rely for his action. and judgment upon the statement of counsel, the latter, however honorable, influenced by a desire to secure results for a client; and any mistake of the judge, while not subjecting him to pecuniary liability, may be more disastrous in the criticism, public or private, affecting his good name and reputation for ability, as well as fairness-criticism the no less hurtful because it may be guarded.

The ideal judge will be zealous for a reputation for learning in his profession, will desire to be conceded as impartial in his relations to those before him, will know that he is regarded as courteous in his official intercourse and will feel a pride in an earnest performance of his work in a judicial manner.

Lawyers are by reason of their peculiar relations fond of indulging in a certain character of gossip about one another. By reason of their intimate relations with each other in the conduct of their business they quickly acquire an intimate knowledge of each other's personal traits, and as among themselves any conversation in reference to the traits or peculiarities of another is keenly comprehended; it is not unnatural that such conversation should partake of the character of gossip, scarcely ever unamiable, but almost always entertaining, and often intensely amusing. A few illustrations will not be amiss. A judge to whom everything in life was a hard problem and who decided each case on some principle or line of reasoning with which he was familiar and to whom all other arguments were as attacks on a battlement encased in ignorance, was one day complaining of the assurance dis

played by young lawyers in appearing before him to argue a case to which they had either not given sufficient study in preparation or which, on the other hand, they presented with such minuteness over A, B, C principles as to render the trial a stupid performance. He said they reminded him of a young gentleman who in essaying his first effort before the Court of Appeals was courteously reminded by the chief judge that it was unnecessary to dilate so minutely upon simple elementary principles and that he must assume that the court was entirely familiar with such, to which reply was made by the young advocate, who said that assuming such was precisely the mistakes he had made in the court below.

The ethical rules affecting the charges of a lawyer are necessarily general in their character, but soon become pretty well known to counsel early in his professional life. There is no more difficult question submitted to a lawyer than the fixing of a fee. To say this must be determined by the extent and character of the work, the length of time consumed and the amount or issues involved is a very simple statement, but involving in its practical application serious problems, and in the solution of which few greater are submitted to the lawyer's conscience. If a client could actually observe all the work done by counsel in some given matter he would usually better comprehend the propriety of a charge. But as a great part of this work consists in the studious reflection over the questions involved, the consideration of authorities and the preparation of notes and papers, the client usually regards the consultations and court arguments the only two features of the work he sees as a pleasant, easy method of daily toil for which any great charge is a shock to his sense of propriety. He usually thinks a very great fee goes with a very great reputation, and if his affair in court is greatly magnified in his mind, as it often is, a fairly large fee will look to him more in proportion than a fairly small one. Hence it is evident how this matter must be solved by the lawyer's conscience.

Very few persons, even the most skillful business men,

have a just conception of a fair fee for a lawyer's services. A very well-known business man and one prominent politically employed a lawyer to represent him in the prosecution of a case in court involving a very large claim, in which another party had an interest and by which party the lawyer had originally been employed. By agreement the fee was to be 10 per cent. of the recovery. A successful result was achieved with much less labor than anticipated, but with sufficient to make the lawyer feel he had well earned the stipulated fee. This was willingly paid by one of the parties, but the other, the politician, scheming like, wished some specific advantage and appealed to the lawyer therefor; the latter, in his eagerness to satisfy, said he would give him the advantage of 212 per cent., whereupon the politician, mistaking the intention and very well satisfied with the supposed concession, said: "Then you will charge me 712 per cent.," and the lawyer, who knew he had earned the 10 per cent. and was entitled to it by his express contract, gratifyingly acquiesced in the 72 per cent., thereby receiving this amount instead of 22 per cent., as he had intended, namely, 5 per cent. more than he had been willing to lose to gratify his political client. Although the difference was nearly a thousand dollars, yet a thousand more or less did not affect in the client's mind the fairness or justice of the fee; so he got a concession from a standard that had been willingly acquiesced in by him as well as by his colitigant and was the factor that made the matter entirely satisfactory to him. And the lawyer was prevented from making a sacrifice of himself in order to keep a client in good humor.

In naming one's fee tact suggests a procedure whereby the mind of the client is furnished a standard familiar to him. Where the legal service involves a recovery and the payment of money the familiar per cent. is judicially employed. An example will illustrate: A lawyer collected for a lady a mortgage debt of some thirteen hundred dollars and charged twenty-five dollars. Upon remitting the collection, less the fee, the client was quite indignant at the charge, saying she would willingly have paid 10 per cent.,

as she had inquired from friends and found this was the usual charge, and she thought that her legal correspondent should, therefore, return to her the remainder of the charge beyond thirteen dollars. Upon his calling attention to the fact that 10 per cent. would have been more than five times what he had in reality charged, she was content to say no more, although in admitting his right to charge 10 per cent. she had wanted him, in naming thirteen dollars, to take only 1 per cent., and he had in fact taken not quite 2 per cent.

In cases, however, where no money passes through an attorney's hands each character of cases furnishes certain features that point out the way to a reasonable charge and which will be acceded to ordinarily by clients as guides in fixing a fee. In an ordinary piece of work if the services of an attorney are needed outside of a court case the ordinary business man has a keen appreciation of the value of his own time, and he is reluctant to concede that an attorney whom he employs is to be higher rated than himself. A court case, however, such business man recognizes out of his sphere, and he is apt to consider such from the standpoint alone of how important it is to him as affecting his pecuniary business or social status, and he will very cheerfully pay a good-size fee on a happy result and as reluctantly pay a very small fee on a disastrous result. With him results alone count, very justly, because he is no doubt convinced he is in the right. It is no derogation to say the other side equally believes he is in the right. It is a peculiarity of legal actions that each side is firmly convinced of the righteousness of his own cause. This is natural, for if it is a legal question involved lawyers will legitimately differ in its solution; if it is a question of fact, it will often require the learning of Solomon to decide justly. There is nothing more difficult than to solve a legitimate difference between two practical men of affairs. Well-informed, intelligent business men usually arrange their differences between themselves. This may require straightforward conferences and mutual concessions.

If after this no conclusion is reached and the matter drifts into litigation, it may be conceived how difficult of solution is the problem; here can be seen the value of a skilled attorney, for with two sides each evenly poised, that will win which is represented most skillfully, and hence the keen appreciation of such services by the litigant and his willingness to suitably recognize such services in the commensurate fee. Also, conversely exists the pique and disgust of the losing side in bearing with ill grace the call for recompense for services in such a case.

It is rather curious in our present day to hear an elaborate discussion as to the rectitude displayed by counsel in undertaking an unjust cause.

The difficulties of a case leave slight room for the almost universal criticism of a lawyer who is supposed to espouse an unjust cause; to a lawyer his side is seldom unjust. If there is a legitimate difference to be decided the justice of the decision is a matter with which he has no concernthat is, for the judge or jury; his duty is fulfilled in extending to his side every aid of law or fact that will enable this judge or jury to see it in the most favorable light. With each side so represented a just result can in no better way be assured.

One who understands the subject can never tire of discussing the uncertainties of litigation. Any litigated matter is usually pretty evenly balanced as to law and as to fact. Hence the closely applied study of the advocate will usually secure a favorable presentation of his side, unless his opponent shall have evidenced closer and more intelligent application. Consequently, which side makes the better showing will often depend upon the respective lawyers selected, and when selected upon their respective industry in the litigation. Thus exists the first elements of uncertainty. Then the judge who passes upon the questions of law presented by the respective lawyers will constitute a particular type of human disposition of which the many types are as greatly varied as our intercourse with one another teaches us, so that here again is presented the opportunity for the industrious and versatile