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bility was ever thought of. It has been complained of, that a paragraph appeared in a paper (the Argus) published at Paris, which states that the Irish owe no allegiance to the British Government; one number of that paper, in which this paragraph was inserted, was shewn to me; it contained much abuse of my self and my friends. Now as I don't feel any pleasure in seeing my friends abused, and none at all in being abused myself, I never sought to see another number of that paper-(a laugh) | -but to point out how industriously some newspapers of the two countries try to be even with each other in abuse, a London newspaper was shewn to me in Paris, in which it was stated, "That Great Britain should fight the "French government with fleets and armies; " and that Frenchmen should jight it, not merely "with pens, ink, and paper." Now I would ask, is not this a direct instigation to assassinate those who manage the government of France? -(A cry of No! no! no! Order! particularly from the Treasury Bench.) I am convinced that a jury would so pronounce it-an invitation to insurrection it obviously is. Such an invitation might, on some occasions, be excusable; but speaking as the representative of a people in amity with the French government, I cannot approve of it. Among the most singular complaints against France, is, that Napper Tandy, and other Irish exiles, have found an asylum there. What! was it intended by those who bargned with the unfortunate men, that they should not find a landing-place in any part of the habitable globe? That bargain specified that they should go to some country at peace with our Government. They have done so, and why then should those murmur who made the bargain, which, by the by, according to its conditions, ought to have been fulfilled much sooner than it was? I again say that I am as anxious as any man in this House to preserve the spirit of the country; and the best way to preserve that spirit is not to engage in war without necessity, and to avoid those unmanly libels which, both in and out of Parliament, are too frequently levelled at the French government. Those libels, I know, are much talked of and reprobated in France; though I also know there are many philosophical minds, both in that country and this, who look at this war of words with the utmost contempt, but yet I should prefer it to any other species of warfare. Let the Moniteur and the Morning Post, the Times and the Argus, go on in their hostile language; it is easier to be endured than a war of bayonets. Let us, however, consider, at the very moment we have sent an ambassador to the French government, eminently qualified to maintain that honourable character-when the representative of our Sovereign may be now, perhaps, making his bow, or performing the accustomed ceremonies in the presence of the First Consul of France, is it decent, is it dignified, that the Members of this House should be applying

opprobrious epithets to the Chief of the French government? Certainly not. It can answer no purpose, unless it is wished to keep up a spirit of perpetual hostility. This I shall ever deprecate. I think the present a most mo mentous crisis indeed for this country, but I see no danger from the government or people of France. Those who do, must admit that they cannot avert that danger, or soften the animosity they suppose to exist, by abuse and irritating language. I heartily disapprove of such language, and still more of the expensive establishment which is desired, perhaps to manifest still more strongly the inveterate pre judice which dictates that language. Imme diately after the conclusion of peace, the Minister held out a hope that the establishment he then proposed would be still farther reduced; but it seems a different course is to be pr sued. This I shall most certainly oppose-not that if I supposed such an extended establist ment necessary, I should decline to support it, lest France should take umbrage, for she would have no right to do so; but because I consider a large standing army, independent of considerations of expense, to be the most dangerous instrument of influence in the hands of the Crown. The Noble Lord expresses much dread, that the French, by their indus try, will injure our commerce; perhaps be would think the cutting of a canal from Paris to Dieppe, a cause of alarm—perhaps a just ground for war. The attempt is really an alarming proof of French enterprise, and the execution of it would be a still more alarming proof of French industry. If the First Consul should order Genoa to rival London, and Amsterdam to rival Liverpool, as commercial orders are always obeyed, the circumstance would be very alarming; but would war reme dy the evil, or would not greater evils arise out of it? For my part, I can admire the beauties of French manufacture without feeling any alarm, or hostile disposition; because, however beautiful they may be, I know the superior value of our own; I know the pot teries of Staffordshire can withstand the beauties of French china. To go to war on prin. ciples of rivalship, would be an act of madness and folly; to be sure by war we might get rid of our money, but that is not worth the con sideration of the Noble Lord's friends. Among the connexions of the Noble Lord may be found the fears of age and the ambition of youth, both urging to a line of conduct which, I hope, this House will resist with as much determination as we should any hostile aggres sion. If any aggression on our honour and independence should be attempted from any quarter, let Ministers call on this House, and I am confident they will find us and the country unanimously responsive to their call. Let us shew ourselves unwilling to attack, but strong to resist; and if we do go to war, let it be a war of defence. Upon this principle I hope Ministers will act, and they cannot fail to be

command of that ready, flexible, and discri minating recollection, for which the Hon. Gen-tleman (Mr. Fox) was eminently remarkable. But he thought it incumbent on him, on this occasion, to attempt some reply to those things which were the most revolting to his judg ment, and which had the most forcibly im

#popular; for I am happy to find, on my return to England, that there is but one sentiment among the people, as to the necessity of persevering in the maintenance of peace. An Hon. General (Gascoigne) competent to speak on the subject of commerce, has stated, that our manufactures are flourishing, but that our commerce has diminished.. I believe that de-pressed themselves upon his remembrance. scription of commerce has diminished, which How was it possible for that Hon. Gentleman arises out of a state of war. It was naturally to deny to the penetration of his own mind, to be expected. Such a diminution has taken that the seeds of inordinate political aggranplace at the conclusion of every war. It was dizement were sown in the minds of the French so in 1749, 1763, and 1783. It is, therefore, nation, coeval with those of democratical rethe common effect of peace; and if that volution? Every succession of the revolutionchange were to be attended to, it would be an ary rulers had openly professed the very prinargument for perpetual war. The French are ciples which so conspicuously possessed the much condemned in this country for the strict mind of the present First Consul. The extenprohibitions they have established against the sion of dominion was made, at one time, the importation of our manufactures. They had very pride of the revolution; at another, its a right to do as they pleased in that respect. necessary defence. But still it was in one form Surely no man would seriously contend that or another, for one purpose or another, the such a prohibition furnished a just ground for most confidently professed. And was it for We, of all other nations, are least enti- any man to come into this House, and offer an tled to complain of that kind of prohibition; encomiastic apology for the first efforts of a for no nation took more pains to exclude any principle which had been thus carried, of deep foreign manufactures that should interfere with design, and by no inevitable necessity, to its her own than we did; but the conduct of present threatening and overpowering height? France, in this instance, is founded on an erro-It had been said, he observed, that Britain had neous policy, which must, if long pursued, injure themselves more than us. In Holland and Prussia, on former occasions, our manufactures were prohibited with the utmost strictness, yet no national alarm was excited. We considered then, what it was equally incumbent on us to consider now, that such a species of prohibition was mere matter of internal regulation, not understood to imply any hostile purpose.

war.

Mr. WINDHAM rose, and in a speech ingeniously refined in argument, yet impressively familiar and pointed in its iliustrations, offered a powerful answer to all that had been advanced in opposition to his known sentiments from either side of the House. We cannot pretend to report his speech in detail, but must, though with reluctance, content ourselves with touching lightly on its leading positions. He observed, in answer to a sarcastic remark from a former speaker, representing him and his friends to give many proofs of their fears, and few of their judgment; that those very fears might be the genuine progeny of judgment, and, therefore, the best proofs of its existence in those who gave the alarm; that, if the fears were conceived only on the approach, or in the very midst of real danger, not to feel them were the only proof of want of judgment; that on the score of fear, therefore, no accusation could be brought against him and his friends, without due discussion of the whole matter which stood at issue. He regretted his inability to recollect the different reasonings which had been advanced in speeches which a sense of duty compelled him to oppose. His habits of debate had not been such as to give him a S

gained nothing by the war, that France had acquired nothing by the peace. Was it, then, nothing gained to preserve our constitution; to hold at bay both the revolutionary principles, and the political ambit on of the French; to maintain that erect, independent, national spirit which has so long constituted the very peculiarizing essentiality of the British character? Was it nothing to confine within the limits of Europe an ambition to bestride, as but a petty space, the very world? Buonaparté, with the soul of an Alexander, might regard this many-peopled earth as but a large prison; and was it nothing to confine that restless spirit within a space which might, to its hopes and darings, be but a narrow cell? The French had gained nothing by the peace! Was it nothing to have procured those restraints which they could neither burst through nor surmount, to be voluntarily withdrawn? The preliminaries of peace; the treaty of Amiens; had they not, like the spell of a magician, like the movement of some talisman, laid open, in an instant, to France, the obstructed passages to the West Indies, to Africa, to Asia, to every region to which she might otherwise have long struggled in vain to make her way? The sudden restitution of St. Domingo to the dominion of France, was not that an effect of the peace? To what but the peace did she owe the advantages of that access which she gained by the acquisition of Louisiana to the back settlements of America? While the issue of the contest remained yet uncertain, France possessed that confirmed power in Italy to which she has since attained. We may judge whether France has not gained by the peace, by reflecting whether, if we were now to renew

other side of the House would be, Lot only to renew, but to render war perpetual. MA dington then adverted to what had fallen from a Noble Lord in the course of the debate: the Noble Lord had asserted a proposition wh was not maintainable, namely, that it was t possible hostilities could be renewed. T House would do him the justice to recoles, that in the very discussion of the treaty a peace, he had insisted that measure was n taken on account of any deficiency in means to carry on the war. He had disclaimà the plea of necessity; and in the present instre he would aver, in opposition to the Not Lord, that if the honour or the security of t country demanded the alternative, it had th means of supporting a contest of seven ordet

the war, we could renew it with all those | The general tenour of his arguments, howers, pledges for success which we held in our hands was applicable either to a state of war or to at the cessation of hostilities? The Hon. Gen-state of peace, though certainly in a greate tleman (Mr. Fox) has talked of the irritations degree to the latter. He was perfectly arme of a paper war between the two countries, of of the principles upon which that Right Ho its contemptible meannes, and of its being Gentleman had stated his opposition to the yet more foolish than irritating. But if we are peace, and he gave him full credit for the to shut out from the people of this country manly, spirited, and consistent manter in wha all knowledge of the designs and conduct of the he had always avowed his sentiments. E French rulers, it were difficult to understand understood his arguments of that night, t how they should be prepared to meet any medi- supposed it to be the Right Hon. Gentieri tated hostilities with just indignation and reso-opinion, that upon the whole it was destit Jution, till they were at our very gates, or that this country, on the general ground che rather kindling to a conflagration the very fires curity, should be restored to that situr | on our hearths. The Hon. Gentleman talks from which it was taken by the treaty of the error of fine-spun and distant specula- Amiens. In that view he spoke of the c tions; then refers us to Machiavel for an ac- which would be averted, that the Fact count of the wonderful and happy things to be would not now be in possession of Louisra expected from the blessed agency of time and or of St. Domingo, and that the British pert chance. But time and chance rarely do much would still remain superior in the Midte in favour of men who can do nothing to sup-ranean. The effect of the arguments of tz port themselves. To time and chance none ever trusted less than the French. Who would bet upon the uncertainties of the dice when he might venture his money upon the sure calculations to which it is possible to subject a game at chess? Look back to the most distant æra of French ambition to sway in the system of Europe. Buonaparté has but accomplished schemes that were conceived by Henry IV. and his minister Sully, and have been ever since uniformly pursued. And is it in this state of things that the Hon. Gentleman is to come, and with a voice, than which an enemy's ambassador could propose nothing more dangerous, to call to us, that we have nothing left but to trust to time and chance; to be quiet, lest we should be attacked; to dread the force of a population so much supe-years duration, without imposing any burde rior to our own; to hope well of our commerce, but to be comforted in the thought, that, when our trade and wealth are ravished from us, we shall have nothing left to provoke an enemy's desires? Did Buonaparte send a friend to solicit the interests of his ambition in this country; what else could he wisely enjoin him, to dissolve all manly resolution in the hearts of our people, than by such arguments to impress a general persuasion of the necessity to lay us hopelessly down in the charms of such a peace? We particularly regret our inability, on account of the general length of the debate, to add here, a very beautiful and ingenious argument on the utility of continental connexions to Britain, and in defence of the fairness and honour of our allies in the late war, which Mr. Windham laboured in considerable detail, in answer to some things which had been previously thrown out by Mr. Wilberforce.]

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER observed, that the speech of his Right Hon. Friend (Mr. Windham) was precisely in the same strain of despondency as that which he had delivered on the motion for the address.

on the people, but such as would be beme with cheerfulness. This allegation was at lightly made, but was the result of delibente and minute investigation. With respect to the Noble Lord's objections to the persons of trac who composed the present Administratie, and his idea of their being unfit for their stak tions, he conceived him to object princip on the grounds of an imputed want of energ and vigour in their conduct. But he work ask the Noble Lord, what part of their c duct, either before or since the peace, just fel such an imputation? They followed up tplans of their predecessors, with respect to the northern hostilities, with vigour and effect. their preparations for the defence and security of the country discovered no want of prompt tude or energy; they sent adequate reinforce ments to the army in Egypt; they detached: squadron to block up Cadiz, and to watch th Spanish coasts; and since the peace, nothing of the nature alluded to could be charge upon them: but they would be deserving of censure did they disarm to the extent which the Noble Lord and his friends at one tim deemed proper. For these reasons he w induced to think, and as there were no speciše

grounds urged, that their real crime in the Noble Lord's eyes was their enjoying the confidence of the Sovereign, and being instrumental in giving peace to their country. He then entered into some detailed calculations to shew that the situation of the country was considerably improved by the peace, and that her strength and resources were such as placed her above every apprehension of danger in those points of view contended for on the other side of the House. Speaking of what had appeared in public prints in both countries, he expressed his concurrence with what fell from an Hon. Gentleman on that head; those kinds of observations were, he thought, equally unworthy the good sense, the prudence, and the manners of the country. However, it was not his wish, on that account, that a finger should be laid on the freedom of the British press. God forbid! The worst consequences which could ensue from those were light and insignificant, compared with what would be the effect of such an outrage! He assured the House, that Ministers would uphold the honour of the Sovereign and of the country; they would make no compromise disgraceful, even for the preservation of peace, but would persevere in a firm but moderate line of conduct.

tum. It could not be contended that a first projet was an ultimatum. At Lisle, Ministers naturally asked more than they would have been contented to take, and it was fair to infer they would have given up the Cape. Before we signed the peace of Amiens, Portugal had been invaded by a French army, and had signed a separate peace. Why should we have stipulated for Portugal, which had settled for herself? But even under these circumstances, when we discovered the cessions she had made in America, we obtained back a part of those cessions. With regard to the House of Orange, it was stipulated in the treaty of Amiens, that it should be indemnified in Germany.

Mr. CANNING contended, that the projet of Lisle was an ultimatum, as he knew it was the design of Ministers in the event of that proposal to have come upon the country, and to have appealed on the fairness of our offers in case they failed. He thought it invidious in Ministers to argue on the projet of Lisle, as they had done, situated as they were in regard to their predecessors.

he said, could not be understood invidiously by his predecessor, as he (Mr. Pitt) had wholly approved of the peace.

Mr. BRAGGE asked, what further security would the possession of the Cape have been against the present aggrandizement of France? EARL TEMPLE could not accuse Mr. Ad-The reasoning of Mr. Addington this night, dington of an intention of misrepresenting him; but in fact he had done so. What his Lordship had said, was not, that the country was incapable of supporting a war, but that under the present Administration there was no hope of avar, and that they did not possess energy of character sufficient to ensure us safety in peace.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, there was one point he had forgot to state. It had been asked, what would be the economy of our peace establishment? In answer, he said, our peace establishment would be about twenty-five millions.

LORD MORPETH spoke in defence of the projet at Lisle, compared with the peace of Amiens. By that projet he said we maintained a scrupulous faith with our allies, and did not sacrifice them, as Portugal and the House of Orange had been sacrificed at Amiens.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he referred to the projet at Lisle only to shew, that whatever difference existed between it and the treaty of Amiens, that difference would not, in the one more than in the other, have shielded this country against the ambition and aggrandizement of France.

LORD HAWKESBURY said, the only material difference between the projet of Lisle and the treaty of Amiens was, the Cape of Good Hope, and that this was not to be urged as a difference in fact. The projet at Lisle was but a projet: the peace at Amiens was an ultimaVOL. II.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2D DECEMBER 1802.

Mr. ALEXANDER brought up the Report of the Committee of Supply; and on the motion that the resolution for granting 50,000 seamen for the service of the ensuing year, be read a second time,

Mr. T. GRENVILLE rose, and spoke to the following effect:-"I rise, Sir, to express my astonishment at the mode of proceeding which is now proposed, a mode which places the House of Commons in quite a new situation. The Minister demands an extraordinary supply of seamen, without condescending to give the least explanation of the reasons which induce the necessity, or the purposes to which he means to apply them. I cannot hesitate to observe, that the conduct of the Ministers, whose duty it was to give this explanation, is novel, unprecedented, and unconstitutional; is disrespectful to this House; and this House will subscribe to its own disgrace, if it should assent to this proposition until the necessary explanation shall be given. When I came down yesterday, I confess I felt a good deal of anxiety, curiosity, and expectation, to hear what language Ministers would employ. I had some hope of hearing from them some exposition of their motives and views, some allusions to the state of Europe, some idea of what 4 21

the country had to look for something dif- | When the Minister, in June last, proposed a ferent from those indefinite terms they have vote of 70,000 seamen, he was asked by an heretofore used, terms equally full of firmness Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Tierney), what would and humility, and implying no fixed or regular be his probable peace establishment, and he resystem of policy; at one time adopting the plied, about 30,000. Why, then, does he now dignified language which becomes the Govern- require 50,000? what change has taken place ment of Great Britain; at another time chim- in our position? what new and unexpected ing in the tone of submission which issued dangers have arisen? what event has occurred from the opposite side of the House: but I was since the Minister made this reply, and which disappointed; Ministers were utterly silent, his great political foresight could then cakuand the vote in the Committee passed without late upon, to render this excess necessary? a single observation. I was glad of the oppor- Has this vote reference to a peace or a war tunity that presented itself on this occasion for establishment? If to the former, Parliament Ministers to speak out; I was glad, because I and the country may think it excessive; if to thought upon such a subject it would be im- the latter, such a force may be deemed inadepossible for them to hold undecided or equivoquate: at present this House is incompetent to cal language; but they have evaded it; they have not thought proper to tell us any of the grounds upon which they have deemed it expedient thus to deviate from the practice of former times, thus to demand a large disposable force, productive of great expense, without informing us what danger we have to dread, and how far the force demanded will tend to avert that danger. I have looked in vain for some communication from them to supply the complete deficiency of information in his Majesty's speech, and in the debates upon it. To the address in answer to that speech I assented, because I could not consistently refuse it, for it was drawn up in such a way as to contain nothing exceptionable, and yet to want that which was most essentially necessary, intelligce as to our present state with respect to the continent. The speech, in fact, contained not a sentiment which was not applicable to any period of our history; it was a collection of truisms, without any opinion or statement peculiarly referring to the present times. How different the conduct of Ministers in former instances! how different at the peace of 1763, and at that of 1783 also! On the former occasion it was stated, in his Majesty's speech, that, from the disposition manifested by the powers with whom the treaty had been concluded, there was the fullest assurance for the continuance of peace; and in the speech of 1783, his Majesty expressed the happiness he felt in being able to inform the House that there was no reason to doubt the disposition of those with whom he had concluded peace, to preserve it inviolate. In both these speeches there were the most intel-, ligible and specific declarations of the opinions of Ministers as to the state of Europe, and they were on both occasious equally explicit in debate, as to the views of policy they meant to pursue, and the force they thought necessary for the defence of the country. But now, for the first time, a Minister opens a session in time of peace with a speech composed of general terms, and applies to Parliament for a vote of 50,000 scamen, without attempting to describe to us the necessity which calls for such a force, or enabling us to judge how far this force may be proportioned to that necessity.

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judge; and before we submit to the obloquy of assenting to the proposition now under dis-,, cussion, I trust the Minister will be compelled to present such materials for our considerata, as may fully qualify us to decide this question The question upon which we are to determine is this: What is the danger that threatens us, and is the state of our resources and prepara tion equal to resist it? Among the dangers that threaten us, let us consider the marit.me state of Europe. When we look at Russia, ia the first instance, we unfortunately find a strong partiality in that power toward the views of France, at least for some time back, though, from the moderate character of the present Emperor, and some late circumstances, there may be a little reason to hope that a f ferent policy will soon prevail, and that our former relations of cordial friendship with that cabinet will be re-established. I am awar that, in adverting to the Northern Confek racy, I am about to tread on delicate ground; but I must observe, that, in my opinion, whit is called the convention, did not satisfactorily settle the point in dispute with that Confede racy; and what the Noble Secretary of State termed the explanatory convention, involved the matter in still greater perplexity. How ever, my principal reason for alluding to that Confederacy is, to take notice of an expression made use of, on a former occasion, by the Noble Secretary of State, to whom I mean n disrespect. That Noble Lord said, that the victory of Copenhagen created an obstacle a the treaty with the Northern Confederacy, which rendered it the most difficult negotiation in which he had been ever engaged. I mes then remark, that the British statesman wte could experience a difficulty in his negotiation with an enemy, from one of the most glorioss victories ever obtained by the British fleet, and over that very enemy, affords no very flatter ing prospect of the consequences likely to c sue from his dexterous management at the court of Petersburgh, or at any other court Europe. But to proceed to a review of the maritime powers of Europe. In Holland, 20 one can be ignorant that great and unpa ralleled exertions are making to restore ther navy; that a considerable number of large ves

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