other victims to expect when he spoke of the government buying cavalry horses. Why did the price of silver decline when the government's purchases increased? Because the supply increased also, and because the public knew that the purchases must stop some time, just as purchases of cavalry horses stop some time. The supply of cavalry horses would increase in like manner after a while. It takes five years to produce a cavalry horse. During five years we might expect a considerable advance in the price of horses if the government's purchases were steady, but at the end of that time the supply would equal the demand, and the price would fall back to the place of beginning.

Really the figure of speech adopted by "Coin" is deceptive in another way. Free coinage, which he aims at, does not imply any purchases by the government at all. Therefore all his talk about the government buying cavalry horses is fustian.

This is a suitable place, however, to say that free coinage of both gold and silver does not create an unlimited demand for both metals. It does not even change the pre-existing demand except for one purpose-that of paying pre-existing debts. After this temporary purpose is achieved, then, supposing that the ratio is really effectual, and that the two metals are at a parity in the market, the general preference for gold, arising from its convenience in all commercial transactions which call for the use of a money metal, will be as strong after bi-metallism as before. Banks and individuals who have to transfer metal and to store it and take care of it will pay a premium for it equal to the extra cost of handling silver, and when a premium is paid for one of the metals, bi-metallism no longer exists.

This is on the supposition that the ratio agreed upon is so near the market ratio that we "start fair." That ratio would be about 32 to 1. If we do not start fair we shall stumble at the first step. There will be an immediate grab for gold, and bi-metallism will be dead before it is born. But, it is asked, what could anybody do with gold except to pay his debts with it? He could use it to make new bar gains on a gold basis. It is admitted that the law can compel people to take silver or copper or anything else for past debts. Our history has many lamentable examples where the law compelled people to accept much less than they had bargained for-continental money for example. But it is firmly denied that the law can compel people in this country to make future bargains in silver if they prefer to make them in gold.

Continuing this lecture, we come to the following statement (page 52):

"The demonetization of silver destroyed one-half of the redemption money of the United States. It did it in this way: By making gold the unit and closing the mints to silver, it lessened the demand for silver, and its commercial value at once began to depreciate as measured in gold."

The demonetization of silver did not destroy a dollar of redemption money, because there was none at that time of either silver or gold. There can be no redemption money without redemption. Even if we had been redeeming our greenbacks at that time, we should not have redeemed any with silver, because, as "Coin" tells us on page 19:

At the time the United States demonetized silver, in February, 1873, silver as measured in gold was worth $1.02."

Is it likely that the government would have bought silver at 2 per cent. premium to redeem its greenbacks with when it could redeem them with gold at par? That is what Coin" wants his scholars to believe.

"Here Mr. Walsh arose again, and Coin paused to hear the question" (page 54). This seems to be the proper place to insert Mr. Walsh's denial that he ever asked any questions.

"To the Editor of the N. Y. Evening Post:

"Sir.-I am very glad that your inquiry of April 9 gives me an opportunity to correct any misapprehension that might be caused by the use of my name in the book called 'Coin's Financial School.' I never attended any of the lectures referred to in that book, and therefore, could not have used the language with which I am credited. JOHN R. WALSH.

CHICAGO, April 11."

CHAPTER VIII.

COIN'S SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS.

The next thing in order is "Coin's" lecture on panics illustrated by cuts. He arranges a series of parallelograms divided into sections, one above another, the lowest section being marked “Primary money," the next highest "Credit money," the next Checks, drafts and bills of exchange," and the highest of all "Notes, bonds, mortgages and accounts," in order to show the genesis of panics and how explosions take place when the three upper sections become too much expanded in proportion to the lower one. No mention is made of the panic of 1873, which came at a time when we were not using any primary money at all.

With much affectation of learning spread over three pages, we are led up to this proposition (page 58):

Finally the silver-men, pushing their cause, forced the declaration from the administration that all paper was redeemable in gold and silver at the option of the holder. This meant that they [sic] demanded the most favored and valuable of the two-gold. The government had stored most of the silver and issued paper money on it which was declared to be redeemable in gold. This cut the base of the column half in two and left us with only half a foundation for our financial system."

Thus, we are told, the financial crisis of 1890 (the Baring crisis) was produced, and this is illustrated by an explosion so destructive that gold itself disappears in the picture, while, according to the text, it was involved under the enormous strain placed upon it," whatever that may mean. These pictures are indispensable because nobody can possibly understand the argument. Take, for example, the quotation printed above, which is really the most intelligible part of the lecture. This tells us two things, viz.; (1) that the silver-men forced the Administration (meaning the Harrison administration) to declare that all paper money was redeemable in gold or silver at the option of the holder; (2) that this took half of our primary money away and weakened correspondingly the foundation upon which the other things in the column rested.

"Coin" had previously told us, on page 52, that silver dollars were not primary money at all, but only token money, and that this fact dated from the demonetization act of 1873, which is true. Here we have silver dollars serving as primary money, until the administration" made a certain declaration, when it ceased to be primary money, and then a series of explosions took place, first the Baring crisis, and then the crisis of 1893, and all the subsequent disasters. The Australian panic is not specifically mentioned, but surely that is as much entitled to be counted among the results of the declaration of Harrison's administration as is the Baring crisis of England and Argentina.

The whole of this jargon about panics is an arrangement of pegs upon which to hang the pictures of the explosions. Nobody can understand it, but most people can understand an explosion-that is, they know that when an explosion takes place, the things resting on the explosive material go up into the air. The artist can arrange these as he likes, and there is no danger that anybody will dispute the arrangement.

How PROF. LAUGHLIN GOT LEFT.

66

The next person who tackled Coin was Prof. Laughlin of the University of Chicago, and this was the question he put :

"You have stated since this school began that, so long as free coinage was enjoyed by both metals, the commercial value of silver and gold had never differed more than two per cent., and that this difference was accounted for by the disturbance of the French ratio and the cost of exchange. Am I right in so quoting you?" "You are," replied "Coin."

Now, "Coin" had not said any such thing. He had said "two points," which we have heretofore shown was fifteen per cent., but he wanted people to understand it in that way. But Laughlin seemed to think that as small a variation as two per cent. offered some chances of the metals parting company, and he asked if there was not some danger of it. Also whether silver coin had not sold at a premium as high as eight per cent. over gold "several times prior to 1857." This last question is abso

lutely unintelligible. It was thrown in for the purpose of making Laughlin appear like a fool.

J

"Coin" began his answer with some wholly irrelevant remarks about the scarcity of small bills in the summer of 1893, which led people to pay a premium for them during a brief period-this by way of showing that a persistent variation between silver and gold, extending over a period of two centuries, is a phenomenon resembling a panic of two or three weeks' duration. Then he says, addressing Laughlin :

"At the time you speak of nearly all small money was made from silver, and on account of the French premium for silver our silver was leaving us. Small money was scarce, and frequently commanded a premium, not on account of the value of the silver bullion, but upon the demand for small money. Gold dollars commanded the same premium as silver dollars and fifty-cent pieces.'

If this means anything, it means that the French people were so short of small coins that they bought ours away from us at a premium, and used it without remelting, because that would have made it bullion, whereas "Coin "says that the premium was not on account of the bullion, but "upon the demand for small money." Now, in order to buy our small coins at any time after 1853, the French people would have been obliged to pay seven per cent. more for it than it was worth as bullion, because we had reduced its weight in that year and made it subsidiary or token money, as "Coin had already remarked in an unguarded moment. But history does not mention any time when France was using our small money in her local circulation, although we did use hers at one time.

After the foregoing colloquy on the subject of the drainage of our small coins to Europe" prior to 1857" on account of the premium offered for them by the greenhorns of France, "Coin" asked Laughlin whether he was satisfied with the answer, saying: "I have the exchangeable quotations of silver and gold bullion at the time you speak of." The professor said he was satisfied. "I am glad these questions are asked," said "Coin." "These statements, when used and not answered, confuse the people." Rabelais's debate on the question "whether a chimera ruminating in a vacuum devoureth second intentions" is the nearest parallel to this discussion between " Coin" and Laughlin, but the latter says in the following note that it never took place at all: THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, April 13, 1895.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE N. Y. EVENING POST: Sir.-Your inquiry as to whether I made the remarks attributed to me in a small book called " Coin's Financial School," is but one of many which I have received from various parts of the country. The book is filled with so many false and misleading statements that I have deemed it unworthy of notice. But I am glad to give publicity to the denial that any such lectures as are detailed in the book ever took place in Chicago, or anywhere else; and here say that I was never present at any such meetings, and that I never made any of the remarks attributed to me on page 68, or on any other page. The whole book is a clever fabrication of falsehoods. Very truly yours, J. LAWRENCE LAUGHLIN. "THE BOY LIED."

It will be noticed that Prof. Laughlin says that none of these lectures ever took place, although "Coin" says that they took place at the Art Institute in Chicago, beginning on the 7th day of May, 1894.

It was shrewdly calculated by Coin" that most of the readers of the book, catching it up hastily and glancing through it, would conclude that such lectures actually took place, and that the persons whose names were used would pass it over with silent contempt, which would answer all the purposes of an admission that it was true. It all turned out as he anticipated except that after Gage, Laughlin, and the rest had got tired of answering letters from persons who really supposed that they had been truthfully reported, they decided to make a wholesale denial in order to save their own time and labor. The reading public do not like to have practical jokes played on them even on All Fools' Day Hence it is no wonder that there has been considerable reaction against "Coin" since the public have found out that "the boy lied."

After Laughlin had been polished off, a man named Eustis asked the following question, page 70:

66 'Then," said Mr. Eustis, "the Latin Union, Germany, and the United States, by free coinage, had maintained the commercial value of silver at par with gold?" "Yes," was "Coin's" reply.

This phrase, "The commercial value of silver at par with gold," has no meaning unless a ratio is mentioned at which parity is maintained. As no such ratio is mentioned, we might pass it over as one of a large number of phrases in this book as meaningless as that quoted from Rabelais, but the fact is that the Latin Union's ratio was 15 to 1, that of the United States 16 to 1, and that Germany had no ratio, having been on the single silver standard prior to 1871.

Eustis's appetite for lies was not yet satisfied. He asked one more question : "And the United States," said Eustis, was the first of these to attack silver and demonetize it?" "Yes," said "Coin."

The truth being quite different. Germany demonetized it in 1871, the United States in 1873.

CHAPTER IX.

COIN'S" LECTURE ON THE GREENBACK SYSTEM.

On page 76, a certain Mr. Ridgley of Ogden, Utah, wants to know what is the ob jection to a purely greenback system of money.

The objection which is urged," said "Coin," "is this: So long as there was confidence in the government, it would be a sound, stable money; but so soon as confidence in the government is shaken, it would depreciate in exchangeable value. When the danger became imminent that the government was not able to enforce its legal tender character, having no commercial value, it would become more or less worthless.”

What is the condition under which a government is not able to enforce the legaltender character of its paper? Our government, during the Revolutionary war, enforced the legal-tender character of Continental money until it had fallen to 1,000 for 1. The difference of effort required to enforce the legal-tender character of that kind of paper and of paper worth nothing at all is not perceptible. In fact, no effort was needed to enforce its legal-tender character even after it had become worthless. The only thing requiring an effort was to repeal the legal tender acts. If these had been left unrepealed, creditors would have been powerless to refuse the paper for past debts. What "Coin" meant by this phraseology we defy anybody to explain.

Mr. Ridgley appears not to have been entirely convinced, for he proceeded to ask questions, viz: "Isn't it a fact that when war and great disturbances come, redemption money disappears and paper money takes its place anyhow? So, are not the people at such times embarrassed with a paper money fluctuating with their confidence in the government, and saddled with a worthless paper money if the government goes down, and does the use of silver and gold as money ever prevent this condition from arising,"

The use of redemption money," replied "Coin," "does not prevent the conditions you describe. Paper money always takes its place at such times.

This is a statement that specie payments are always suspended during wars and great disturbances, but without any definition of a great disturbance. Probably it means any condition where specie payments are suspended—that is, that specie payments are always suspended when they are suspended. This can hardly be denied, but the general proposition that specie payments are always suspended during wars may be. There is no limitation on account of time, or place, or the size of the war. Well, we did not suspend specie payments during the Mexican war. We have had several Indian wars in which we did not suspend. England did not suspend during the Crimean war, or in any other of her numerous wars since 1820. Germany did not suspend during the Franco-German war of 1870. There is no evidence that David suspended during his wars with the Philistines, or Xerxes during his invasion of Greece, or Cæsar during his Gallic wars.

Equally edifying is his explanation of social conditious during suspension: "After the use of redemption money ceases, because of war," he tells us, "every one is on the same footing. As the paper money fluctuates from day to day all are taking chances alike. If it becomes wholly worthless, all have suffered more or less proportionately, and primary money immediately takes its place."

This is a flat contradiction of observed facts during every era of irredeemable paper. It is not true that "every one is on the same footing." On the contrary, speculators are on one kind of footing and laboring men on another kind. This was the most conspicuous and notable feature of social and industrial life during the civil war, both North and South. It was the same way during the Revolutionary war. A laboring man working for $30 per month would find his wages, when they became due, worth only $15. As the continental money neared its end and the depreciation became rapid, Prof. Sumner says that "a man might lose his whole wages while earning them." And yet "Coin" tells us that the employer and the employe are on the same footing.

A PRECOCIOUS TRAITOR.

Continuing to enlighten Ridgley, on page 77, after he has told us how primary money (meaning metallic money), takes the place of paper money when the latter becomes worthless, he says:

This latter is true, whether a new government is founded on the ruins of the old one at once or not. There may be a long interregnum, as in France towards the close of the last century, when one form of government was from year to year almost substituted for another. No one knew what was coming next. No stability was in the government itself. During such a period, which may last for years, it would be impossible to make paper money circulate. But money made from property having a commercial value would circulate, and would assist materially in restoring order and civilization. In fact, it would be hard to restore civilization without its use during such a period."

“We are approaching such a period now, unless wise statesmanship shall intervene ; commodity money-silver and gold-will be our only money, and will have to answer the purpose of a medium of exchange until a stable government can get on its feet and issue paper money.

"All know and feel the necessity of money, and if chaos comes in this country, it may be years before there is another government sufficiently established to give confidence generally to its issue of paper money.'

What is it that we are approaching now? Evidently, the condition that France was in towards the close of the last century—that is, revolution, reign of terror, Jacobinism,

statesmanship shall intervene."

and finally Bonapartism and a stable government. All this is to come "unless wise The only statesmanship that "Coin" knows or <ares about is silver at 16 to 1. Therefore, the logic of his position is that unless we have free coinage at 16 to 1 the government will be broken up and a more stable one put in its place. Who will break it up? Those who are dissatisfied with it, of course. But the only dissatisfied ones are the 16 to 1 silverites. We fear that "Coin " is a precocious young traitor. We advise the Chicago police to keep an eye on him.

CHAPTER X.

JUGGLING WITH PRICES.

On page 108, "Coin " presents a table of prices of wheat beginning in 1872, at $1.40 per bushel (not mentioning the fact that that was the quotation in irredeemable paper), and ending in 1893, at 63 cents per bushel.

Then he says:

"If a dollar buys a bushel of wheat during a time when the supply is normal, and the conditions continuing normal, at a later time a dollar will buy two bushels of wheat, then the dollar has doubled its purchasing power."

To complete the sentence he should have said "in wheat"-its purchasing power in wheat. But he wanted his readers to understand that if a dollar would buy twice as much wheat at one time as at another it would also buy twice as much of everything else. Mr. J. K. Upton has examined this juggle, as it has been repeated by Mr. W. H. Harvey, in his letter to President Cleveland. Mr. Upton shows that ten years ago the price of wheat was 77 cents per bushel while to-day it is 57 cents, a decline of 26 per cent. instead of 50 per cent. On the other hand the price of corn ten years ago was 35 cents per bushel, while to-day it is 45 cents, an increase of 28 per cent. As the corn crop of the United States is one-half greater in value than the wheat crop it follows that the farmers of the country have been gainers on these two crops taken together. From this Mr. Upton draws the