COMMON CARRIERS.

1. LIABILITY OF RAILROAD COMPANY ON CONTRACT TO CARRY BEYOND TERMINUS-
SHIPPING RECEIPT.-A railroad company that contracts to carry goods over its own
and connecting roads, and deliver the same within a certain time at a destination
beyond the terminus of its own line, is liable to the shipper for damages caused by
delay in transportation over such connecting roads. Whether the contract of ship-
ment provided for a carriage beyond such terminus is a question for the jury. Upon
the determination of this question the provisions of the receipt delivered by the
carrier to the shipper are not conclusive upon the latter. Pereira v. Central Pacific
R. R. Co. Cal. 372.

See NEGLIGENCE, 3-7, 10; RAILROADS.

COMMUNITY AND SEPARATE PROPERTY (EDITORIAL).
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 193, 305, 357, 389, 445, 541.

COMPLAINT.'

See APPEAL, 2.

COMPROMISE OF ACTION.
See ATTORNEYS, 1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

See FINDINGS, 1.

CONDITIONS.

See INSURANCE, 6.

CONFESSIONS.

See Evidence, 4.

CONSIDERATION.

1. INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION.-Mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to avoid
the sale of real property; but when such inadequacy is gross and the vendor was
needy and of weak mind, and acted upon the impression that he was indebted to the
vendee, when he was not, equity will give relief by treating the vendee as the trus-
tee of the property for the vendor or his representatives. Four hundred dollars held
to be a grossly inadequate price for property worth not less than fifteen hundred
dollars. Parkhurst et al. v. Hosford et al. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Or. 311.

. 2. CONSIDERATION OF DEED-PAROL EVIDENCE OF.-Parol evidence is admissible to
show that the real consideration of a deed was other property given in exchange, in-
stead of the money stated therein. Lake v. Lake. Nev. 159.

See FRAUD, 2; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. CHARTER OF GEORGETOWN, VALIDITY OF— - SPECIAL LEGISLATION.-The charter of
Georgetown having become a law prior to the adoption of the constitution, remains
in force after such adoption, so far as not inconsistent with the latter instrument.
The fact that it is local or special legislation does not affect its validity. People v.
Jobs. Col. 236, 561.

2. THE SAME AUTHORITY OF POLICE JUDGE.-Whether the declaration in such charter,
clothing the police judge of Georgetown with power to act as justice of the peace,
is valid, quære? Conceding, however, that such extension of power is unconstitu-
tional, the authority of the police judge, as such, is not affected thereby. The
right of such officer to preside at meetings of the selectmen, and to exercise other
powers, usually devolved upon the mayor, is not abrogated by the constitution. Id.
See BAIL, 2; CITIZENSHIP; ELECTION; JURY AND JURORS, 11; JUSTICES' COURTS, 2;
PROHIBITION, 1; PUBLIC OFFICERS; SWAMP LANDS, 1, 6, 11; TAXATION, 1; VENUE,

CONTEMPT.

1. CONTEMPT, AFFIDAVIT FOR-VERIFICATION OF BY THIRD PERSON.-The affidavit
charging a person with a contempt for refusing to obey an injunction decree, need
not be verified by a party beneficially interested in the injunction proceedings; and
although the court should refuse to act unless satisfied that the party making the
affidavit was authorized to do so by the party beneficially interested, the presump-
tion is that such party, by his attorney, presented the affidavit, and that fact is suf-
ficient to show that the party making the affidavit was authorized. Strait et al. v.
Williams. Nev. 480.

2. THE SAME-WHAT THE AFFIDAVIT MUST SHOW.-Such affidavit is sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction of the contempt proceedings, if it states in substance the ren-
dition of the judgment, that the same is in full force and effect and unreversed, and
shows the violation thereof by the defendant. Id.

CONTRACT.

1. DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT-NEGLIGENCE - PREVENTION OF Loss.— One
who sues to recover damages for injuries in an action arising out of contract or tort,
cannot recover if the injuries were consequent upon his own negligence which di-
rectly contributed to thein. Everyone engaged in the performance of a contract is
bound to do everything in his power to prevent loss to himself from a breach of the
contract by the other party. If he cannot prevent it altogether, he must make rea-
sonable exertions to render it as light as possible; and if, by his own negligence or
willfulness, he allows the damages to be unnecessarily enhanced, the increased loss
must fall upon him. Winans v. Sierra Lumber Co. Cal. 277.

2. PARTIAL BREACH OF CONTRACT-ESTOPPEL-PART PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT. —A
party to a contract is not estopped from asserting his claim for a partial breach of
the contract by the other party, from the fact that at the time when a settlement
was had between them for work done under the contract, no mention was made of
such claim. If the contract was susceptible of more or less performance, and there
was a partial breach thereof by one of the parties, the other has the right to con-
tinue to carry out the contract, reserving to himself the right to bring action for
such damages as he may have sustained by the partial breach. Id.

3. BREACH OF CONTRACT TO MANUFACTURE LUMBER - MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-The
plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed tɔ man-
ufacture lumber, and the defendant agreed to purchase all that the plaintiff might
manufacture, at a stipulated price, and to furnish him certain machinery for such
purpose. The machinery furnished was inadequate, and by reason thereof the plaint-
iff was unable to manufacture as much lumber as he otherwise would have done.
In an action to recover for the breach of such contract, held, that the measure of
damages was the contract-price for the lumber which the plaintiff was so prevented
from manufacturing, less the expense he would have incurred in manufacturing said
lumber, over and above the amount necessarily expended, under the circumstances,
in manufacturing the amount actually manufactured by him. Id.

4. STIPULATION IN BUILDING CONTRACT FOR ARBITRATION - CONSTRUCTION OF CON-
TRACT. A stipulation in a contract for building a railroad, that in case any disputes
or differences arise between the company and contractors "as to the construction or
meaning of the agreement or specifications or sufficiency of the performance of any
work to be done under it or price to be paid, the same shall be referred to the chief
engineer of the company, who shall consider and decide the same, and his decision
shall be final," is valid, and the decision of the engineer on any of such matters is
binding on the parties, in the absence of fraud or mistake on the part of such officer.
Held, however, that a dispute as to the amount of work done by the contractor was
not included within such stipulation. D. S. P. & P. R. R. v. Riley. Col. 238.
5. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT SUED ON-BREACH OF CONTRACT.-The plaintiffs and
the defendant entered into a contract whereby the latter agreed to sell to the former
ice, in such quantities as might be demanded, at a certain price. The plaintiffs agreed
not to buy ice from anyone else. During the continuance of the contract one of
the plaintiffs bought ice from other parties. Held, that the same constituted a
breach of the contract, and released the defendant from its obligations under the
contract, although the ice was bought by such plaintiff for his individual use. Two-
mey et al. v. People's Ice Co. Cul. 700.

6. CONTRACT-LIABILITY FOR ILLEGAL ACT-INFERENCES OF INTENTION.-A party is
not bound for the consequences of an illegal act, from a mere suggestion in a conver-

sation in regard to a matter of contract, unless there can be justly inferred from it an intention on his part to bind himself contractually. Andrews v. Runyon. Cal. 81. 7. JUDGMENT AND ORDER affirmed after construing the contract sued on. Martin v.

Hill et al. Cal. 430.

See ASSIGNMENt, 1; Common Carriers, 1; Guaranty; MASTER AND SERVANT.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

See NEGLIGENCE, 1-3.

CORPORATIONS.

1. CONTRACT BETWEEN A DIRECTOR AND THE CORPORATION-LOAN ON EXCESSIVE INTEREST.-A director of a corporation cannot contract with his co-directors that, in consideration of a sum of money advanced by him he should receive the company's notes for a much larger amount, bearing an excessive rate of interest, although by oral contemporaneous agreement it was provided that of the excess beyond the amount loaned, the corporation should be required to pay only the sum which the lender might pay for taxes upon the property, with interest thereon. The corporation may satisfy such notes by paying the amount actually loaned, with interest thereon at the ordinary rates. Sutter Street R. Co. v. Baum et al. Cal. 291. 2. INCREASE OF CAPITAL STOCK-FICTITIOUS ISSUE-SPRING Valley Water WORKS.The Spring Valley Water Company is authorized to increase its capital stock and to. sell the increased issue at the actual market value of the stock of the corporation, for the purpose of raising funds to extend and enlarge the capacity of the works of the corporation, so as to afford greater protection to the property of the inhabitants of the city and coRnty of San Francisco, and to supply them with an abundance of water. Such increased issue is not “fictitious,” within the meaning of article XII, section 11 of the constitution. Stein v. Howard et al. Cal. 43.

3. CORPORATION HOLDING STOCK OF ANOTHER CORPORATION-ULTRA VIRES.-It is not presumptively ultra vires for one corporation to hold or acquire the stock of another corporation. Evans v. Bailey. Cal. 427.

4. SUBSCRIPTION FOR STOCK-SHAREHOLDER-BOOKS OF COMPANY.-The books of a corporation are competent evidence to prove the number of shares which had been subscribed for and issued at the time an alleged indebtedness arose, and who were the shareholders. Id.

5. THE SAME--ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION.-The articles of incorporation of a company, dated in 1877, do not necessarily show who were the shareholders, or in what amounts respectively, during a subsequent period. Id.

6. PLEA IN BAR OR ABATEMENT.-In an action by a corporation on a contract, a denial of its corporate existence goes not only to the disability of the plaintiff, but to the cause of action also, and is therefore a plea or defense in bar of the action, and will be so considered unless expressly pleaded in abatement. Oregonian etc. R. R. Co.. v. Oregon R. R. etc. Co. (U. S. Cir. Ct.) Or. 548.

7. ESTOPPEL BY CONTRACT.-A party who contracts with a corporation, as such, is thereby estopped, in an action on such contract, to deny its corporate existence, or power to make such contract; but in case such want of existence or power is pleaded as a defense to such action, the corporation must claim the benefit of the estoppel on the record, or the same will be considered waived. Id.

8. PLEADING AN ESTOPPEL.-When the matter constituting the estoppel (the contract) does not appear in the previous pleadings, it must be set up by replication; but where the same does so appear, the estoppel must be raised by demurrer. Id. 9. CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF SERVANTS.-Corporations are liable for the acts of their agents and employés in the same manner and to the same extent as private persons. Accordingly, the employés of a railroad corporation, who are engaged in service at its stations or on its trains, are presumed to be authorized by it to do such service, and to perform the acts usually incident to their position; and the corporation is liable for their tortious acts which are performed in the course of such service. Denver, S. P. and P. R. R. Co. v. Conway. Col. 672. 10. THE SAME-KNOWLEDGE OF SERVANT KNOWLEDGE OF CORPORATION.-Knowledge acquired by agents of corporations in the discharge of official duties, of facts material to the transactions in which they are engaged, or coming within their respective departments, is the knowledge of the corporation. Id.

See INJUNCTIONS, 1; TAXATION, 2, 3, 14, 15; Venue, 1.

COSTS.

See EJECTMENT, 1.

COTENANTS.

See TENANTS IN COMMON.

COUNTY COURT.

1. JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURT-AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY-ÁVERMENT OF.-- -A complaint in an action in the county court need not allege, in the very words of the statute, that the amount in controversy does not exceed two thousand dollars. It is sufficient if it affirmatively appears from the complaint that the value of the property in controversy, or the amount involved for which relief is sought, does not exceed that sum. Hughes v. Brewer. Col. 450.

See CERTIORARI, 5, 7, 9.

COUNTY GOVERNMENT ACT.

See BONDS, 1.

COVENANTS.

See LEASE, 3-6.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE-IN GENERAL.

1. MOTION TO QUASH INDICTMent-Patent DEFECTS.-A motion to quash an indictment under the Compiled Laws, page 152, section 101, only lies for defects which are apparent upon the face of the record. Cook v. Territory. Wy. 340. 2. ARRAIGNMENT DUTY OF COURT TO INSTRUCT AS TO RIGHT TO COUNSEL.-An arraignment is not void because the court, before the commencement of the proceed. ings of arraignment, omitted to imform the defendant of his right to counsel, or to assign counsel to defend him if he was unable to employ one, if the court instructed the defendant concerning his right to counsel during the course of arraignment. People v. Villarino. Cal. 693.

3. OBJECTIONS TO INFORMATION, WHEN MUST BE TAKEN. Any statutory objections to an information, or any defects apparent upon its face, cannot, after a plea of not guilty, be availed of on the trial, nor on a motion for a new trial, nor on a motion in arrest of judgment. It is only a want of jurisdiction, or a failure to state facts constituting a public offense, which may be taken advantage of at any time in the course of criminal proceedings. Id.

4. THE QUESTION WHETHER AN INDICTMENT DOES OR DOES NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT can be raised in the appellate court for the first time. Territory v. Young. Mont. 468.

5. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT-REVIEW OF EVIDENCE.-On an appeal from a judgment alone the appellate court will not examine the evidence as to its sufficiency to support the verdict. Id.

6. ADMISSIBILITY OF DEPOSITION TAKEN BEFORE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-On the trial of a defendant for having in his possession dies, plates, etc., designed for and used in counterfeiting coins currrent in this state, the deposi tion of a witness taken before the committing magistrate is admissible in evidence, upon proof that such witness is absent from the state. Sections 686 and 869 of the penal code, authorizing such evidence, are not in conflict with the last clause of section 13, article 1 of the constitution of 1879. People v. Oiler. Cal. 383.

7. DRUNKENNESS AS BEARING ON INTENTION IN COMMISSION OF CRIME-The effect of a prisoner's inebriated condition, as bearing upon the intention with which he committed a crime, is a question for the jury. Cook v. Territory. Wy. 340.

8. THE EVIDENCE IN A CRIMINAL CASE MUST CONVINCE TO A MORAL CERTAINTY before a conviction can be had. Territory v. Adolphson. Mont. 474.

See APPEAL, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14; ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON; BAIL; ESCAPE FROM STATE PRISON; FALSE PRETENSES; HABEAS CORPUS; JUSTICES' COURTS, 1; LARCENY; MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER.

CUSTOM.

See NUISANCE, 5.

DAMAGES.

See MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

DEADLY WEAPON.

See ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See FRAUD, 2; MORTGAGE, 2; PAYMENT; REDEMPTION.

DECISION.

See JUDGMENT,

DECREE.

See JUDGMENT.

DEEDS.

1. GRANT OF LAND-DESCRIPTION BY GENERAL NAME-EXCEPTION FROM GRANT.-A grant of a tract of land with well-known boundaries, designated and known by a general name, passes all the land within the tract so named or designated; and, upon the same principle, where in the grant of a tract of land by metes and bounds there is excepted therefrom a portion of the tract with well-known boundaries, designated by a general name by which it is known, the tract so designated does not pass by the grant. Truett v. Adams. Cal. 633.

2. DOUBTFUL DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES INTERPRETATION OF.-In determining what land was intended to be conveyed, where the description in the deed is doubtful, it is the duty of the court to assume as nearly as possible the position of the contracting parties, and to question the circumstances of the transaction between them, and then to read and interpret the words which they used in the light of these circumstances. Id.

3. THE SAME EVIDENCE OF ACTS AND DECLARATIONS OF PARTIES.-Where the location of premises intended to be conveyed can be ascertained from the terms used in the instrument of conveyance, neither the acts nor declarations of the parties are admissible to show their understanding of the description contained in the conveyance. But where the terms used to describe the premises meant to be conveyed are equivocal, ambiguous or insufficient, the subsequent acts of the parties while in interest showing the practical construction put upon the terms of the description by them, may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining their intention. And where it is proved that a line has been agreed upon, either expressly or by long acquiescence, as the dividing line between two tracts of land, courts will not disturb the line. Id.

See BOUNDARIES, 1; CONSIDERATION, 1, 2.

DELAY.

See EQUITY.

DELIVERY.

See RELEASE.

DEMAND.

See REPLEVIN.

DEMURRER.

1. DEMURRER TO SEPARATE ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADING.-Disconnected averments in a pleading cannot be separately demurred to. Herefort v. Cramer. Cal. 229.