Ballots.

"

be tried before the county court, as herein before ures the dimensions of the lots and blocks fronting
provided for the trial of contest of county officers, thereon. Subsequently, under authority of the
so far as the same is practicable; but the judg-legislature, a highway of a specified width.was es-
ment rendered in such cause shall be final, and no tablished along the river, within the limits of the
appeal to the supreme court therefrom shall lie," city, and thereafter the city authorized a railroad
refers to a municipal corporation; an "incorporat- company to construct and maintain a railroad up-
ed town. County Court Garfield County v. on the highway so established, which was done.
Schwarz. (Colo.) 22 P. 783.
The ground occupied by the company does not ex-
tend beyond the limits of the highway, and the oc-
has continued from that time until the present.
of the highway by the railroad company
cupancy
An owner of a lot fronting on the street claimed
that, according to the plat and dedication, the rail-
road company was occupying a portion of his lot,
and brought an action to eject it therefrom. Held
that, as the railroad was constructed upon a high-
way or street of the city established as aforesaid,
and was laid thereon by authority of the city, the
action of ejectment cannot be maintained.--Atchi-
son & N. R. Co. v. Manley, (Kan.) 22 P. 567.
Public use.

7. Pol. Code Cal. §§ 1265, 1266, requiring the
county clerk to preserve packages of ballots un-
opened for 12 months, except where there is a con-
test in court, includes not only elections for offices,
but any election which may be contested in a court.
-Gibson v. Board of Supervisors, (Cal.) 22 P. 225.
S. Where the statute provides (Laws Cal. 1883,
p. 311) that the ballots, on an election to determine
the issuance of bonds, shall be printed "For the is-
sue of bonds," or "Against the issue of bonds, "
ballots "For the issue of bonds" are sufficient, with-
out adding the word "Yes."-Gibson v. Board of
Supervisors, (Cal.) 22 P. 225.

Fraud.

9. Where the returns of an election are regu-
lar in form, and genuine, a canvassing board may
not reject and refuse to canvass them on the ground
that illegal votes had been received, or other frauds
or irregularities practiced at the election. Lewis
V. Marshall Co., 16 Kan. 102.-Brown v. Jeffries,
(Kan.) 22 P. 578.

EMBEZZLEMENT.

Evidence.

1. On an information for embezzlement, it ap-
peared that defendant was the assignee of an in-
solvent debtor, and that the assignment contained
preferences. A firm of which defendant was a
member was second in the list, but defendant paid
its debt first, leaving little for payment of other
debts. He also received $737 from sales of milk,
and only accounted for $427. Held, that the evi
dence justified the verdict of guilty, as it was for
the jury to say whether defendant intended fraud-
ulently to appropriate the property.-People v. De
Lay, (Cal.) 22 P. 90.
Defenses.

2. In such case, under Pen. Code Cal. § 513,
providing that if, prior to information laid charg-
ing embezzlement, the accused restore, or offer to
restore, the property alleged to have been embez-
zled, such fact is not ground of defense, but goes
only towards mitigation of the punishment, it
could not avail that defendant offered to return
the balance due from him as assignee.-People v.
De Lay, (Cal.) 22 P. 90.

3. Nor is it a defense that defendant has given
an indemnity bond for the amount of property
coming into his hands as assignee.-People v. De
Lay, (Cal.) 22 P. 90.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

The power.

1. A railway corporation authorized to con-
struct and operate its road upon a street in an in-
corporated city, by authority of the common coun-
cil thereof, granted in accordance with the charter
of the city, or upon a county road, under an agree-
ment with the county court of the county in which
the road is situated, in accordance with Ann. Laws
Or. § 342, cannot be enjoined from proceeding
therewith at the suit of an owner of lands abutting
upon the street and county road, whether the fee
to the lands to the center of the street and county
road adjacent thereto is in such owner or not, with-
out establishing, by allegations and proofs, that
the construction and use of the railway will spe-
cially interfere with the owner's ingress and egress
to and from his premises.-Paquet v. Mt. Tabor St.
R. Co., (Or.) 22 P. 906.

2. The Atchison town company platted a tract
of land lying on the west bank of the Missouri
river for a town-site, indicating on the plat that
there was a street along the river, but failing to
show the width of the street, or to indicate by fig-

3. Under the language of the California con-
stitution as it existed prior to 1879, where the
state, for public purposes, turns or straightens the
channel of a river where it empties into another
river, so that the land on the opposite side is, five
years afterwards, injured or destroyed by the in-
creased velocity of the current, such damage is
entitle the owner to compensation.-Hoagland v.
not a "taking" of land for public use, and does not
State, (Cal.) 22 P. 142.

Procedure.

4. On appeal from the award of commissioners
in condemnation proceedings, the appellant, in giv.
ing a description of her land in the appeal-bond,
omitted to state the range in which it lay, but did
allege that it was situate in a certain county, and
also referred to the report of the commissioners,
in which the land was accurately described. Held,
that the description was sufficiently definite and
certain. Kansas City & S. W. R. Co. v. Hurst,
(Kan.) 22 P. 618.

5. The failure of the county clerk to indorse
upon the report the time when it was filed in
his office will not preclude a party from show-
ing when it was actually filed, and thus establish
that the appeal was taken within the prescribed
time.-Kansas City & S. W. R. Co. v. Hurst, (Kan.)
22 P. 618.

6. A petitioner cannot introauce in evidence
an outstanding deed in one not a party to the pro-
ceeding, unless the same be averred in the petition
in disparagement of the defendant's title or in-
terest.-Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. Allen, (Colo.) 22

P. 605.

7. The burden is upon the defendant to show
the value of the property or interest actually tak-
en, as well as damages, if any, to the residue;
hence he is entitled to open and close at the trial.
-Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. Allen, (Colo.) 22 P. 605.

8. A petition for the condemnation of lands in
the county court should show the value of the
property sought to be taken, or the amount in-
volved in the proceeding; and, if the property be
longs to a married woman, the husband must be
joined as a party. Where these substantial requi-
sites are not complied with, such proceedings,
based upon service by publication, are ineffectual
to pass the title, or any right or interest therein.
-Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. Allen, (Colo.) 22 P. 605.
9. Defective condemnation proceedings may
be renewed, and the petition and other papers may
be amended, whenever necessary to a fair trial
and final determination of the controversy.-Colo-
rado Cent. R. Co. v. Allen, (Colo.) 22 P. 605.

Appeal.

10. Comp. St. Kan. c. 23, § 86, and chapter $1,
$ 121, 122, and 124, provide that an appeal from an
award made by commissioners appointed to con-
demn a right of way for a railroad is triable at the
next term of the district court which occurs 10
days or more after the appeal is perfected. Held
that, where such an appeal was perfected more
than 10 days prior to the beginning of a term, the re-
fusal to continue the trial of the cause to the next
term was proper, although the pleadings were

Closed only the day before the trial.-Chicago, K.
& W. R. Co. v. Wilkinson, (Kan.) 22 P 412.

so as to depreciate the value thereof.-McQuaid v.
Portland & V. Ry. Co., (Or.) 22 P 899.

19. Where a railway corporation locates its
road on a street, under the provisions of statute, in
such close proximity to the premises of an adjoin-
ing lot-owner that its use obstructs his communi
cation with the street, and interferes with its en
joyment by those who occupy the premises to such
an extent as to materially depreciate their value,
the lot-owner is entitled to recover the amount of
such depreciation.-McQuaid v. Portland & V. Ry.
Co., (Or.) 22 P. 899.

11. On an appeal by a land-owner from the de-
cision of commissioners appointed to assess dam-
ages for land condemned by a railway company
for a right of way, where the trial is had before
the grading of the road-bed is completed, and the
company introduces evidence that the engineer's
profile shows that he has ordered an under-cross-
ing through which cattle could pass under the rail-
road from one side to the other, but there is noth-
ing in the profile filed by the railroad company,
nor in the report filed in the county clerk's office 20. It is not error to show the location, use, and
by the commissioners, showing such crossing, the effects of a ditch constructed by the railroad com
court should have instructed the jury, when re- pany partly on the right of way and partly on the
quested by the owner of the land, that the com- land not appropriated, when the jury, by the in-
pany was not obliged, under the evidence, to main- structions of the court, are confined to the consid
tain such under-crossing.-Lind v. Chicago, K. &eration of only such damages as are occasioned by
W. R. Co., (Kan.) 22 P. 423.
that part of the ditch that is located on the right of
way.-Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Cosper, (Kan.)
22 P. 634.

12. Under Comp. Laws Kan. 1885, c. 23, the re-
port of commissioners appointed to condemn a
right of way for a railroad is not complete and
final until it is filed in the office of the county
clerk, and the land-owner may take an appeal from
their award at any time within 10 days after it is
so filed. The time of taking an appeal will be
reckoned from the filing of the report, instead of
from the time when it is reduced to writing and
signed by the commissioners.-Kansas City & S. W.
R. Co. v. Hurst, (Kan.) 22 P. 618.

13. Where one who is not named in a condem-
nation award, or in any of the proceedings, appeals
from the assessment, and files a petition on ap-
peal, claiming that he is the owner of the land ap-
propriated, which the railroad company denies, the
burden is on him to prove title or exclusive posses-
sion for the period covered by the statute of limit
ations.-Chicago, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Cook, (Kan.)
22 P. 958.

Rights before payment.

14. Until the payment of the condemnation
money or its deposit as required by law, a railway
corporation obtains no right to the land attempted
to be appropriated, excepting a right to make a
survey.Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Watkins,
(Kan.) 22 P. 985.

Compensation.

15. The true and actual value of the property, or
interest therein, belonging to the defendant at the
time of the appraisement is the measure of com-
pensation in condemnation proceedings in Oregon.
-Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. Allen, (Colo.) 22 P. 605.
16. Where a railroad company laid its tracks
upon a street in such a manner as to cut off access
to plaintiff's lots abutting on the street, and did
not compensate plaintiff for such injury, the de-
fendant company, which purchased the railroad at
foreclosure sale, became liable for a continuance
of the nuisance.-Ft. Scott, W. & W. Ry. Co. v.
Fox, (Kan.) 22 P. 583. .

17. A railroad company which builds its tracks
upon a street of a city in such a way as to render
the street wholly useless to plaintiff as a means of
access to and from his lots abutting on the street
is liable in damages to plaintiff, although the rail-
road is skillfully and properly constructed, and
plaintiff's lots are accessible from another street.
-Ft. Scott, W. & W Ry. Co. v. Fox, (Kan.) 22 P.

583.

18. In an action against a railway corporation
to recover damages in consequence of its locating
and constructing its road upon certain streets, it
was alleged that plaintiff was the owner of prem-
isos at the corner of two of the streets; that de-
fendant had located its road above the grade there-
of, and made a large curve in its road; that it had
built it so near the plaintiff's premises that a wag-
on could not pass between the curb of the side-
walk and its road; and that it had so taken and
appropriated such part of the streets at the corners
of plaintiff's premises as to interrupt and greatly
obstruct access thereto. Held, where there was
evidence of the truth of such allegations, that the
trial court should have submitted to the jury the
question as to whether the location and operation
of the defendant's road interfered with the plain-
tiff's ingress and egress to and from his premises,

21. Where an appeal is taken from an award of
damages by commissioners in condemning a right
of way for a railroad, and where it is shown that
certain buildings on the plaintiff's premises were
greatly damaged by reason of the proximity of the
road thereto, as an element of damages it is error
for the court to permit plaintiff to show what it
would cost to erect other buildings at other suita
ble places on the farm, and adequate to the use
of the farm. The evidence in such a case must be
confined to the injury to the improvements, with-
out regard to what it would cost to erect others,
suitable and adequate.-Council Grove, O. C. & Q.
Ry. Co. v. Center, (Kan.) 22 P. 574.

22. On the trial of the question of damages for
the taking of a right of way for a railroad, an in-
struction that the land-owner has, and shall at all
times hereafter have, the right to make any and
all crossings over the right of way which he may
the operation of the railroad, is properly refused,
desire to make, provided they do not interfere with
as the necessities of the farm must require the
crossing at the particular place designated for it
Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Cosper, (Kan.) 2
P. 634.

23. Whether or not an opening under a bridge
constructed by a railroad company can be used by
the land-owner advantageously as an under-grade
crossing is a question of fact for the jury to de
termine; and when the record discloses that there
is only one place on the farm that could be used as
an under-grade crossing, and at the time of the
condemnation by the commissioners an agent of
the railroad company stated to the commissioners
that a bridge would be constructed at that point.
so as to make an under-grade crossing, and proved
this statement at the trial on appeal to influence
the question of damages, and when the railroad
company asked for a special instruction as to their
liability on that promise, it is not error in the trial
court to refuse to instruct generally on the subject
of under grade crossings.-Chicago, K. & WR
Co. v. Cosper, (Kan.) 22 P. 634.

24. Under Const. Colo. art. 11, § 15, providing
that private property shall not be taken or dam
aged for public or private use without just compen-
sation, plaintiff cannot recover for damages to his
property occasioned by the obstruction of a street
by a railroad, where the streets and alleys border
ing on plaintiff's premises, and by which he gaits
access thereto, are entirely unobstructed, although,
at a short distance from plaintiff's house, a street
which plaintiff has occasion to use more than any
one else is so obstructed.-Gilbert v. Greeley, S. L.
& P. Ry. Co., (Colo.) 22 P. $14.

Evidence.

25. At the trial of a case for damages for the
taking of a right of way for a railroad turough
farming land, a farmer living in the neighborhood,
who had knowledge of the farm for years, knew its
location, advantages, character of soil, and its
market value compared to other lands surrounding
it, is a competent witness, and qualified to testify
to the value of the land taken, and to the damages
to the whole tract. The case of Railway Co. v.
Hawk, 39 Kan. 638, 18 P. 943, cited and followed.-

Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Cosper, (Kan.) 22 P. | owners, was signed by one of defendants; that the

$34.

26. Farmers who reside in the vicinity of a par-
ticular farm, who are acquainted with the farm,
but who cannot testify to its market value or its
usable or productive value, ought not to be permit
ted to state how much, in their opinion, the farm
is depreciated in value by the appropriation of the
right of way for a railroad across it.-Ottawa, O.
C. & C. G. R. Co. v. Fisher, (Kan.) 22 P. 713.

27. In condemnation proceedings for the assess-
ment of damages occasioned by the procuring of a
right of way for a railroad company the owner of
the land may recover damages only for his loss in
surrendering to the railroad company such right
of way, and cannot recover in such a proceeding
for independent trespasses committed by the rail-
road company or its agents outside of the right of
way. And it was error to admit evidence on the
trial tending to prove that the railroad company
went outside of the right of way appropriated by
it, and excavated on other land of the land-owner,
and used the earth taken therefrom in making its
road-bed, although the objection of the railroad
company to such evidence was general.-Leaven-
worth, N. & S. Ry. Co. v. Usher, (Kan.) 22 P. 734.
28. The petitioner is at liberty to show, by prop
er pleadings and proof, the state of defendant's
title, claim, or interest, and that it is only a bare
legal title, without any equity in defendant, and
that the damages are merely nominal.-Colorado
Cent. R. Co. v. Allen, (Colo.) 22 P. 605.

EQUITY.

See, also, Fraudulent Conveyances; Injunction;
Mortgages; Partition; Partnership; Quieting
Title; Receivers; Specific Performance; Trusts.
Jurisdiction.

1. When a court of equity acquires jurisdiction
of a cause for one purpose, it maintains it for all
purposes, and administers complete relief. It will
neither invoke the aid of other courts, nor permit
them to interfere with its process.- Haynes v.
Whitsett, (Or.) 22 P. 1072.

2. Where plaintiff, under duress, releases a
banking firm from a certain amount due him, and
at the suggestion of defendant, the head of the
firm, it retains the same, but afterwards, on plain-
tiff's check, pays it over to defendant, the latter is
liable for the same in equity, notwithstanding
plaintiff may sue the bank at law. - Schiffer v.
Adams, (Colo.) 22 P. 964.

Reformation of contracts.

3. In a suit to correct the description of a mort-
gage, a defense that the land has been sold to bona
fide purchasers is a personal one, and can only be
raised by the purchasers, or those holding title un-
der them.-Haynes v. Whitsett, (Or.) 22 P. 1072.
4. In a suit to have a deed absolute in form de
clared a mortgage, where the allegations of the
complaint and the evidence are that the money
received by plaintiff was a loan, and not for the
purchase of the property, a finding that there was
a parol agreement that plaintiff could buy the land
back at any time, by paying the price he had re-
ceived, with interest, is outside the pleadings, and
unsupported by the proof.-Dalton v. Leahey,
(Cal.) 22 P. 283.

5. In an action for the specific performance of
a written contract, whereby the parties agreed to
locate a claim on disputed land to defeat a suit of
other claimants, the expenses incurred thereby,
and in contesting the suit, to be shared by the lot-
owners proportionately, and each lot-owner to re-
ceive a conveyance of his share of the contested
land on the successful termination of the suit, it
appeared that money had been collected and ex-
pended in defraying the expenses of the suit and
focating the claim, under advice of counsel; that
defendants knew of such expenditures, and re-
ceived part, asserting that they did so for their as-
sociates; that the contract was drawn up at the
instance of one of defendants, by their own at-
torney, and read over to them, and, after receiving
the approval of the representative of the other lot-

alleged mistake set up in defense of the action was
discovered two years before this suit, but no effort
to have it reformed was made. Neither defendants-
nor their attorney testified as to the execution of
the contract, nor how the alleged mistake happened.
Held, that such contract will not be reformed on
the ground of mistake.- Fitschen v. Thomas,
(Mont.) 22 P. 450.

Cancellation of contracts.

6. An allegation in a suit to cancel a deed, that
the alleged maker never had, after the making of
the deed, sufficient strength of mind or body to de-
liver it, "and the said deed never was delivered by
him, sufficiently raises the question of delivery,
when denied in the answer, to require a finding on
such issue.-McGrath v. Hyde, (Cal.) 22 P. 203.
7. In an action to cancel certain conveyances
made by plaintiff to her four step-children, alleged
to have been executed while mentally impaired and
under undue influence, it was undisputed that
the day after the funeral of plaintiff's husband,
who had been shot and instantly killed, and while
she was deeply shocked and agitated, T., a brother
of deceased, who had professed great sympathy
and solicitude for her, and several of his relatives,
together with an attorney, who had been previ
ously consulted and employed by him, visiteù her,
and advised with her about these instruments;
that at this time plaintiff was pregnant, which
was known to T.; that she had no adviser except
these persons, who were all interested in securing
all the property of deceased for the children; and
that, without consideration, she then executed
these instruments, conveying all her interest in
her husband's property, worth $47,000. Held, that.
the conveyances should be set aside.-Moore y
Moore, (Cal.) 22 P. 559.

ERROR, WRIT OF.

See, also, Appeal; Certiorari; Exceptions, Bill'
of; New Trial.
Amendment.

Where a petition in error is filed in the su
preme court, with a part of the transcript of the
cause annexed thereto, within one year after the
rendition of the judgment, and before the expira-
tion of the year a motion is filed to attach the "case-
made" to the petition in error, as a part thereof,
the supreme court may, for good cause shown, and
in furtherance of justice, grant the motion, and.
permit the petition in error to be amended.-Leav-
enworth, N. & S. Ry. Co. v. Whitaker, (Kan.) 22
P. 733.

ESCROW.

Authority of depositary.

Plaintiff having agreed to convey certain
mining property to defendants, he executed a deed
thereof satisfactory in form to all parties, and
defendants executed their promissory notes. The
deed and notes were left in escrow with one B.,
under an agreement that the latter was to hold the
papers until plaintiff should produce a satisfactory
title to the property. B. executed an instrument
whereby he acknowledged the receipt of the deed
and notes, and recited that the notes were to be
delivered to plaintiff, "who is to produce to me an
abstract of title showing his right to convey," etc.
Held, that the sufficiency of the title was to be de-
termined by B.-Henderson v. Johns, (Colo.) 22 P.
461.

In pais.

1. Where property seized on execution against
a third person was turned over by plaintiff to one
holding a mortgage which she had given on the
property, she was estopped from raising the ques-
tion as to whether a legal forfeiture under the
mortgage had been incurred.-Bowman v. Davis,
(Colo.) 22 P. 507.

in this state, when duly certified by the register or
receiver having the custody of such paper or docu-
ment, may be received in evidence in the same
manner and with like effect as the original.-Stin-
son v. Geer, (Kan.) 22 P. 556.

4. Under Gen. St. Colo. § 583, providing that
copies of all papers filed with the recorder of deeds,
certified by him under the seal of his office, shall
2. A contract for the sale of land was made by be prima facie evidence in all cases, a copy of ar-
ticles of incorporation, certified by the recorder,
one acting as agent, in the presence of the owners,
and the sum paid on the purchase price was, by though inadmissible to prove corporate existence,
direction of one of the owners, immediately paid yet, where that fact appears from the objecting
by the agent to the other, and the owners after-party's own evidence, is competent evidence of the
date of incorporation.-Schiffer v. Adams, (Colo.)
wards directed the agent to execute a written con-
tract for the land. The purchaser took possession 22 P. 964.
under his contract, and made valuable improve-
ments on the land with the knowledge of the own-
ers. Held, that they were estopped to assert the
agent's want of authority.-Karns v. Olney, (Cal.)
22 P. 57.

3. Where a vendor having a vendor's lien and
the purchaser of such interest at a void execution
sale are fully aware of their rights under the con-
tract, and the vendor knows of the levy on his in-
terest under the lien, and what is intended to be
sold, and is present at the sale, and fails to protest,
but consents to the application of the proceeds to
the satisfaction of the judgment, receives the sur-
plus, and demands the return of the security for
the judgment debt, he is estopped from denying
the validity of the sale.-Fallon v. Worthington,
(Colo.) 22 P. 960.
Evidence.

4. When expenditure on the faith of a license
is relied on as an estoppel, evidence of the facts
constituting such estoppel should be clear, and the
expenditure should not be trivial in amount.-Mc-
Carthy v. Mutual Relief Ass'n, (Cal.) 22 P. 933.

EVIDENCE.

See, also, Deposition; Witness.
In actions for deceit, see Dereit, 2, 8.

for negligence, see Negligence, 6.

on note, see Negotiable Instruments, 12.
to quiet title, see Quieting Title, 15, 16.
to set aside conveyances, see Fraudulent
Conveyances, 7-11.
condemnation proceedings, see Eminent Do-
main, 25-28.

criminal cases, see Arson, 24; Counterfeiting,
4; Embezzlement, 1; Extortion, 2, 3; False
Pretenses, 2; Gaming, 3; Homicide, 21-31;
Incest: Larceny, 6, 7; Perjury; Rape, 1;
Robbery, 2, 3.

particular actions, see Assumpsit, 4; Eject-
ment, 7-10; Trespass. 2.
Objections to, see Trial, 2-5.

Of adverse possession, see Adverse Possession,
6, 7.

agency, see Principal and Agent, 7-11.
marriage, see Marriage, 3-5.
partnership, see Partnership, 2.
Opinion evidence, see Homicide, 18-20.
Proof of paternity, see Descent and Distribution,

1-3.

Opinion evidence.

5. In a trial by the court, the opinion of one
shown to have ordinary knowledge as a farmer and
logger, as to what it would cost to clear land and
prepare it for the plow, is not necessarily improper,
as the court understands the extent of the witness'
knowledge, and can fairly estimate the weight of
his evidence.-Barnum v. Bridges, (Cal.) 22 P. 924.
6. Where one has been engaged in a line of
business for 15 years, is familiar with its details,
and is otherwise competent, there is no abuse of dis-
cretion in allowing him to testify as an expert con-
cerning the value of goods in that particular line.
Smith v. Jensen, (Colo.) 22 P. 434.

7. The opinions of experts on questions of
medical science, though based upon hypothetical
statements, are entitled to the same consideration
as other direct oral testimony, when such state-
ments are found to be real.-Langford v. Jones,
(Or.) 22 P. 1064.

Documents.

8. As the law authorizes the clerk to tax the
costs, his certified statements are the best evi-
dence of the amount thereof, and, as being certified
copies of a part of the record, are admissible under
Code Civil Proc. Colo. § 384.-Thalheimer v. Crow,
(Colo.) 22 P. 779.

9. Where, in an action based on the fraudulent
conversion of property, it is alleged and found that
defendant, before suit brought, had agreed to con-
vey the same to a third person, a deed of the prop
erty, executed after the commencement of the suit,
is admissible to prove the nature of the agreement,
without further pleading. -Schiffer v. Adams,
(Colo.) 22 P. 964.

10. A memorandum given as a bill of sale of a
"4-hors Concord" wagon, executed by the debtor
to plaintiff, is competent evidence on the question
of the sale, by the debtor to plaintiff, of the Con-
cord wagon in dispute.-Bunting v Salz, (Cal.) *

P 1132.

11. A shop-book is admissible in evidence where
the party introducing it testifies that it is his only
that all the items were correct, and were entered
book of original entries; that he kept it himself;
at the time they were severally transacted, except
some outside accounts put in at the close of the
shop account; and there is no objection to the man-
ner in which the book was kept.-White v. Whit-
ney, (Cal.) 22 P. 1138.

12. The certificate attached to a copy of the rec-
ord of a judgment rendered by the supreme court
of New York, attached by the "presiding justice"
of that court, is within Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 195,
providing that a judicial record of a sister state
may be proved by the attestation of the clerk, and
the seal of the court annexed, if there be a clerk
and seal, together with a certificate of the chief
judge or presiding magistrate that the attestation
is in due form.-Bean v. Loryea, (Cal.) 22 P. 513.

13. Defendant agreed to sell certain wood to
plaintiffs, to be delivered at a place mentioned
within a specified time, payment to be made ac-
cording to certain stipulations. Defendant sent
an order to plaintiffs to receive a quantity of wood
from one S. on her contract. Plaintiffs accepted
the order, subject to certain reservations, but, after
S. had placed the wood at the agreed point, plain-
tiffs received an unsigned letter directing them
not to take the wood. Believing that it came from
S., plaintiffs did not take the wood. There was
evidence tending to prove that the letter was