Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

tion shall not issue within six months from the granting of letters testamentary or of administration, without leave of the county court or judge thereof. Section 276 provides that if execution be issued after the death of the judgment debtor, and be against real or personal property, it shall require the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out of any property in the hands of the debtor's personal representatives, heirs, devisees, legatees, tenants of real property, or trustees as such. Held, that a judgment creditor is entitled to have an execution issued on a judgment rendered against a deceased debtor to enforce such judgment against the property of the debtor, or for the delivery of real or personal property.-Bower v. Holladay, (Or.) 22 P. 553.

2. A decree foreclosing a street assessment is a judgment, under the provisions of Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 681, authorizing the issuance of an execution thereon within five years after the judgment is entered.-Dorland v. Hanson, (Cal.) 22 P.

552. Sale.

3. Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 681, requiring execution on a judgment to issue within five years after judgment is entered, applies also to an order of sale.-Dorland v. Hanson, (Cal.) 22 P. 552.

4. A sale of land under execution on a judgment against persons having no title, though in possession, cannot pass the title.-Pekin Mining & Milling Co. v. Kennedy, (Cal.) 22 P. 679.

5. At a constable's sale, March 22, 1884, one who volunteered his assistance to the justice to write out the certificate of sale inserted his own name as purchaser, and the certificate was signed by the constable and recorded. Afterwards the mistake was discovered, and a new certificate was issued to the real purchaser, which recited the sale as taking place July 12th, and which was filed for record July 19th, and the constable executed a deed to the assignee of this certificate. Held, that no title passed to the assignee as against the persons having the right to redeem from the sale, who in the mean time, without notice of the second certificate, had paid the necessary amount, and received a certificate of redemption from the holder of the first certificate.-Pekin Mining & Milling Co. v. Kennedy, (Cal.) 22 P. 679.

[ocr errors]

6. Gen. St. Colo. § 1835, subjecting real estate to execution sale, declares that the term "real estate" includes "all interest of the defendant, or any person to his use, held or claimed by virtue of any deed, bond, covenant, or otherwise for a conveyance, or as a mortgagor. Held, that a vendor, who by contract subsequently releases his trust deed for the purchase price, and merely reserves a lien, has only a chose in action, and no interest in the land which can be made the subject of an execution sale.-Fallon v. Worthington, (Colo.) 22 P.

960.

Distribution of proceeds.

7. A sale of goods to satisfy plaintiff's execution netted $180. A few days afterwards, the goods having been bought for the judgment debtor, the same goods were levied on to satisfy a junior lien, and netted $2,402.50. This amount was insufficient to satisfy the junior lien. Plaintiff was in business but a few doors from the business place of the judgment debtor, and after the first sale the purchaser, who claimed individual ownership, but who really purchased for the debtor, continued the business at the same place. Plaintiff, however, did nothing to secure a new levy. The junior creditors bore all the expense of the second levy and sale, indemnified the sheriff, and contested a replevin suit by the purchaser at the former sale. There was no charge of bad faith or negligence on the part of the sheriff at the first sale, but the amount realized at the second sale represented the real value of the goods. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to have his claim satisfied from the proceeds of the second sale.-Joslin v. Spangler, (Colo.) 22 P. 804. Vacating.

8. Where an order authorizing the issuance of an execution is made by one department of the court below, an order vacating the same may be

[ocr errors]

made by another department of the same court.Dorland v. Hanson, (Cal.) 22 P. 552.

9. Where the court below has, without author

ity, made an order authorizing the issuance of an execution, the same court may, on motion, vacate and set aside said execution or a sale made under it, though the order is appealable.-Dorland v. Hanson, (Cal.) 22 P. 552.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS.

See, also, Descent and Distribution; Wills.
Action by, see Quieting Title, 5.
Sale by, see Powers.

Appointment and removal.

an executor or administrator, within one month 1. Hill's Code Or. § 1112, makes it the duty of from the date of his appointment, or such further time as the court or judge may allow, to file with the clerk an inventory, verified by his own oath, of all the real and personal property of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge; and section 1114 makes it his duty, before the inventory is filed, to cause the property to be appraised at its true cash value by three disinterested persons, and for a failure to discharge these duties he is liable to removal.-In re Holladay's Estate, (Or.) 22 P. 750.

2. County courts are vested with a very large discretionary power over the conduct of executors and administrators, and its exercise will not be interfered with on appeal, unless plainly required by some principle of law.-In re Holladay's Estate, (Or.) 22 P. 750.

*

3. Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 1354, provides that "where a person absent from the state is named executor, ** if there is no other executor, letters of administration with the will annexed must be granted;" and § 1388 empowers the court to examine "on oath the party applying, and any other persons, "as to the value of the property, to determine the penalty of the bond required of an executor. Held, that a non-resident, named as executor in a will, may apply for and receive letters testamentary, and it is unnecessary that he be actually in the state when the order for issuance of the letters is made.-In re Brown's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 233.

4. The fact that an administration has not been completed, though 14 years have elapsed since the appointment of the administrator, is prima facie evidence of neglect of duty on his part, and, in the absence of satisfactory explana tion of the delay, supports a finding that the administrator has wrongfully and willfully neglected the estate, and has unnecessarily, willfully, and wrongfully prolonged its administration, to its great detriment, and justifies his removal, and the revocation of his letters of administration.-In re Moore's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 653. Duties.

5. The duties of an executor or administra tor are active, and not passive. He cannot be permitted to neglect to do those things which are plainly required at his hands by law or the order of the court, and, when complaint is made of such neglect, excuse himself by alleging that such delay or omission was for the benefit of the estate. In re Holladay's Estate, (Or.) 22 P. 750.

6. An executor is not bound by the duties of his office to pay bankers, brokers, and other per sons a bonus above legal interest, to secure a loan of money to redeem property, belonging to the estate of his testator which has been soid under the decree of a court having jurisdiction to order the same, nor is he bound to pledge his own securities or use his own credit secure such loan.-In re Holladay's Estate,, (2 P. 750. Claims against estate.

7. A claim against he estate of a decedent, presented to the personal representative, for services rendered, which gives the number of days' service in each month, the total for each year, and

the grand total for all, with the wages per day,
stating the full amount, and then credits the
amounts received on account during each year,
leaving a certain balance, is sufficient in form.-
Duncan v. Thomas, (Cal.) 22 P. 297.
Settlements and accounting.

money from another, sends him a letter expressing
or implying, or adapted to imply, such threat, is
punishable as though he had actually obtained the
money. Section 950 provides that an information
must contain a statement of the acts constituting
the offense in ordinary and concise language, so
that a person of common understanding may know
8. Executors have no authority to litigate ad-
what is intended. Held, that an information is
verse claims of heirs, legatees, or devisees, and
sufficient which charges that defendant sent a let-
payments to counsel so employed will not be al-
lowed on settlement of the executorial accounts.plied, and was adapted to imply, a threat to impute
ter to a certain person which expressed and im-
In re Jessup's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 260.
disgrace to him, and to expose it; which letter, as
set out, stated that the writer, having found out
all the facts charged against such person in a cer-
tain newspaper, would, for a certain amount, not
only disclose nothing, but prevent discovery by
his antagonists, "should they employ detect-
ive," but on condition that an answer must "come
before night."-People v. Tonielli, (Cal.) 22 P. 678.
Evidence.

9. Though an administrator is not authorized
to carry on his intestate's business, and should not
blend the expenses and disbursements connected
therewith with the legitimate items of his ac-
counts, where he charges himself with the gross
profits of the business, and the court debits him
with the amount thereof, he should be allowed
money paid out in the course of the business.-
In re Rose's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 86.

10. Items of administration expenses less than
$20 in amount, paid by the administrator, accord-
ing to his uncontradicted testimony, should be al-
lowed. In re Rose's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 86.

11. An administrator is entitled to his expenses
incurred while traveling on business of the estate.
-In re Rose's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 86.

12. Neither expenses incurred by the adminis-
trator in procuring the removal of the guardian
of a minor heir, nor money advanced for the heir's
benefit, are proper charges in the settlement of the
administration account, though they may be al-
lowed as credits upon the distributive share of
the heir when a settlement with him is made.-In
re Rose's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 86.

13. An administrator should be allowed counsel
fees and expenses incurred in good faith and un-
der the advice of counsel in resisting appeals by
distributees from orders auditing his accounts.-
In re Rose's Estate, 22 P. 86, 80 Cal. 166.

14. Commissions should not be allowed the ad-
ministrator until the final settlement of his ac-
counts. In re Rose's Estate, (Cal.) 22 P. 86.
Sales under order of court.

15. If notice to the heirs and persons interested
of the time and place at which an application by an
administrator to sell the real estate of the deceased
is not ordered by the probate court, and is not giv-
en to such persons, the sale is void.-Chicago, K.
& N. Ry. Co. v. Cook, (Kan.) 22 P. 988.

the

16. Where a patent to land is issued to the heirs
of a deceased person, such land does not become a
part of the estate of the deceased, and cannot be
sold under an order of the probate court to pay
debts of the decedent. Such sale is a nullity, and
the purchaser at such sale, and those claiming un-
der him, acquire no title to the land. Rogers v.
Clemmans, 26 Kan. 522.-Coulson v. Wing, (Kan.)

22 P. 570.

2. In a prosecution for an attempt to extort
money by means of a threatening letter the ad-
mission in evidence of the people's translation of
a newspaper article referred to in the letter was
not prejudicial error, as it tended to explain de-
fendant's motive and object, and as he himself in-
troduced the same article translated with but im-
material variance.-People v. Tonielli, (Cal.) 22 P.
678.

contains the word "another" between "employ"
3. Though the letter introduced in evidence
and "detective," the variance is immaterial.-Peo-
ple v. Tonielli, (Cal.) 22 P. 678.

FACTORS AND BROKERS.
Construction of contract.

1. After agreeing to sell land belonging to
plaintiff for $12,000 within one year, defendant
agreed to account "for the proceeds of sale of said
premises whenever, prior to the expiration of said
twelve months, he may effect a sale of said prem-
ises.' Held, that this was not an agreement to
pay only on condition that a sale was made, but
was an absolute promise to pay within the year,
and to pay before the end of the year, if a sale
should be sooner effected.-Dunn v. Mackey, (Cal.)
22 P. 64.

Lien.

a certain net price, the excess to be divided equally
2. Defendant agreed to sell plaintiff's wine at
between them. After receiving a part, and mak-
ing advances to plaintiff, and paying freight, under
the agreement between them, defendant refused
to receive any more; and, before any of the wine
had been sold, plaintiff demanded a return of that
which defendant had received, without offering to
pay back the money which defendant had advanced
and expended for freight. Held, that under Civil
17. The head of a family made entry upon pub- Code Cal. §§ 2026, 3051, 3053, defining a factor, and
lic land, and died before final proof. After her giving him a lien on the property placed in his
death her administrator advanced the money and hands for money advanced and expended, defend-
paid the government for the land, and obtained a ant was a factor, and had a lien on the wine, and a
patent to it for her heirs. Subsequently he ob- right to retain it, so that his refusal to comply
tained an order from the probate court to sell the with the demand did not constitute a conversion.
land to repay him. Held, that the money so ad--Lehmann v. Schmidt, (Cal.) 22 P. 973.
vanced was not a lien upon the land, and that no
title thereto passed by a sale under such order.
Black v. Dressell's Heirs, 20 Kan. 153.-Coulson v.
Wing, (Kan.) 22 P. 570.

[blocks in formation]

Liability of brokers.

He

3. Plaintiff agreed to purchase of defendants,
real-estate agents, certain land, which they in-
formed him they were selling for the owners.
paid defendants $300 of the purchase price, and
they remitted the same to the owners. Subse-
quently plaintiff notified one of the owners that he
would not complete the purchase because of delay
in executing the deed. The owner said he did not
care whether the sale was made or not, and there-
upon paid the $300 back to defendants, telling
plaintiff to settle with them. Defendants refused
to return the money to plaintiff, claiming that he
had forfeited it. In an action to recover it, held,
that if any one was liable to plaintiff it was the
owners, and not defendants.-Bogart v. Crosby,
(Cal.) 22 P. 84.

4. Plaintiff can take nothing by the fact that
defendants' appointment as agents to sell the land

was verbal. The receipt of the $300 by the owners
would estop them to deny the agency.-Bogart v.
Crosby, (Cal.) 22 P. 84.
Commissions.

5. The owners of land cannot escape paying
their agents commissions for the sale of land for
the reason that they sold for a sum less than the
price given their agents to sell, where the reduc-
tion is made of their own accord, and to escape
payment of the commissions, and the agents were
the means of bringing the owners and purchaser
together, and the sale resulted therefrom.-Plant
v. Thompson, (Kan.) 22 P. 726.

FALSE PRETENSES.

See, also, Deceit; Fraud; Fraudulent Convey-

ances.

Information.

1. An information charging that defendant
"knowingly and designedly, by false and fraudu-
lent representations and pretenses, defrauded " one
T. of certain property, describing it, but which al-
leges none of the facts constituting the fraud, is
insufficient, as Pen. Code Cal. § 952, subd. 3, pro-
vides that an indictment must be direct and cer-
tain as to "the particular circumstances of the of-
fense charged, when they are necessary to consti-
tute a complete offense."-People v. McKenna,
(Cal.) 22 P. 488.
Evidence.

2. A firm of which the defendant was a mem-

regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.
Held, that this provision does not authorize county
supervisors to put a prisoner to hard labor where
his imprisonment is for the purpose of collecting a
fine, because to do so would be to add to the judg
ment of the court.-In re Fil Ki, (Cal.) 22 P. 146.
4. A contempt of court, though a quasi crimi-
nal offense, is tried summarily by the court, and
without the right of jury, and is not a misdemeanor
within the meaning of St. Cal. 1889, p. 239, § 30,
which authorizes the board of supervisors to re-
quire a prisoner confined in the county jail for a
misdemeanor to be put to work.-In re Fil Ki,
(Cal.) 22 P. 146.

5. Prisoners unlawfully put to work at hard
labor on the streets, and discharged from such un-
lawful imprisonment by habeas corpus, are not
discharged from the custody of the sheriff, or from
lawful imprisonment in the county jail-In re Fil
Ki, (Cal.) 22 P. 146

FIXTURES.

As between mortgagor and mortgagee, see Mort-
gages, 8-11.

What constitutes.

Under Civil Code Cal. §§ 658, 660, providing
that real property embraces land and that which is
affixed thereto, and that a thing is deemed to be
affixed to land when it is permanently attached,
"as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or
screws," soap-kettles, candle-machines, a gun-met-
al digester, and a boiler, which are permanently
attached to the realty by bolts, and to each other
by pipes, and which are placed in a building to be
used in manufacturing, are fixtures.-Lavenson v.
Standard Soap Co., (Ĉal.) 22 P. 184.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DE-
TAINER.

ber kept about 390 steers during the summer, and
part of the fall of 1887, in the Indian Territory. On
the 20th of November 202 head of them were sold,
with defendant's knowledge. On the 9th day of
December he executed a bill of sale for 383 head
as being at "Hayden's ranch on Lightning creek,
Indian Territory," and stated then that a few of
them might have died, and the others might be
scattered, but that there were at least 383 in the
Indian Territory. Relying upon this statement,
the purchaser paid $2,000 in cash to a bank, to liq-
uidate the indebtedness of the firm to which the tention is certified to the district court from a jus
1. Where an action of forcible entry and de-
defendant belonged. Held, that the evidence was
tice of the peace on the claim that the title to land
sufficient to sustain a verdict against the defend-is in dispute, it is error to dismiss the action on a
ant of guilty of obtaining money under false pre- motion, because the title to the premises in con-
tenses.-State v. Jackson, (Kan.) 22 P. 619.
troversy is still in the government.-Lyman v.
Todd, (Kan.) 22 P. 1003.

Collection.

FINES.

Jurisdiction.

Stay of proceedings.

2. Under Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 1176, provid-
ing that in actions of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer "an appeal taken by defendant shall not
stay proceedings upon the judgment, unless the
before whom the same was ren-
judge *
dered so directs," after the trial judge has direct-
ed a stay, and a bond has been given in the amount
fixed by him, he cannot withdraw his direction,
and discharge the order.-Lee Chuck v. Quan Wo
Chong Co., (Cal.) 22 P. 594.

1. Comp. St. Mont. div. 1, § 318, requires the
sheriff to satisfy a judgment imposing a fine or
costs upon a defendant in a criminal prosecution
out of the real property belonging to defendant on
the day when the judgment is docketed, or at any
time thereafter. Section 464, div. 3, provides that
nothing in the statute shall prohibit the issuing of
execution, and the enforcing the collection thereof
out of any other property of defendant than that
enumerated. Held that, where defendant conveys
the land after arrest, but before the judgment is
docketed, an execution is not the only method of
enforcing the judgment; but an action may be See Chattel Mortgages, 6–10; Mortgages, 12–16.
brought against the grantee to sell the land.-Sil-
ver Bow County v. Strombaugh, (Mont.) 22 P. 453.

Hard labor.

2. Pen. Code Cal. § 1446, provides that a judg-
ment that defendant pay a fine may also direct
that he be imprisoned till the fine be satisfied, at
the rate of a day's imprisonment for each dollar of
the fine. Defendants, being adjudged guilty of
contempt of court, were fined $500 each, and the
judgment directed that in default of payment they
be confined in the county jail at the rate of a dollar
a day each till the fines were paid. Held, that the
prisoners could not be put to hard labor on the
streets or elsewhere, as the imprisonment author-
ized by the judgment was intended as a means of
collecting the fine, and not as a punishment.-In
re Fil Ki, (Cal.) 22 P. 146.

3. Const. Cal. art. 11, § 11, provides that any
county, city, or town may make and enforce within
its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other

Foreclosure.

Former Jeopardy.

See Criminal Law, 6-11.

FRAUD.

See, also, Deceit; False Pretenses; Fraudulent
Conveyances.

At elections, see Elections and Voters, 9.
Relief.

Defendant, a broker, sold to plaintiff, for P.,
lot 5, for the sum of $2,400, informing her, when
offering it, that it was the same property he had
sold for B. to P. for $1,800, but concealing from
her the fact that lot 5 did not embrace all the prop-
erty he sold to P. for said sum, and also concealing
from her the fact that, in consideration of his sell-
ing lot 5 to her for $2,400, P. was to give him the

balance of the property which he had bought from B., and which was worth $600. At the time of the sale to plaintiff, lot 5 was worth $2,400. The usual commission for a sale of that amount was $100. The court having found that he occupied a position of trust towards plaintiff, decreed that defendant pay plaintiff $2,400 on the conveyance to him by her of lot 5. Held error, as it did not appear that she had been deceived as to the quantity or quality of the land, and, besides, defendant had never agreed to purchase lot 5, nor had he received the $2,400. Baker v. Brown, (Cal.) 22 P. 879.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. Parol lease, see Landlord and Tenant, 3. Promise to answer for debt of another. 1. In an action for goods sold and delivered, and money advanced to defendant on his alleged promise to pay for them, where the evidence shows that the goods were delivered and the money advanced to another, and so charged by plaintiffs, the defendant cannot be held as an original contractor, he being, at most, but a guarantor.-Har ris v. Frank, (Cal.) 22 P. 856.

2. The verbal guaranty of defendant, of the payment for goods furnished to another, was within the statute of frauds; Civil Code Cal. $ 1624, providing that a contract to answer for the debt of another is void, where the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is not in writing, and signed by the party, unless within certain exceptions named in section 2794, which are not applicable to defendant's promise.-Harris v. Frank, (Cal.) 22

P. 856.

Agreements relating to land.

3. A parol agreement to convey land, and full payment of the purchase price, will not operate to pass the title thereto, where no possession of the land is taken under the agreement, and no memoranda thereof is in writing.-Goddard v. Donaha, (Kan.) 22 P. 708.

4. Plaintiff, an old man, owned a lot of ground, and entered into a verbal agreement with defend ant that if the latter would erect a house on the ground, pay half the taxes, etc., and take care of plaintiff, he might occupy said house during the natural life of plaintiff. Defendant complied with the terms of the agreement. Held, that part performance of the contract by defendant took the verbal agreement out of the statute of frauds, and defendant acquired a life-estate in the property.Manning v. Franklin, (Cal.) 22 P. 550.

5. In an action for breach of contract to sell land, on failure to prove a written agreement, evidence to show an oral agreement was properly excluded, as such agreement, if made, was void under the statute of frauds.-Wristen v. Bowles, (Cal.) 22 P. 1136.

Pleading.

6. Where plaintiff relied upon a verbal contract of guaranty, but the declaration contained only the common counts, a contract of guaranty not being pleaded, defendant was not required to plead the statute of frauds, but had a right to avail himself of it under his general denial.- Harris v. Frank, (Cal.) 22 P. 856.

FRAUDULENT CONVEY

ANCES.

What constitutes.

1. Where the grantor of a trust-deed and the beneficiary agree that the deed is not to be recorded as provided by law, that it may not affect the financial standing of the grantor, and such fraudulent agreement is carried out by concealing the existence of the trust-deed, and also by represent ing the credit of the grantor as good, when the parties must have known it was at best doubtful, whereby the grantor is enabled to obtain credit from those who are misled by such representations, the evidence of fraud is conclusive.-StockGrowers' Bank v. Newton, (Colo.) 22 P. 444.

[blocks in formation]

2. It appeared that plaintiff had recovered a chased some land, which she caused to be conveyed, judgment against defendant L.; that L. had purafter the judgment, to one G.; that G., some months thereafter, conveyed the property to defendant B., who was a non-resident and the sister of L., for the same price, though valuable improvements had been made thereon; that L. remained in possession of the property the whole time, was financially embarrassed, and had no other property out of which a judgment could be made. Held, that the evidence supported a finding that the conveyances were fraudulent.-La Fitte v. Rups, (Colo.) 22 P. 309.

3. An answer seeking to avoid a transfer to plaintiff, as in fraud of creditors, alleged that the purpose was to defraud, etc., but failed to state any facts showing fraud, except that the sale was not accompanied by immediate delivery, nor followed by actual or continued change of possession, and in this the finding was against the answer. It did not allege that no consideration passed, or that there was no other property of the debtor with which to satisfy his debts, and the only allegation tending to show knowledge on the part of plaintiff that the conveyance was to defraud creditors was The finding was that the conveyance was made by that plaintiff knew that his grantor was insolvent. both parties thereto to defraud creditors of the grantor, and that the sale involved all the property of the debtor. Held, that the answer and findings were insufficient to show a fraudulent conveyance.-Albertoli v. Branham, (Cal.) 22 P. 404.

Judgment by confession.

4. In an action to set aside a judgment by concreditor and debtor were brothers, and that the latfession for fraud it appeared that the judgment and was unable to pay his debts. To secure his ter owed the former, and was also owing plaintiff, brother he had signed a confession of judgment some time before the judgment in question, but it had been agreed between the brothers that the judgment should not be entered of record lest it might injure the debtor's credit, and that he should keep his brother's attorney informed of his affairs, so that any movement by the other creditors to seize the property might be anticipated. With this understanding the debtor borrowed from his brother $1,500 more. He also obtained credit from plaintiff by representing that his brother had no security, and would not press him. On the day the debtor confessed judgment the last time plainsubsequent to the levy of an execution to satisfy tiff sued in attachment, but the writ was levied the confessed judgment. Held, that a finding by the court that the debtor was insolvent at the time judgment was confessed, and that the judgment was void as against plaintiff, would not be disturbed.-Walton v. First Nat. Bank, (Colo.) 22 P.

440.

Gift.

5. A husband, when perfectly solvent, made a gift of personal property to his wife, who duly accepted it. After delivery the husband at all times represented that the property was the separate property of the wife, and whenever it was loaned to others it was by the direction and consent of the wife, and not of the husband. The latter, however, continued to use the property as before, and there was nothing in its use by the wife that was inconsistent with ownership by the husband, or from which the public could de termine that the title had passed to the wife. The husband afterwards left the state, and the property was for a while in litigation, and in the hands of the sheriff, but otherwise the wife had the exclusive possession and use thereof. Held, that there was an "immediate delivery, followed by an actual and continued change of possession, within Civil Code Cal. § 3440, which makes every other transfer of personal property made by a person having possession and control fraudulent as to his creditors, and the successors in interest of such creditors, etc.-Morgan v. Ball, (Cal.) 22 P. 331.

[blocks in formation]

7. In an action to set aside a conveyance on the
ground of fraud, declarations by one defendant
showing fraud on his part are admissible as against
him, though not made in the presence of his co-
defendants.-La Fitte v. Rups, (Colo.) 22 P. 309.

8. Where it appears that the written confes-
sion of a judgment was kept secret by the parties
thereto, lest the debtor's credit might be injured,
any representations thereafter made by the debtor
to obtain credit from others are admissible in an
action against the judgment creditor to set aside
the judgment for fraud, under the rule that repre-
sentations made by one are binding on others with
whom he is in collusion.-Walton v. First Nat.
Bank. (Colo.) 22 P. 440.

9. The payment of taxes on land by one in pos-
session, who was also the owner of an undivided
half interest therein, is not evidence of the bona
fides of the deed from his co-tenant for the other
half, under which he holds.-Traverso v. Tate,
(Cal.) 22 P. 1082.

10. In replevin brought against an attaching
officer by one claiming to have purchased the prop-
erty attached from the debtor, for the purpose of
showing fraud on the part of plaintiff, the attach-
ing officer offered to prove by the debtor a report
which the latter made privately to his wife of a
conversation between himself and plaintiff at the
time of the sale. Held, that the testimony was
inadmissible, for, though it might prove fraud on
the part of the debtor and wife, it was only hear
say as to the intent of plaintiff.-Smith v. Jensen,
(Colo.) 22 P. 434.

11. G. was carrying on business in the name of
his wife, and, one creditor having demanded pay-
ment of his debt, G. applied on Saturday to B., an-
other creditor, for indorsement. The latter took
the matter under advisement till Monday, but on
Sunday he arranged with G. and wife to give him
a bill of sale and possession of their goods. Nego-
tiations were closed on Monday, B. giving a check
to the wife for the price, which was immediately
indorsed and returned. The invoice showed goods

state that the game was "played for money, checks,
credit, or any other representative of value."
People v. Carroll, (Cal.) 22 P. 129.
Evidence.

3. One witness cannot describe the game and
another testify that, from the description, the game
was a banking game or any other, but a person
who knows the game may testify in general terms
what the game he witnessed was; if not familiar
with the game he may describe it, and the court
should instruct the jury as to what constitutes the
game charged to have been played or conducted,
leaving it for them to determine whether the game
played was the one charged or not.-People v. Car-
roll, 22 P. 129, 80 Cal. 153.
Instructions.

4. The question whether the game played was
a banking game or not was one of law for the court,
and as the court should have charged as to the
meaning of the term "banking game" it was not
error to permit a witness to define the term and
then instruct the jury that it was a matter of fact
for them to determine whether the game in ques-
tion came within the term.-People v. Carroll,
(Cal.) 22 P. 129.

Gifts.

[blocks in formation]

Issuance.

HABEAS CORPUS.

Gen. St. Colo. c. 49, § 20, provides that the
county court shall not issue writs of habeas cor-
pus when there shall be a term of the supreme or
district court within the county within 30 days
from the time of application for said writ. Held,
that in computing the time between the applica
tion to the county court for a writ of habeas cor-
pus and the sitting of the district court, the day
on which the application is made should be ex-
cluded.-Evans v. Bowers, (Colo.) 22 P. 812.

[blocks in formation]

Prescription.

of about twice the value of B.'s debt, and other
1. Pol. Code Cal. § 2631, provides that, "by tak
suspicious circumstances were connected with the
transaction; but the debt was justly owing. The ing or accepting land for a highway, the public ac
goods consisted of a broken stock. A second inquire only a right of way, and the incidents neces-
voice greatly reduced their valuation, and the con-
duct of B., after obtaining possession, was consist-
ent with his declarations that his object was to se-
cure his debt, and not to assist G. and wife in de-
frauding other creditors. Held, that the burden
of proof was on the attaching creditor to show
fraud, not only on the part of G. and wife, but also
on the part of B., in collusion with them, and that
the evidence was insufficient for that purpose.
Smith v. Jensen, (Colo.) 22 P. 434.

Indictment.

GAMING.

1. An indictment for a violation of Pen. Code
Cal. 330, need not state the name of the game or
of the device by which it is played, and where
games may be known under different names the
inclusion of such under the name "banking game"
does not render the statute so indefinite as to be
inoperative.-People v. Carroll, (Cal.) 22 P. 129.

sary to enjoying and maintaining the same, subject
to the regulations in this and the Civil Code provid-
ed." Civil Code, § 806, provides that "the extent of
a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant,
or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was ac-
quired," and is extinguished, when acquired by
enjoyment, by disuse" for the period prescribed for
Held that, where
acquiring title by enjoyment."
the public have acquired a right to use a highway
by five years' user, as prescribed by statute, non-
user for less than that period will not create an
abandonment by operation of law.-Rose v. Bott-
yer, (Cal.) 22 P. 393.

2. Under Act Cong. 1866, (Rev. St. U. S. §
2477,) granting the right of way for the construc-
tion of highways over public land, it is immaterial.
on the question of the right of the public to use a
highway, that the land over which such right of
way was acquired was at that time, and at the
time the use ceased, public lands of the United
States-Rose v. Bottver, (Cal.) 22 P. 393.

3. Pol. Code Cal. 1873, $ 2619, provides that
2. Pen. Code Cal. 330, provides that every "all roads used as such for a period of five years are
person who carries on and conducts any banking highways." Plaintiff's evidence, which conflicted
or percentage game, "played for money, checks, with defendants', showed that he had kept the
credit, or any other representative of value, is locus fenced for over 20 years prior to defendants'
punishable," etc. Held, that an information that trespass; that for 6 or 7 years prior thereto he had
defendant did "willfully and unlawfully open, maintained locked gates there, and had permitted
carry on, and conduct for money a certain banking no travel over the road without his consent; and
game, **to-wit, a wheel marked with num- that for over 20 years there had been an inclosure
bers and colors,
* commonly known as a
of part of the road, and bars across it, on the op-
'Wheel of Fortune,' " etc., charges no offense un-posite side of his land. Held, that a finding that
der said section, or any other in that it fails to the road had not become a highway under the

[ocr errors]

*

« ZurückWeiter »