may take his choice among feveral different actions. So every sophistical fyllogifm may, by a little art, be brought under one or other of the fpecies mentioned by Aristotle, and very often you may take your choice of two or three.

Befides the enumeration of the various kinds of fophifms, there are many other things in this treatife concerning the art of managing a fyllogiftical difpute with an antagonist. And indeed, if the paffion for this kind of litigation, which reigned for so many ages, fhould ever again lift up its head, we may predict, that the Organon of Ariftotle will then become a fafhionable study; for it contains fuch admirable materials and documents for this art, that it may be faid to have brought it to a science.

The conclufion of this treatife ought not to be overlooked: it manifeftly relates, not to the present treatife only, but also to the whole analytics and topics of the author. I fhall therefore give the fubftance of it.

"Of those who may be called inventers, "fome have made important additions to "things long before begun, and carried VOL. III. 3 F

on

on through a courfe of ages; others "have given a fmall beginning to things "which, in fucceeding times, will be brought to greater perfection. The be

66

ginning of a thing, though small, is the "chief part of it, and requires the great"eft degree of invention; for it is easy c to make additions to inventions once "begun. Now with regard to the dia"lectical art, there was not something "done, and fomething remaining to be "done. There was abfolutely nothing "done: for those who profeffed the art "of difputation, had only a set of ora❝tions compofed, and of arguments, and "of captious questions, which might fuit 66 many occafions. These their scholars "foon learned, and fitted to the occafion. "This was not to teach you the art, but 66 to furnish with the materials pro"duced by the art: as if a man profef

you

fing to teach you the art of making "fhoes, fhould bring you a parcel of "fhoes of various fizes and fhapes, from "'which you may provide those who want. "This may have its ufe; but it is not to “teach the art of making fhoes. And indeed, with regard to rhetorical decla

“mation,

"mation, there are many precepts handed "down from ancient times; but with regard to the conftruction of fyllogifms,

"We have therefore employed much "time and labour upon this fubject; and "if our system appear to you not to be "in the number of thofe things, which,

66

being before carried a certain length,

were left to be perfected; we hope for your favourable acceptance of what is ઠંડ done, and your indulgence in what is " left imperfect.".

CHA P. VI.

Reflections on the Utility of Logic, and the Means of its improvement.

SECT. I. Of the Utility of Logic.

MEN

EN rarely leave one extreme without running into the contrary. It is no wonder, therefore, that the exceffive admiration of Ariftotle, which continued for 3 F2

fo

fo many ages, fhould end in an undue contempt; and that the high esteem of logic as the grand engine of fcience, fhould at laft make way for too unfavourable an opinion, which feems now prevalent, of its being unworthy of a place in a liberal education. Those who think according to the fashion, as the greatest part of men do, will be as prone to go into this extreme, as their grandfathers were to go into the contrary.

Laying afide prejudice, whether fashionable or unfashionable, let us confider whether logic is, or may be made, fubfervient to any good purpofe. Its profeffed end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to reafon, with precifion and accuracy. No man will fay that this is a matter of no importance; the only thing therefore that admits of doubt, is, whether it can be taught.

To refolve this doubt, it may be obferved, that our rational faculty is the gift of God, given to men in very different meafure. Some have a large portion, fome a lefs; and where there is a remarkable defect of the natural power, it cannot be fupplied by any culture. But this natural

power,

power, even where it is the strongest, may lie dead for want of the means of improvement: a favage may have been born with as good faculties as a Bacon or a Newton: but his talent was buried, being never put to ufe; while theirs was cultivated to the best advantage.

It may likewise be observed, that the chief mean of improving our rational power, is the vigorous exercife of it, in various ways and in different fubjects, by which the habit is acquired of exercising it properly. Without fuch exercise, and good sense over and above, a man who has ftudied logic all his life, may after all be only a petulant wrangler, without true judgement or skill of reasoning in any science.

I take this to be Locke's meaning, when in his Thoughts on Education he says, "If you would have your fon to reafon "well, let him read Chillingworth." The ftate of things is much altered fince Locke wrote. Logic has been much improved, chiefly by his writings; and yet much less stress is laid upon it, and less time confumed in it. His counfel, therefore, was judicious and feafonable; to wit,

That