judgment, without the feeling which influenced no effectual stipulation was made to that that of his Right Hon. Friend, whether it was Prince for the loss of his property: this was not proper that those troops, which were in the an objection that might have been made to the pay and service, and under the direction, con- preliminaries of peace, and most unquestiontrol, and management of the British govern- ably it was a very important subject. Cerment, should not in this case be considered tainly the terms were not so favourable for in the same situation as any of our own would that illustrious family as he could have wishbe if prisoners of war in another country? ed; but certainly the treaty contained terms for With respect to Malta, his Right Hon. Friend adequate compensation; for it is said, that for had taken a very ample field. He spoke under losses suffered as well in private property, as correction, but he very much doubted whether by the change of constitution adopted in that counthe arrangement made respecting Malta was try, an adequate compensation should be pronot an arrangement which was in contempla- cured for the House of Nassau, for losses not tion by the late Administration; but he could only of a territorial nature, but of private proconceive it very possible that his Right Hon. perty. The only objection he had to the moFriend might not have concurred in that mea- tion of his Right Hon. Friend, applied merely sure while he was in administration. But with- to the day on which he proposed to bring it out entering into the particulars of the state- forward; and when this treaty was proposed ment of his Right Hon. Friend, he had the satis- to be taken into consideration, he was not at faction to know that the Maltese themselves did all surprised that his Right Hon. Friend, who not partake of the sentiments of his Right Hon. disliked the whole of the peace, should like Friend; theirs were those of satisfaction and gra- to see every part of it rejected; but the sense titude to Great Britain for the terms procured he had of his duty compelled him to do every them. With regard to the Cape, he had con- thing in his power to prevent an interval taking versed with many of those who certainly had place between this and the period of the disthe best means of being qualified to form a cussion of the subject, and during which the correct opinion upon the subject, and they people of this country would be kept in susthought that no disadvantage was likely to pense, which, of itself, was a consideration of result to Great Britain from the change which some importance: he did not know the use of was adopted in this respect. His Right Hon. delay in this case; did his Right Hon. Friend Friend had said a great deal on the subject of mean to prevent any of the provisions of the the treaty, as to the omissions of it. He had treaty being carried into effect? What then was said, it did not renew any of those commercial the object of his Right Hon. Friend? If he had arrangements which it had always been custo- any specific object besides that of a general mary to renew. Great pains had been taken censure upon the treaty, let him state it. Did upon that subject, to set off the supposed dis- he mean to prevent restitution being made accord advantages to us of these omissions. Uponing to the provisions of the treaty? If he did, this, he could at present only say, that if the principle upon which the treaty was agreed to was erroneous, it was without any plea or excuse erroneous on the part of his Majesty's Mini-House. Wishing, however, that a full discussters, for this omission was not an accidental one, it was advisedly so settled; his Majesty's Ministers were thoroughly convinced, that, under the present state of Europe, and all the circumstances of the case, they took a part which was adapted to the real interests of Europe in general, and to his Majesty's dominions in particular, by abstaining from the renewal of any treaties of commerce whatever. His Right Hon. Friend had closed his comments by a reference to an article of great importance, he meant the care of the Prince of Orange: he had said that Prince was not described in the treaty by his title of Prince of Orange. Now, he was not to inform his Right Hon. Friend, that such title had never been recognised by any government of France; he was sure this could not be contradicted, and he would repeat it, that such title had never been recognised by any government whatever of France; he meant, that the head of that illustrious House had never been recognised by any government of France since the Revolution, by which the head of that illustrious -House had been placed on the throne of Great Britain. His Right Hon. Friend had said, that

let him state it. But it was an object, in the prosecution of which, he believed his Right Hon. Friend would not be countenanced in that

sion should take place, he should propose, that, instead of to-morrow fortnight, Tuesday se'nnight be inserted; or, more formally, that instead of the 18th, the 11th of May be inserted in the motion. He concluded by moving this amendment.

Mr. THOMAS GRENVILLE rose, and expressed the utmost astonishment, that profess ing, as the Right Hon. Gentleman did, that the subject was one highly worthy of the consideration of the House, he should consider fourteen days as a period too long for obtaining that degree of information, without which that consideration could not be fairly or profitably conducted. It was impossible, in his opinion, to have given any degree of attention to the succinct statement of his Right Hon. Friend, without being convinced that so great and so important were the objects demanding consideration, that the period originally pro posed was barely sufficient for that purpose, pre-occupied as the attention of the House would necessarily be by a variety of other business. Was it possible to reflect for a mo

armed, and regimented at Brussels, for the purpose of being employed to attack this country. If any one doubted this fact, he had it in his power to prove it; and he thought nothing could be more humiliating in us than to be obliged to defray expenses incurred for such a purpose. The Cape of Good Hope, according to the preliminaries, was to have been declared a free port, and now reverts in full sovereignty to the Batavian republic. This, in time of war, would make it completely a French port, supposing even that the condition of its being open to the ships of war of the other contracting parties should be complied with. We know the French system

war, in equal numbers from cach country, should be admitted at the same time. Supposing then, that number to be two each; for two English men of war, the French, Spanish, and Batavian allies would have six; which would oblige us, at the expense of twenty-five or thirty ships of the line, either to keep up a great fleet in those seas, or send convoys with every trading fleet; and every regiment outward or homeward, must be escorted by a force equal to cope with the allies, and prevent them from attacking our possessions in Hindostan. This subject, however, of the Cape of Good Hope, was one of so much importance, that he should take a future opportunity of bringing it more specifically before the House. With regard to the island of Malta, which some considered as not inferior in consequence to the Cape, we were led from the preliminaries to believe that it would be placed under the protection of some power capable of preserving it from the arbitious views and pretensions of France: this power was pro

ly neglected in the preliminaries; and he believed, however desirous they might be of peace, the preliminaries would never have been approved of, if Ministers had not declared that the honour and good faith of this country required that a compensation should be made to the Prince of Orange, our ally (if that term might be applied to a Prince now left without any dominions). His Lordship then enumerated the various kinds of property which the House of Orange heretofore possessed in Holland. He denied that the House of Orange had been elevated by the republic of the United Provinces, which, on the other hand, was itself erected by that House, whose Princes held great possessions, not indeed in full sove-in this kind of neutrality to be, that ships of reignty, nor much short of it, long before the republic started into existence. The dignities of the House of Orange, it was true, had not been formally recognised by the old government of France; but that was no reason why we should now consent to sink their title into the branch of the House of Nassau established in the republic of the United, Provinces, and only stipulating that it should have a compensation, without providing in what it should consist, or when, or where, or by whom it was meant to be made. As to its adherents, they were not even alluded to, but seemed to be considered as unworthy of notice, while we saw France stipulating for the security of every Jacobin in all the nations of Europe, and claiming and obtaining from this country a traitor (Napper Tandy, we suppose), who appeared in hostile and rebellious arms in Ireland. All these were consequences of the improper instructions of those who were to conduct the negotiations at Amiens. France introduced the plenipotentiaries of its two allies into the congress, while those of Portugal and Naples were ex-bably meant to be Russia, whose weight and cluded, probably because they were interested in the result, but more probably because they were the friends and allies of England. By these means it happened, that while the Noble Lord (Cornwallis), whom he should never mention without the highest veneration and respect, was putting his signature to the peace, containing the condition of an indemnity to the House of Nassau, the French and Dutch | ministers were, without his knowledge and consent, drawing up an agreement at the other end of the table, stipulating that the compensation should not be made at the expense of what was now called the Batavian republic: an act of perfidy and duplicity which he reprobated in the strongest language. Speaking of the stipulation for each country paying the debts of the prisoners taken on either side, he animadverted on the provision which. included foreign troops taken while in the pay of each nation. Even in this article, so much a matter of form, all the advantage was on the side of France. A number of Russian troops had been taken at a time when they were at our disposal, which, in consequence of different political arrangements, were afterwards clothed,

influence in Europe might probably have accomplished that end; and the more easily, as it had the means of supplying at all times a sufficient force for its defence. This the court of Russia perhaps would not consent to, and the definitive treaty placed it completely under the influence of France. The knights for the future would be wholly unable to maintain it. Their order was partly military and partly religious, and composed entirely of Maltese nobles, who would rather undergo any hardship than associate with that democratic langue which this treaty proposed, but most probably never could succeed in establishing. The revenues for their support were heretofore supplied from most of the other countries of Europe. These countries had their distinct langues, supported by benefices which could only be held by the knights, whose profession was honourable in their youth, and promised to reward them with considerable possessions when advanced to more mature years. At present almost all of these incentives were gone. The revenues were confiscated in France, on the left bank of the Rhine, and in Bavaria, which contained the richest posses

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influence on the Northern United States, as well as on the South of America. It gave them the command of our West India navigation, and it brought them within three hundred miles of the city of Mexico; the march would be as easy as from Chester to London; and he had no scruple to affirm, that on the unfurling of the first standard for an expedition to Mexico, the whole of the West of America would immediately repair to it in arms-a circumstance which must ever put Spain in a state of entire dependance upon the French republic. His Lordship next proceeded to consider a stipulation in the treaty, for which, he said, there was no precedent upon record; namely, that avhich went to surrender the claims of British subjects upon the government of France, for losses sustained before the war, or at the commencement of the revolution. In these periods, pro

sions of the Order. Something indeed would | remain in Naples, as long as Naples continued any way independent; and how long that might be, was matter of great uncertainty. Something was also left them in the Ecclesiastical States; but this, as well as the rest, was held by a very precarious tenure. The revenues of the island itself, partly territorial and partly commercial, were appropriated partly to maintain the splendour of the Grand Master, which could not be dispensed with; and partly to the support of religious establishments, to the expense of hospitals, and to furnishing a granary for the consumption of the island, which could not produce grain in any proportion to the number of the inhabitants: so that by applying it now to the maintenance of a new democratic langue and the defence of the works, this plunder of the alms-houses would be found wholly inadequate. A Nea-perty of English subjects in the French funds politan force was spoken of for that purpose; but the King of Naples had no interest in the preservation of the island, which could induce him to be at that expense. Besides, in time of war, he could never be in a condition to refuse yielding it to the French, in order to assist any project of theirs to intercept our East India trade, or to recover the possession of Egypt. It must, in future, be obedient to what we may call the King of Italy, who may at any time march from the new Italian republic, and, in forty-eight hours, seize upon the capital of the other sovereign. There could be no hesitation, therefore, when the alternative was between the safety of the Neapolitan metropolis and the defence of the island of Malta. It was not in the least probable that his Sicilian Majesty would embroil himself at all with the affairs of Malta while it remained within the grasp of the First Consul; and must dread the hostility of England, which would be formidable to him, though by no means so to France. Under these circumstances, he thought it imprudent in this country to give up the possession of that important island, at the moment France, by its late accessions, was so greatly extending its empire in the Mediterranean. The annexing of the new Italian republic to itself would at any other time have been thought a sufficient cause of war; and now the retention of Malta would, on our part, be still an inadequate equivalent. He illustrated this by the comments of a writer in the Mercure de France*, and published under the immediate inspection of the French government, and which, in explaining how the articles of the definitive treaty are advantageous to the republic, added, "that Malta must, "always be French, as long as it shall be "Neapolitan." This paper he frequently recurred to in the course of his speech. He then adverted to the immense acquisition made by France in the ceded province of Louisiana, including Florida, which gave them an immense

See Register, vol, i. p. 516.

to a considerable amount was confiscated; which was done chiefly by means of that unprincipled manœuvre, by which the French financiers confiscated two thirds of the funded debt, in order to enable them to pay the remaining third.-He next adverted to the nonrenewal of ancient treaties, which he would contend was a principle in the process of negotiation equally novel and injurious; and, in illustrating these positions, he again referred to the French official paper that he had already quoted, which said, "The old law is “destroyed; a new public law commences:" which principle might be most destructively applied by France in her future projects of aggrandizement; and they might well say to us, that, abiding by the treaty of Amiens, which in effect ordained a new law of nations, we had no right or title to inquire; nor was that the worst, for, though these treaties were ineffectual on our part with respect to France, we were bound by the letter of them with regard to other nations, which must certainly lay the seeds of future quarrels and dissensions. Added to these important considerations, there were others, which were more of the nature of omissions than positive stipulations, but which were of equally injurious tendency. He first adverted to the point of the honour of our flag in the British seas not being asserted, and which would, in an inconceivable degree, go to abate the spirit of our seamen, on whose ardour and exertions our best hopes always depended; and this point was settled by formal stipulation in the treaty of 1783. Another point was, the omission with respect to the regulation of the gum trade, of the extent and importance of which he spoke shortly in detail. The logwood trade was the next topic which fell under the Noble Lord's observation, and on the great importance of this he also expatiated. He then observed upon what had fallen from a Noble Lord on a former evening, to the effect, that whatever claims should be demanded by France, would be founded on the arguments urged by him (Lord G.). No.