when it is suggested that a lawyer's occupation is one of high ideals and eminent usefulness in his espousing the cause of a helpless litigant, who looks to him for succour in time of great distress and threatened loss; but likewise it is suggested, that this litigant has an opponent in exactly like situation, whose cause also is espoused by a legal representative, who likewise is engaged for such client in what he conceives an equally meritorious labor.

Where on such an array is the value to humanity of the lawyer's talents and labors, whichever of these litigants succeeds is the loss of the other. Distress and sorrow must surely come to one, elation and pleasure to the other. As great damage appears to be done in the one case as benefits in the other. Do not the opposing labors of counsel leave the situation so far as the general good to humanity is concerned precisely at the termination of their labors, at cross purposes as at the commencement of such labors. This often propounded problem is a plausible, but entirely misleading conception of the labors of a lawyer, and for a simple reason: In all the experience of mankind past and present no nobler and more elevated character appears than that of the just judge. The judge is just as he renders a just decision and the decision can only be just as it comprehensively, intelligently and accurately disposes of the matter to be decided. No more thorough, complete and positive information can be conveyed to him of the facts and arguments for each side respectively, than that furnished by the trained advocate for each side, so that with an earnest presentation from the standpoint of each litigant, the arbiter of their rights is in a position to decide in such a way as appeals in the highest degree to the sense of justice of the disinterested man, who as judge between the parties seeks the truth and decides the right.

The prejudices of a lawyer are markedly peculiar in one respect most men will voice their prejudices unre

strainedly, but will ordinarily not permit such to influence them in their business relations, if conflicting with their interest. The lawyer, however, assumes a position of sharp contrast in that he will be exceedingly chary of expressing his prejudices, but nevertheless will undeviatingly regard such in his attitude to others.

As prejudices are ordinarily founded on some reason, these will be voiced or not as one is careful of the favorable regard of the community.

Now men usually in their business advancement are not affected by the opinion entertained of their personal sentiments by the public, provided such sentiments be not of that character to exclude them. The lawyer, however, depends for his acquisition of work in the regard entertained for him by others and so will exercise care to refrain from those expressions which will impair this regard, or will be governed in his conduct by that course which will indicate no compromise with principle, nor concede convictions to the occasion-with a result that prudence will suggest to him as well to repress the voicing of his prejudices as also to govern his conduct by a strict adherence to the recognized standard of right or wrong, these two principles with reference to which prejudices usually pertain. Such course leaves less opportunity to subject him to adverse criticism, so hurtful to his reputation and prosperity.

The acquisition of wealth is the dream of those who are not seasoned to its trials. In one or two isolated localities and in a few isolated instances certain distinguished gentlemen have attained that happy state untouched by slander or calumny, but ordinarily to enjoy the fame of wealth a lawyer must expect a severe strain on his good name.

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Big fees are so few and far between and the work they require so burdensome and absorbing that no great opportunity offers in the field of acquisition. And should one in the pursuit of his profession reach this condition he will also possess that esteem of his professional brethren of questionable comfort and pleasure. If he should not excite envy, he will be lucky to escape criticism, just or unjust, and for faults or acts imaginary or real, and however just the criticism and however real the faults, he is not less a shining mark by his distinction of wealth. So that philosophy and prudence will dictate so unobtrusive a career of money making on the part of one eager in this respect that he will refrain from confiding to his legal brethren the pecuniary prosperity he may enjoy. With large wealth his case will be so isolated in character, that he need entertain no surprise at the public sentiment of the profession being arrayed in the direction of where most of its members stand in this respect. Do not decide in consequence that lawyers are more unamiable than the balance of the community. As a class the reverse is so. Their obligation to and dependence upon one another is not calculated to lessen amiability. But the instinctive feeling of merit possessed by each person, whatever his pursuits, and the inability of conceding to a rival the justice of a superior reward will be as apt to reach the weak spot in a lawyer as in any and all other professions and occupations.

If a gentleman wishes to recommend himself to the suffragists of the community for a judicial office, he usually begins to consider whether his armor is vulnerable to attack from his colleagues in the profession. If in his own estimation he passes proof in this, he next considers what endorsements he can secure as to

his legal eminence and attainment. He calculates that some six or more good names, with age, respectability and prominence back of them, will secure a sufficient following in numbers to furnish to the public the necessary impression. There will be no very insuperable difficulty in procuring these six or more good names, and the gentlemen so contributing their respectability to advancing the cause of the judicial aspirant will not usually regard their conscience as involved in such endorsements.

It will not be too rash to say that any respectable and fairly well informed lawyer can, through his own efforts and the efforts of a few friends, procure these initiatory endorsements, knowing that with such obtained the remainder follows as of course. The certificate or address and the innumerable signatures thereto portrayed in public print constitute usually the first intimation to the public of the great merit possessed by the gentleman who asks for its support. This, with the backing of the political party whose principles he espoused, is all the judicial seeker usually deems necessary for his campaign for office.

Anything further he has been taught to think derogates from the dignity that should attach to him who seeks this office. It must need be said that this constitutes quite a respectable method of political campaign. If he be elected he will be at once clothed in public esteem with the sanctity, learning and ability that fall upon his shoulders with the judicial mantle, and from that time he, who with due deference and modesty may have theretofore advanced his opinions, has been now relegated to the seat to decide on the contending views of earnest and determined advocates.

The customary opinions possessed by a certain por

tion of the public is that a lawyer is contentious, without public spirit, possessed of no fixed principles, untruthful, ready to barter his talents for pay to the first comer, without reference to right, justice or conscience -and he who has the special reputation for cunning, shrewdness and sharpness is usually accepted as the ideal type-but yet when one of the public has occasion to employ a lawyer he does so upon the principle that he must select a man he can trust as to his integrity and fealty, and possessed of the finest ability and learning to advocate successfully his cause and he would shrink with horror from placing himself and his rights in the keeping of the sharp practitioner. So that this is one of those instances where expressed views are not carried out in practice. A critical analysis of such views will develop a misconception of the duties of counsel. An earnest advocate arguing a cause with an opponent of like character, will suggest a situation in which one side must be right and the other wrong, and yet the wrong side is contended for as determinedly, without reference of the effect on the public-sustained by an appeal to principle, and supported by an array of truths-all in consequence of counsel having accepted services for that side for the fee he receives.

Now the right and wrong of a case is for the decision of a Judge or a jury; an advocate's duty consists in presenting his side in its most effective lights to the tribunal charged with its decision. The more effective each side is thus presented, the more information possessed by the deciding factor and the better position he occupies for deciding rightfully. Within the bounds of law and legal ethics the more earnest, industrious and devoted to his cause, the more accurately does the advocate justly perform his functions as counsel for his clients, and thereby whether he has represented the successful or unsuccessful side does he by his learning, his close analysis of his case and its forceful presentation contribute to that full information and clear conception that must be possessed by Judge or Jury to efficiently dispense justice.