ing of the will, is inadmissible in a proceeding to construe the will. 3. After the homestead has been set apart to the widow, the court has no jurisdiction over it for the purpose of distribution. Commissioners' decision. Department 2. Appeal from superior court, Alameda county; JOHN ELLSWORTH, Judge. Appeal by certain legatees (children of Robert Gilmore, the deceased) from a decree of distribution giving to the widow of decedent three-fourths of an estate, under a will directing that she take one-half of all the property of which the testator should die possessed. F. B. Ogden, for appellants. Nye & Richardson, for respondent. (2) no power to dispose by will, of his wife's VAN CLIEF, C. Appeal from decree of dis-munity, immediately upon his death, is not tribution under the following provisions of to be readily inferred, especially where, as the will: "Thirdly. I give and bequeath here, the words employed by the testator to my wife, Elizabeth Gilmore, one-half of may have their fair and natural import by all my property, both real and personal, applying them only to that moiety of which of which I shall be possessed at the time of he had, by law, the testamentary disposimy death, the same to be equitably divided tion." The devise in this case is "of all my by my executors, giving to her the privi- property of which I may die possessed," and lege of taking her half of said real and per- not of any specific property. The devise to sonal property, if the same can be satisfac- the wife is not inconsistent with the other torily divided; if not, then the said execu-devises to the daughter and grandchildren. tors shall sell the same, or such portion as All the "words employed by the testator cannot be so divided, and give to my said may have their fair and natural import by wife one-half the net proceeds of the same. applying them only to that moiety of which Fourthly. I give and bequeath the remain- he had, by law, the testamentary disposiing half of all my property, both real and tion;" and there is nothing in the circumpersonal, of which I may die possessed, to stances under which the will was made, the following persons, to be divided by my substantially tending to rebut the preexecutors equitably between them, and each sumptions above stated. It is only where of them, share and share alike." The per- there is such a clear manifestation of intent sons named, who are to take under this to devise the whole community property fourth paragraph, are his daughter by a as to overcome those presumptions that former marriage, and her children, and the the wife can be put to her election either to children of a deceased daughter by the for- take under the will, or to take what she is mer marriage. All the property affected by entitled to by law. Morrison v. Bowman, the will was community property of the tes- 29 Cal. 347: Noe v. Splivalo, 54 Cal. 207; Estator and his wife, Elizabeth; and the court tate of Stewart, 74 Cal. 98,15 Pac. Rep. 445. below construed the will as giving to the But, where there is no such manifest intent, widow, in addition to one-half of the com- the wife may claim and take both what munity property to which she was entitled the law gives her in the community propby law, an undivided one-half of the resi-erty, and also what is given her by the will due that was subject to the testamentary disposition of the husband. Was this in accordance with the expressed intention of the testator? is the principal question to be decided. of her husband in that portion thereof subject to his testamentary disposition. Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252: Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 301; Estate of Silvey, 42 Cal. 210; King v. Lagrange, 50 Cal. 331; Estate of Frey, 52 Cal. 658. Under the circumstances of this case, the court did not err in excluding evidence of what the testator said, just before his death, to his executor, as to what was intended by his will, and who wrote it. Civil Code, § 1318. The declarations sought to be proved were made five years after the date of the will, and therefore constituted It will be observed that the will does not specifically describe any property, but simply gives to the wife "one-half of all my property, both real and personal, of which I shall be possessed at the time of my death." Conceding that the will is susceptible of two possible constructions,-one, that the testator intended to devise all property of which he should be possessed at the last moment of life, including the no part of the res gestæ. Nelson v. Mcwhole of the community property over Clanahan, 55 Cal. 308; Estate of Garraud. which he had the power of disposition dur-35 Cal. 336. ing life; and the other, that he intended to devise only his property then in his possession, over which alone he had the power of testamentary disposition, still, well-settled rules of construction and presumptions of law require the adoption of the latter construction, which accords with the decree of the lower court. (1) The testator must be presumed to have known the law applicable to the disposition of property by will, and, therefore, to have known that he had The order setting apart the homestead to the widow relieved it from administration, and excluded it from distribution, (Estate of Hardwick, 59 Cal. 292,) but it did not affect the title to the homestead, (Herrold v. Reen, 58 Cal. 443; Watson v. His Creditors, Id. 556; Estate of Burton, 63 Cal. 36.) Under the provisions of the Codes, it is only a homestead selected from the community property, during the existence of the coumunity, to which the law of title by survi We concur: BELCHER, C. C.; FOOTE, C. PER CURIAM. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the decree is affirmed. vorship applies, (Civil Code, § 1265, and Code | tempt having been made to file such bond, Civil Proc. § 1474;) and therefore, upon the the one approved by the chief justice, and death of the husband, in this case, the com- filed in this court, could not be effective. munity property vested according to sec- An appeal is taken by serving and filing a tion 1402 of the Civil Code, regulating the notice of appeal within the time prescribed succession to such community property, by law. But the appeal is ineffectual for subject, however, to its temporary use as any purpose, unless within five days after a homestead by the family of the widow, service of the notice of appeal an undertakunder an order of the probate court set-ing be filed, or a deposit of money be made, ting it apart for that purpose, (Code Civil or the undertaking be waived by the adProc. § 1465.) But, after having been thus verse party in writing. Code Civil Proc. set apart, the court had no jurisdiction § 940. The giving of the undertaking is over it for any purpose of distribution; necessary to confer jurisdiction on this and therefore there is no apparent error in court, and must be given within the time the decree in respect to the homestead. I prescribed by the Code. But section 954 of think the decree should be affirmed. the Code provides: "If the appellant fails to furnish the requisite papers, the appeal may be dismissed; but no appeal can be dismissed for insufficiency of the undertaking thereon, if a good and sufficient undertaking, approved by a justice of the supreme court, be filed in the supreme court before the hearing upon motion to dismiss the appeal." This section does not authorize the giving of an undertaking in this court in the first instance; but, when an inbelow, the defect may be remedied by filing sufficient one has been given in the court a new undertaking here. The giving of the new bond is in the nature of an amendment to a defective proceeding. In this case no bond was given on the appeal from the order denying a new trial, nor was there any attempt to do so. For these reasons the bond approved and filed in this court was ineffectual for any purpose, and the appeal must be dismissed. No amendment of the undertaking could be allowed, because none had been given, and there was nothing to aniend. The precise question has been decided by this court in a case in which leave 2. The rendition of a judgment is its announcewas asked to file an undertaking here. The ment by the court, and not its entry in the judg-court said "The section referred to [secment book, within Code Civil Proc. § 939, providing that "an exception to the decision or verdict on the ground that it is not supported by the evidence cannot be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment, unless the appeal is taken within sixty days after the rendition of the judgment." SCHURTZ V. ROMER et al. (No. 13,311.) (Supreme Court of California. Nov. 22, 1889.) APPEAL-BOND-RENDITION OF JUDGMENT. 1. Code Civil Proc. Cal. § 954, provides that, if an appellant fails to furnish the requisite papers, the appeal may be dismissed, but no appeal can be dismissed for insufficiency of the undertaking thereon, if a good and sufficient undertaking, approved by a justice of a supreme court, be filed in the supreme court before the hearing on motion to dismiss. On an appeal from a judgment and order denying a new trial, the appeal-bond specified the judgment alone. After the time allowed by statute for giving the bond in the court a quo, he filed in the supreme court a bond on appeal from the order, approved by the chief justice. Held, that the statute only authorizes a new bond when the one filed is insufficient, and that the appeal from the order should be dismissed. Following Associates v. Wilkins, 12 Pac. Rep. 799. Department 1. Appeal from superior court, Los Angeles county, WILLIAM P. WADE, Judge. tion 954] does not authorize it. It only authorizes a new undertaking when the one filed is insufficient. But in this case there has really been none filed. To allow new ones to be filed would be, in effect, to permit a new appeal to be perfected after the time fixed by law Associates v. Wilkins, 71 Cal. 626, 12 Pac. Rep. 799. See, also, Berniaud v. Beecher, 74 Cal. 617, 16 Pac. Rep. 510; Wood v. Pendola, 77 Cal. 82, 19 Pac. Rep. 183. Action by Joseph Schurtz against Max Romer and F. Kerkow. Judgment was for plaintiff; and from the judgment, and an The appellant contends that, as his aporder denying a new trial, defendant Ker-peal from the judgment was taken within kow appeals. Gottschalk & Luckell, for appellant. Wells, Guthrie & Lee, for respondent. 60 days after the entry of judgment, the statement on motion for a new trial may be looked to for the purpose of determining whether or not the decision is supported WORKS, J. The appellant, Kerkow, gave by the evidence. The Code provides: "But notice of an appeal from the judgment, and an exception to the decision or verdict on from the order denying him a new trial. the ground that it is not supported by the He gave an undertaking on appeal from evidence cannot be reviewed on an appeal the judgment alone. No reference was from the judgment, unless the appeal is made in the undertaking to the order de- taken within sixty days after the rendition nying the new trial, or the appeal there- of the judgment." Code Civil Proc. § 939, from. After the time provided by law for subd. 1. It has been held by this court giving the undertaking on appeal in the that there is a material difference between court below, the said appellant applied to the rendition and the entry of a judgment. the chief justice to approve an undertaking A judgment is rendered when it is anto be filed in this court. The undertaking nounced by the court. It is entered when was approved by the chief justice, and sub-it is actually entered in the judgment book. sequently filed with the clerk of this court. Gray v. Palmer, 28 Cal. 416; McLaughlin v. The respondent moves to dismiss the ap- Doherty, 54 Cal. 519; Estate of Cook, 77 peal on the ground that no bond was filed Cal. 220, 17 Pac. Rep. 923, and 19 Pac. Rep. in time in the court below; and, no at-431. This appeal was taken within 60 days v.22r.no.20-42 after the entry of the judgment, but not | owner of, and in the possession of, that cerwithin 60 days after its rendition. For tain piece or parcel of land situate, lying, that reason we are precluded, by the ex- and being in said city and county of San press language of the statute, from consid- Francisco," (describing the lot.) 'And the ering the question whether the decision is plaintiff further avers that the said defendsupported by the evidence. It is contended ant claims an interest therein adverse to that, under the earlier statutory provis- the plaintiff, and that the claim of said deions limiting the time for taking appeals, fendant is without any right whatever, the time commenced to run from the rendi- and that the said defendant has not any tion of the judgment, and not from its en-estate, right, title, or interest whatever in try, and that the Code has been so amend- said land or premises, or any part thereof.” ed as to make the time commence to run at The second count, for another lot in the the latter date, and that, as the appeal city of San Francisco, is in the same form. cannot be taken until after the entry of the The prayer, in substance, is that defendant judgment, that part of the section we are be required to set forth the nature of her considering should be so construed as to several claims; that all her adverse claims make it relate to the same time. But we be determined; that it be adjudged that know of no reason or any rule of law that plaintiff is the owner of the lots, and that would warrant us in changing one portion the defendant has no estate or interest of the Code by judicial construction because therein; and that defendant be enjoined the legislature has changed another by from asserting any claim thereto adverse law. Besides, there is no apparent reason to the plaintiff. This complaint, not being why the limitation of the right to use the verified, was answered (1) by a denial of statement for the purpose named should each and every allegation of both counts; not be enforced under the present provisions and (2) by the affirmative allegations of the Code, as well as under the former" that the defendant is the owner in fee of provision. The party appealing can secure the real property described, as trustee of the right to use the statement by prosecut-an express trust respecting the same, and ing his appeal from the judgment within that the plaintiff herein is the beneficiary of the time fixed. If he fails in this, he is not said trust." The court found, generally, without his remedy. He still has his mo- that all the allegations in plaintiff's comtion for a new trial, which, if properly plaint are true, and that all the allegations prosecuted, furnishes him the same reme-in the defendant's answer are untrue; and dy. The evil of our system of practice is specially found that the defendant was not, that it gives too many remedies; and at- at the commencement of the action, the torneys, by hesitating which one to pursue, owner in fee of the lots, or any part therefrequently lose them all. This is one of the of, as trustee of an express trust, or othmany cases in which this has occurred. erwise; and that the plaintiff is not, and For the reasons stated we cannot look into has not been since the 13th day of January, the evidence to see whether or not it sup- 1884, the beneficiary of any trust concerning ports the decision. or relating to said property, or of any part thereof. As a conclusion of law, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as prayed for in the complaint, and judgment was so rendered. Defendant appeals from the judgment, and from an or der denying her motion for new trial, and relies wholly upon the point that the findings of fact are not justified by the evidence. The only other point urged in the appellant's brief is that the findings do not support the judgment. We have carefully examined the findings, and hold them to be entirely sufficient, and that they support the judgment rendered. Appeal from order denying new trial dismissed, and judgment affirmed. We concur: PATERSON, J.; Fox, J. HARRIGAN V. MOWRY. (No. 11,815.) (Supreme Court of California. Nov. 22, 1889.) ACTION TO QUIET TITLE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVI DENCE. 1. Where plaintiff conveys land to defendant in trust for herself, which defendant is to reconvey at the end of five years, the fact that, at the expiration of that time, plaintiff is in possession of the land does not authorize a finding that the legal title is in her. 2. An action to quiet title does not lie under Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 738, where defendant claims no adverse title to plaintiff. Commissioners' decision. Department 1. VAN CLIEF, C. Action to quiet title. The amended complaint, in two counts, and in the most general forms, (filed July 28, 1885,) alleges "that the plaintiff above named is now, and has been for a long time past, the There was no substantial conflict in the evidence. It was proved by the plaintiff that on the 13th day of January, 1879, the estate of Eliza Haskell, deceased, was in process of administration in the probate court of the city and county of San Francisco, and consisted of real and personal property; that John L. Haskell the stepof the estate; and that plaintiff, as the father of the plaintiff-was administrator daughter and heir of the deceased, was entitled to an undivided one-third part of the estate. Under these circumstances, and on that day, (January 13, 1879,) the plaintiff executed a deed to John L. Haskell and the defendant, by which she granted and conveyed to them, for the consideration of one dollar, all her interest, it being an undivided one-third part, "of all the property, real, personal, and mixed, belonging to the estate of Eliza Haskell, deceased, and situated in said eity and county," (and for a more particular description referring to county records, and to the apers on file in the probate court,) with all appurtenances, together with all her claims, demands, and interest in and to the estate of Eliza Haskell, deceased;" to have and to hold, 铃 * * * * ** all and singular, the said herein before de-of exercising control over this property scribed premises and property and estate, since the 13th of January, 1884? Answer. * * for the uses and purposes herein- Oh, I have been in to see that the place was after mentioned, for the benefit of the party rented, and to see that repairs were made. of the first part, # namely, to take My father would tell me that such and such charge of, manage, lease, and preserve, and repairs were to be made, and I would go to take and receive the rents, issues, profits, and see if the work was really wanted. increase, and income of, said estate, prop-Cross-Examined. Q. What change was erty, and premises, and out of the same to made on the 13th of January, 1884? Did keep and preserve said property, premises, you not receive the rents and profits before and estate in good order and repair, prop-that? A. Well, I used to receive about so erly insured and preserved, and to pay all much a month before that time. Q. Who taxes, assessments, and liens imposed there- received the rents before the 13th of Januon, and to pay the residue of such rents, ary, 1884? A. My father, that is, my stepprofits, increase, and revenue, as and for father, J. L. Haskell. Q. Did he receive the her separate estate, to the said party of the rents of the property after that time, and first part for and during the term pay them over to you? A. He did for a of five years, and at the end of said term to while,-two or three months, or so. Q. reconvey to said party of the first part Now, who actually collects the rents? A. the property, premises, and estate Madison & Burke. Q. Didn't Madison & herein granted. The parties of the Burke always collect the rents before the second part shall have no right to execute 13th of January, 1884? A. Yes, sir. Q. any conveyance or deed of, or to create any Then no change was made on the 13th of lien upon, the estate and interest of the January, 1884, except that you received the said party of the first part without her whole of the rents and profits? A. Yes, written consent. And it is further sir. By the Court. Have you made a deunderstood and agreed that said parties of mand on Mrs. Mowry for a deed? A. Yes, the second part will pay over to the party sir; I have. Cross-Examination Resumed. of the first part the rents, issues, and prof- Q. Did you ever make any demand on Mrs. its due her monthly, so far as the same Mowry personally? A. No, sir; not permay be practicable. That from sonally. Q. At the 13th of January, 1884, time to time, and not less than once at the did you receive any accumulated rents, or expiration of each and every term of three have any settlement of the account of months from and after the acknowledgment rents? A. No, sir. Re-examined. Q. In of this agreement, a report in writing shall what capacity did your father act when he be made by said trustees to said party of collected the rents since the 13th of Januthe first part of the receipts, disbursements, ary, 1884? A. He was my agent. Q. Has and condition of said estate and interest, he rendered you monthly statements since if demanded by the party of the first part. the 13th of January, 1884? A. He gave me And said Volina E. Harrigan waives and one accounting for the full year last Janureleases all right or power to sell or dispose ary. Q. How did he make out his acof or incumber the said property for and counts? A. To me. Q. As your agent? during said term of five years. [Usual testa- A. Yes, sir; as my agent." tum clause.] [Signed] VOLINA E. HARRIGAN. We, the undersigned, do hereby accept the above conveyance, upon the terms and conditions as above set forth. JOHN L. HASKELL. LAURA A. MOWRY." * * * * 66 Laura A. Mowry, called for plaintiff, said: Question. What claim do you make to this property? What reason have you for not executing a quitclaim deed to it? Answer. I have not made any claim, except The plaintiff further proved that on the to have an accounting and settlement. By 14th day of February, 1879, a decree of dis- the Court. I understand you to say you tribution was entered by the probate court make no claim, and assert no right, to giving to John L. Haskell and the defend- the property; that the only question with ant, as trustees of plaintiff under said deed, you is the matter of the accounting and an undivided one-third part of the proper- trust? A. For Mr. Haskell and myself to ty of the estate of Eliza Haskell, deceased, have an accounting with Mrs. Harrigan. consisting of both real and personal prop- Direct Examination Resumed. Q. Do you erty, and including the two lots described claim to hold any title to this property as in plaintiff's complaint. On May 13, 1880, a trustee? A. Only until there is an aeby decree of the superior court, certain real counting. That is just what Mrs. Harproperty derived from said estate was par-rigan wished me to do. Q. You decline titioned. By this decree the two lots in to make any conveyance until there is an question were set off to John L. Haskell accounting? A. And I am settled with and the defendant, as trustees of plaintiff Q. Well, you claim that you have a right under said deed of trust. The following to hold this property until you are settled testimony was given on behalf of the plain- with? A. Yes, sir. Q. That is your claim? tiff but no evidence was introduced by the A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you consider that you defendant: have a lien upon that real estate until you are settled with for any claim which you may have? A. Well, I will tell you what I understand. I understand that I was put in there as a trustee. Q. You make no other claim than that you have stated? A. The aly claim that I make is for Mr. Haskell and myself to make an accounting to our ward for exactly what we have received, and what we have paid out, and what there is on hand, and how we have Volina E. Harrigan, (the plaintiff,) on her behalf, said: "I am the plaintiff in this action, and am, and have been since the 13th of January, 1884, in the possession of the two pieces of real property described in the amended complaint in this action, and have been receiving the rents and profits thereof. Mr. Haskell and Mrs. Mowry were in possession of that property before that time. Question. What have you done in the way transfer this property? Answer. I did. Q. Was it accompanied by any release of claims or demands on the part of Mrs. Harrigan? A. I don't think it was at the particular time of the presentation; but afterwards, at the time of presenting the deed to Mrs. Mowry, she said she would take the deed, and go to her attorney with it, and would return the deed to me, and let me know whether she would execute it or not; and I asked her who her attorney was, and she would not inform me at the time, but afterwards she told me it was Mr. Mhoon, of Flournoy & Mhoon. I afterwards called upon her about the deed, and asked her several times, but got no definite answer. Afterwards it came about that I was to bring a release to Mrs. Mowry. The release was drawn up by you, and I copied it, and presented Mrs. Mowry with a copy of the release. She said that she believed that it was full enough. I believe I have a memorandum of it in my book.” Here the plaintiff rested, and no further evidence was offered on the part of the defendant. 1. The finding that the plaintiff was owner of the lots is not justified by the evidence. Conceding that plaintiff was in possession, and that possession is prima facie evidence of ownership, yet such prima facie evidence was rebutted and entirely overcome by the trust-deed, and other evidence introduced by the plaintiff showing that defendant and Haskell held the legal title. Sepulveda v. Sepulveda, 39 Cal. 17. delivered the profit to our ward. I do not wish to have it said afterwards that Mrs. Mowry had wronged her ward. I want an accounting. Q. Now, you have no claim except what grows out of this trusteeship? A. No, sir. Q. Was there a deed presented to you for signature? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you declined to execute it? A. No, sir. Q. You have never executed it? A. No sir; but I did not decline. I told Mr. Haskell that we should get together, and see exactly how we stood, and return to our ward exactly what was proper, and then I was ready and willing to sign. Q. Why did you insist on having an accounting before you executed the deed? A. Because I thought it was right, and I considered it my duty. Cross-Examined. Q. For whose benefit was the accounting you have sought? A. Mrs. Harrigan's, my ward, it was for her benefit. Q. Have you ever claimed, at any time, any interest adverse to her? A. No, sir; I have not; on the contrary, it is to assist and benefit her. Q. Have you not at all times been willing to do anything that would benefit her? A. Yes, sir; and have repeatedly asked Mr. Haskell to make an accounting. Q. Did you not demand it? A. I demanded it in writing of Mr. Haskell. Q. Will you state to the court if it is possible for you to prepare an account? A. It is an utter impossibility, because he refused me the books. I have no possible way of getting at it. Q. Who was the administrator of the estate of Eliza Haskell, deceased? A. J. L. Haskell. Q. Then your co-trustee was the person from whom you and he, as trustees, had to receive all the share of the personal property? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ever know positively that all or any considerable part of the personal property had been turned over by the administrator to the trustees? A. No; there is only $5,000 that I have any knowledge of: That was received by John L. Haskell and Laura A. Mowry, trustees, from John L. Haskell, administrator. It was turned over at once, when there was a partial distribution. Q. During all the period of five years, did you act in the matter? A. Always. Q. Some mention was 3. But conceding, without deciding, that made of Messrs. Sharp & McCeney having the plaintiff was entitled to a conveyance some claim against the trust-estate? A. of the legal title, and that defendant Yes, sir. Q. Did you, or did you not, wrongfully refused to convey it, an action spend a large amount of time on behalf of to quiet title under section 738 of the Code Mrs. Harrigan in that matter? A. I did. of Ĉivil Procedure was not appropriate, Q. State about what you did as trustee. nor even permissible. Von Drachenfels v. A. Sharp & McCeney were to get one-third Doolittle, 77 Cal. 295, 19 Pac. Rep. 518; of what they recovered for Mrs. Harrigan Brewer v. Houston, 58 Cal. 345; Learned v. from Mrs. Haskell's estate as their fee. Welton, 40 Cal. 349; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. They claimed $25,000 originally as due to S. 552, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1129. I think the them. By reason of my exertions as trus-judgment and order should be reversed, tee, that was reduced to $14,400, which they and the cause remanded. agreed to take, and relinquish all their interest in the estate. Q. Have you ever received any compensation for your services as trustee? A. I have not; nothing at all Redirect Examination. Q. Now, as a matter of fact, Mrs. Mowry, you have not received any rents, issues, or profits of the estate of your ward, have you? A. Not directly. Q. Mr. Haskell did all the business, did he not? A. Yes, sir. Q. As between you and him? A. Yes, sir." 2. For the same reasons the finding that the "defendant has not any estate, rit, title, or interest whatever in said land or premises, or any part thereof," is unsupported by the evidence. Nor is there any evidence that the defendant claimed any interest in the land adverse to the title of plaintiff. It appears that the defendant rightfully claimed that she and Haskell held the legal title as trustees for the plaintiff; but their legal title, as such trustees, was not adverse to the title of the plaintiff as sole beneficiary,-the only title proved in her. We concur: BELCHER, C. C.; Foote, C. PER CURIAM. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order are reversed, and the cause remanded. ASHTON V. DASHAWAY ASS'N et al. (No. 12,069.) (Supreme Court of California. Nov. 22, 1889.) CORPORATIONS-MISAPPROPRIATION OF PROPERTYACTIONS BY MEMBERS. Charles G. Nagle, on behalf of plaintiff, said: "Question. Did you ever present 1. A temperance society, owning improved Mrs. Mowry with a deed, and ask her to land, was incorporated, without capital stock, "for |