duct of that person which should give us any just and reasonable hopes, that he would not take the earliest, the first favourable opportunity of breaking the peace that offered? In what instance had he shewn the milk of human kindness so much as to lead us to rely on his abstaining from fresh hostilities, as soon as he felt it his interest to recommence the war against us? Had he never betrayed a rooted jealousy towards this country, an implacable revenge, and a deep-lodged hatred? Was his milk of human kindness so superabundant and overflowing as to wash from his remembrance all his past animosity towards us? Since the signing of the preliminaries the intrigues of the French had negotiated a private peace between the republic and the Porte, and prevented the latter from feeling a just and grateful sense of the manifold support and assistance we had afforded it (greater assistance he would venture to say than had ever been afforded the Porte by any European power), and prevented it from making those returns to which we were entitled. So much for the good faith of the First Consul of France in the first instance. Let their Lordships remember that by this treaty we had conceded every thing that would aid the French republic to recover its commerce and restore its marine. We had given to the First Consul "a giant's strength, and "ave might be assured he would use it like a "giant." own peculiar merits, and cannot possibly have an exact parallel in past times; periods, ever so little removed from the present moment, must vary in circumstances, which will defeat the application of any precedent; the opinion of Parliament varying in persons, or subjects varying in circumstances, ought not to have the slightest weight on future parliamentary deliberation; and it would be a tedious and useless waste of your Lordships' time, to canvass the consistency of particular Lords, instead of discussing the subject on its own grounds. If there were no other difference between the two periods alluded to by the Learned Lord, than the mutiny in the fleet, it would be sufficient to annihilate all compa rison; and indeed it is so difficult to find two remote periods exactly corresponding at all points, that, even in the present existing moment, the Noble Lords who argue on the same side, concurring in their approbation of the same articles of peace, do not concur in the relative situation of the two negotiating countries at this instant. The Noble and Learned Lord says, that it is a necessary peace; he places us at the feet of France, suing for peace, and he laments that more advantageous terms could not be obtained. Other Noble Lords, speaking with ministerial information, assert that the country never stood higher; that our resources are unexhausted; that we have treated for a peace, in an hour of triumph, upon equal terms; and they defend the peace, as a safe, honourable, and adeThe EARL of CAERNARVON said, that it quate peace. The Noble and Learned Lord was not his intention to detain their Lordships has felt that nothing but necessity could justify long; it was however difficult on so important a a peace so inadequate and dishonourable; and subject to give a silent vote; "I shall not, how- if the other Noble Lords have truly stated the ever (said the Noble Earl), trespass on your flourishing state of the country, the terms must Lordships' time by following a singular rule laid appear dishonourable and insecure. The Noble down by the Noble and Learned Lord upon Marquis (Buckingham) has expressed his opithe woolsack, who will not admit as reason- nion of the instability of the proposed peace, able, any disapprobation of the preliminaries by doubting (on the supposition that the French of peace under our discussion, unless the ob- seamen had been returned) whether the preli jector will undertake to furnish a new PROJET minaries would ever reach a definitive confirmfor a better peace. I shall, however, take leave ation. I confess that I feel no apprehension, to exercise my parliamentary duty, which is that France will not wait till the definitive that of a censor, called upon from the Throne, treaty has put her in possession of all the to approve or disapprove, not as a Chancellor, advantages of this peace; but when we to advise his Majesty in the exercise of his pre- have restored to France, without equivalent, rogative, especially on a subject which his all that she had lost in nine years of war, and Ministers have already pledged his honour to to her allies, all that we had taken from them, carry into execution by a definitive treaty; nor with small exceptions, and disgracefully subwill I be impeded by another curious assertion mitted to the uncompensated plunder of our and maxim of the Learned Lord's, that the friends and allies, she may then pursue against question has already been decided by Parlia- this country any object which her policy or insament in 1797, in the shape of the projet for tiable ambition may dictate, and her augmented peace of that year, approved by Parliament; power may enable her to execute. We are called and that no Noble Lord has a right to disap-upon to approve the preliminaries of a peace, prove of the present articles of peace, if any which, the moment it is put into execution, former Parliament has sanctioned terms, in will place us in a worse relative situation than the Noble Lord's opinion, worse than those at the moment of its signature, or in any penow in discussion. I am not inclined to con-riod of the war; and we must then depend on sider parliamentary precedents as sacred, nor at all times implicitly to subscribe to their justice and wisdom, particularly in a question of this nature, which must be decided on its the good faith of a nation, not conspicuous for that virtue, and generally esteemed our natural enemy, and trust that she will not avail herself of her advantages. Some Noble worse; and then all the undecided points will probably be influenced by the same predomi nant influence which dictated the prelimina ries; and it is impossible, under these circumstances, that I should approve the preliminaries as (under the existing circumstances) safe, adequate, and honourable, or that it will produce such a peace, as the speeches from the Throne have from the commencement of the war till this hour held out to the country." LORD HOBART said, that, with regard to the Cape, it could only be kept at an enormous expense to this country; that it had already cost us a million of money; that we had, on our first taking possession of it, imported home all the corn we found there, hoping to supply this country, and that the consequence had been, that we had since, even during the great scarcity, been obliged to re-export corn to the Cape, to preserve the settlement from staring. As to any necessity for ships to touch exist. He had himself known a fleet of thir there in their passage to India, he denied it to teen Indiamen sail from Madras home, without touching any where; and if in war-time a squadron of his Majesty's ships were sent to India, and on the voyage stood in need of water, they might take it in at the Cape de Verd islands, at Madagascar, and at various other islands. The question was then put from the wool Lords have silenced all their apprehensions, by persuasion that this peace will have left us do bone of contention; it is a singular argument, for the surrender of every thing valuable, that we shall enjoy the beggar's security, suho CANTAT VACUUS CORAM LATRONE. Tavo articles retained by us in this unequal peace, may be objects of future hostility, and meant only as temporary concessions; or the present or future ruler of France may again adopt the maxim, DELENDA EST CARTHAGO, before the rest of Europe have recovered their exhausted strength. The Noble and Learned Lord, in his defence of his necessary peace, puts a question on each individual article, whether it was an object worth the continuance of a bloody war, and the annual expenditure of millions, as if each separate article required a separate war, and its pursuit the separate expenditure of millions, as it may require separate discussions on its utility. The Noble and Learned Lord, who uses a question for an argument, may be answered by his own question applied to France: Is each separate article worth to her a separate war and the expenditure of millions? The Learned Prelate (Rochester) truly observed, that the terms of peace were composed of all the articles, and could not be considered but as one, good or bad peace, taken conjointly. Those who have considered the peace as a necessary peace, have only considered the state of this country, and have shut their eyes to the state of France. 1 scarce know any single object worth the expenditure of blood and treasure of a long war, and yet other circumstances in the relative situation of two countries, may make war necessary; if this peace was desirable to us, was it not equally desirable to France? It may be reasonably imagined that France was as fatigued and exhausted with the war as this country, and ready to purchase peace upon equal terms. The fact, I am persuaded, was so, and that peace, more adequate, safe, and honourable, might have been obtained, had not our negotiators ineffectually surrendered the interests of the country. Every article in the preliminaries is concession on our side, and advantage to France and her allies; and so much is left for discussion in the definitive treaty, that the principal effect of the preliminaries quill be to shea how much disposed we are to renounce every thing for peace. In the article respecting Portugal, nothing is obtained for her; we sanction the terms which France has imposed upon her, by reference to her existing situation, and we may, for aught we know, approve of our own exclusion from the ports of Portugal, which was understood to form an article of that treaty. The comfort given to us by the Noble Lord, that we may be better by the definitive treaty, and cannot be worse than now fixed, is as fallacious as his former reasoning; for the same observation is as just, and I fear will be more effectual, in the mouth of France, that they also may be better by the definitive treaty, and cannot without folly be the Throne, approving of the picliminary treaty. List of the Non-contents. Marquis of Buckingham, Fitzwilliam, Earls Spencer, 1 Caernarvon, Lords Grenville, Gwydir, Bishop of Rochester. HOUSE OF COMMONS, NOVEMBER 30, 1801. SIR RDMUND HARTOP moved the address; he said that he could not repress his sanguine hope, that as the sentiments of the people without doors were universally and unanimously in approbation of the peace, so would the seatiments of those whom he had now the honour to address. He said, the cause of failure in one great object of the war was the want of co-operation on the part of our allies, the consequence of which has been, that whilst our enemy has been able to add extensively to her dominions by territories wrested from her neighbours, it became expedient for us, under all existing circumstances, to enter into negotia tions for peace; for, deserted as we were by all our allies, we had no room to hope that we should be able to force her back within the limits of her ancient boundaries. But in the unparalleled events of the last glorious cam *This debate was on a motion for an address government ever was established in France since the revolution, that promised so much stability. But what security was there for peace between any two nations the moment it became the interest of either to violate it? He recollected to have heard the saying of an Emperor of Morocco, in proposing to make war, and being told that it was a violation of faith to break peace, he answered, "I break it beguage of the savage monarch. He suspected that he had spoken in plain, blunt terms, the liberal language and principles of the modern courts of Europe.-The blood and treasure which had been exhausted by England in this war was no more than our duty to posterity demanded; and if the expenses were considered, the national debt was increased no more than 170,000,000l. more than it stood at the conclusion of the American war, with this difference, that we had then no such prospect of its reduction as the admirable sinking fund established by the Right Honourable Gentleman who lately and for so many years presided over the finances of this country had given. By this fund, he said, that in little more than seventythree years, supposing a permanent peace, the whole of the debt would cease to be a burden on the people of England. paign, amidst the victorious and brilliant achievements of our arms, we have beheld the pacific councils of his Majesty's Ministers so attached to the restoration of tranquillity as not to be shaken by the splendour of our successes, not to be stimulated to a renewal of the contest in another campaign, where so much more of the national blood and treasure must have been exhausted in an useless pursuit. No; but, on the contrary, his Majesty's Ministers," cause it is my interest." Such was the lanwisely considering the second great object of the war no longer attainable, and considering the honourable advantages we had acquired in the struggle, formed the resolution of treating for a peace; and in forming the preliminaries, to secure the interests of those allies who had maintained their faith with us to the last extremity. Having then preserved through the whole of this arduous contest the integrity of our own dominions; having maintained through every vicissitude the strictest faith towards our allies; and having shewn that no ambition of extending our territories could induce us to prolong a war by refusing to surrender even a part of our conquests as a price of security to those allies, we have held forth to Europe an illustrious example of honour, of justice, and of faith, worthy of admiration and example, and highly advantageous to our reputation and our interest, which he held to be inseparable. Mr. LEE said, that the question he wished to ask, with respect to the good policy of the peace, was, whether we had obtained our objects in the war? In his mind we had, completely, in the preservation of our constitution, and the defence of our territories; and if we had so far succeeded in the Cape of Good Hope as to make it a neutral port, he would ask, was it worth while to risk another campaign for the chance of effecting a better alternative, whatever was the probability of success? In such an attempt, if we could not succeed in our purpose with all the great powers in Europe in our alliance, was it now probable that we should singly succeed against France, who had shewn herself able to resist the world in arms? He thought not; but was convinced the best security we had for the permanence of peace, avas, because France and England, the two greatest powers in the war, have approved it, and had both been considerable gainers by the contest. One great objection heretofore to the conclusion of peace, was the great instability of the French executive power; but in his mind this was one of the best sureties for it now; and whether that great colossal power was permanent or crumbled to pieces, we ought not to interfere with its internal policy. The present Chief Consul amused the people of France with an idea that they enjoyed a free republic, while, in fact, he himself possessed more absolute power over them, than all the Bourbons ever had done; but the people of France were satisfied with it, and no form of LORD LEVISON GOWER, after disapprov ing of the terms of the peace, said that he was not disposed to give a vote against it. Peace was an object for which he was heartily joyful, and he was not now prepared peremp torily to assert that it could have been obtained on better terms. The peace, such as it was, had excited universal joy throughout the country; and having himself witnessed this joy, he could not consent to vote against it, though he had thought it his duty to throw out these observations to the House. LORD HAWKESBURY rose, and addressed the House to the following effect:-" Sir, I rise at this early hour of the debate, in consequence of the observations which have fallen from my Noble Friend, and in order to explain, I trust, to the satisfaction of Gentlemen, the motives which induced his Majesty's Ministers to enter into a negotiation with the French republic, and to conclude the preli minaries of that treaty submitted to-night to the consideration of the House. The very reasons urged by my Noble Friend against the nature and terms of the treaty, tend, in my opinion, most directly and strongly to evince their propriety and claims to the approbation of the country, and to the sanction of Parlia ment. He has undertaken to compare the projet as proposed by Lord Grenville at Lisle with the articles of the present adjustment; a mode of proceeding unwarranted by the fair consideration of both in their various relations: and he has ventured to assimilate things, between which no comparison can exist. I state sons, in positive terms, that they cannot be com- was a torrent so dreadful and violent in à pared; for no man will venture to deny that origin and progress, that no man, or set Lord Grenville would have been glad to have men, could be so sanguine as to entertai taken less from the government of France than hope of checking its rage and impetuc he demanded at that period of the negotiation. but if we had opposed it even in its fatai a After nine years effusion of blood; after con- almost irresistible course with some succ tracting an increase of debt to the amount of if we had, even when there existed but a w nearly two hundred millions; after the inde- faint prospect of a favourable issue to fatigable and uninterrupted exertions of the labours, rendered it less dangerous in its eff country; but at the same time, after a series than it would otherwise have been; if we of the most splendid achievements and un- at least, changed its direction, and made it l exampled successes, there is not a man in the in a channel less harmless to the general) kingdom who must not admit that peace was piness and interests of the world, I trust, a most desirable attainment, was the object of that some acknowledgment is due to the his sincerest wishes and most ardent desires. dom, vigilance, and perseverance of Govt But notwithstanding the hope and zeal with ment, as well as to the spirit and exertion which all must have looked and laboured for the country. It is indeed impossible to the restoration of tranquillity, I solemnly dis- at the present state of France without claim the plea which has been set up by some per- convinced that we have at least effected the plea of overruling necessity. I am per-important change; a change which is a suaded, that such a cause for the conclusion to the most superficial observer, in the of the preliminary treaty will not be traced to ners, the opinions, the habits of the peopl any thing like satisfactory grounds. I am de- France. Let those who pretend to doubt sirous that his Majesty's Ministers should, in | justice of this observation look to the sta the adoption of that measure, be tried by those France as it was in 1793, and to the stat reasons in which the war originated, by which it France as it is in 1801! Let them take was carried on, and which were found to exist trouble of comparing the striking and when the contest ceased. In saying thus much, incredible alteration which has taken pla I am, Sir, aware that the peace, however the manners, opinions, and habits to whi eligible, however adequate to the relative state have alluded, and then give me a candid of this country and of France, however it can swer! If after this comparison, if after be justified upon the principles of sound policy, that has been done, I am called upon to is not free of all evil, of all chance, of all risk or ver my opinion with respect to the moral danger. But let me ask, what event has taken of peace, I must say I feel, under all the place in the recollection of all who hear me, or cumstances of the present moment, that what event may yet take place, in accounting are certainly less than on any former occa for which it has been or will be possible to With regard to the continuance of hosti remove every objection? Under all the cir- there are two considerations by which we cumstances in which we were situated, I to be regulated: the first is, whether we maintain that the treaty is honourable and ad- sessed the power of forming another coal vantageous; and the question now for the de- against France; and the second, if we cision of the House is, whether his Majesty's tinued the war, what harm could Fran Ministers have been to blame or not? In the to us, and what harm could we consideration of this question, Gentlemen will France? The first coalition had failed not, I am persuaded, lose sight of the relative second coalition had equally failed; and state of the two countries, nor hesitate to we any satisfactory grounds to make examine whether better terms could have been sirous of framing a third, and hazarding obtained. Some persons object to the peace, ther experiment of the same nature? because they contend that the end of the con- was the chance, what was the probabil test is not gained. They argue that the war forming a new coalition in the least was undertaken with the view of destroying likely to be of service to the powers republicanism, and of interfering in the inter- continent, or to this country in particular nal affairs of France, for the purpose of stop- was, I will venture to assert, altogether ping the progress of the revolution. I main- possible to find in Europe the elements of tain, on the contrary, that the destruction of a combination of force directed to the a republicanism was not its object; and that no ment of one grand end. Were they to be interference in the internal concerns of France in the Empire of Germany? Were they was intended. Such statements I absolutely found in Prussia? Were they to be f disclaim; and declare, on the contrary, that Russia? I ask then, what was the pros the country was forced into the war by the of success that could be derived from a conduct of France. It was she who interfered confederacy against France? And if, in the affairs of other nations; who took part fore, it be evident that no coalition coul and direction in the internal regulations of all formed, I ask, what object could we pe countries; who, both openly, and by her have, under that point of view, in the furt agents and intrigues, propagated disaffection, prosecution of hostilities? As to any sedition, anarchy, and revolt. The revolution which France could do to us, or which we ger, from continuing faithful to their engagements. To Portugal every protection has been given, consistent with our strength, and with her interests; and in the case of Naples we displayed a magnanimity which we might have been well justified in omitting. Naples was called upon by France to exclude our shipping from her ports; but she went further, and joined in an alliance which would have warranted on our part a declaration of war: yet with sufficient grounds to justify to Europe and to our own conscience such a measure, what was our conduct upon that occasion? We interfered in her favour, and obtained the restoration of her dominions and territories, and the re-establishment of her independence. In the case of Portugal, our conduct had not been less exemplary. To the Ottoman Porte we were under peculiar obligations; and of all our allies she remained faithful to us to the last. To her we evinced proofs of the most inviolable attachment; for we obtained for her, without sacrifice, not only the restitution of all her dominions and territories in their inte grity, but we also obtained the renunciation of France to acquisitions which threatened not only her independence, but existence. France had ceded Venice to Austria; Austria had, in return, ceded the Ex-Venetian islands to France. These islands, which from their situation might have been productive of the most serious danger to the Ottoman Porte, have been abandoned by the French republic, and their independence recognised. Thus, Sir, you have obtained by the treaty all that could be obtained for your allies, and not only preserved your good faith inviolate, but manifested your generosity where it could not be expected. There are indeed two other powers of which it may be proper to take notice; the Stadtholder and the King of Sardinia. It is do to France, I believe it does not require many words to shew to the satisfaction of Gentlemen, that a cessation of any thing like serious and decisive aggression had taken place. Where and in what manner was it possible for us, with our immense superiority by sea, to affect France by striking a fatal blow? The fact was, that neither power could affect the other. These remarks, Sir, I have made with a view of shewing the inefficacy of any new coalition against the French republic, as well as the inefficacy of the continuance of the war between her and this country. In discussing the preliminary articles of peace, there are three considerations which press strongly upon my mind, and which I am sanguine enough to hope will not be deemed destitute of weight; I mean the time, the tone, and the terms of the treaty. And first, with re spect to the time at which the treaty was signed. It was concluded under a just impression of your success; it was concluded at a moment when your triumphs were complete. Such a time was worthy of the country to accelerate the important work of pacification. Would it have been prudent, would it have been consistent with political wisdom, to have pushed matters to an extreme point? It was, on the contrary, in the hour of victory that it became the spirit and magnanimity of the Government, and the people, to listen to | the voice of peace; and if the terms appeared advantageous, I have fair grounds to presume, that a more glorious opportunity could not present itself. In speaking of the tone in which the peace has been concluded, it is sufficient for me to observe, that it is marked with a tone of dignity and independence; that the honour of the nation has been preserved, and that every idea of humiliation has been resisted with success, both with respect to ourselves | and our allies. When I come to an examina-obvious that we were not bound by any oblition of the terms of the treaty, I must disclaim the support, and condemn the opinions of those who have been accustomed to undervalue the resources of this country, and to extol those of the enemy. The circumstances under which we were, as opposed to the enemy, have been essentially different, and it is in that difference that the best reasons for the concluding a peace will be found. But first, Sir, it may not be improper to call the attention of Gentlemen to our conduct towards our allies; and particularly to the strict maintenance of that good faith for which we have been so eminently distinguished. The first power which I have occasion to mention is the Ottoman Porte, whose territories and dominions are to be restored and maintained in their integrity, as they were before the war. An instance of our generosity, as well as of our good faith, must not however be passed over; I allude to the release which we gave to those powers connected with us, from express and positive stipulations, when they were exposed by the necessity of the moment to danVOL. II. gation of strict faith towards them; yet I can safely state that every thing which this country could do for them has been performed. An arrangement with respect to the former had, at our instance, been carried on at Berlin; but that arrangement had, from various causes, been withdrawn. In favour of Sardinia we had also interfered, although she had given up the coalition, and entered into an offensive alliance with France.-Having noticed the manner in which we have uniformly and honourably displayed our good faith, I now come to the question of acquisition, as it should be fairly taken with respect to the power and resources of a country. And here let me observe, that the spirit of acquisition may be strained beyond its proper limits. It is not of this country alone that I am speaking; for the principle will, if properly scrutinized, apply with equal force to France. I contend, that an increase of power does not take place in proportion to the increase of acquisitions. That this doctrine applies no less to France than to this country, is justified by the opinion of men U u |