met has justly remarked the ambiguity of his notions respecting the divinity of Christ, and the doctrine of original sin; the indecency of his prefaces and explanation of the Canticles; and objects to him that he weakens or reduces almost to nothing the prophecies relating to Jesus Christ! Nor was he less offensive to protestants for his notions concerning the pope's not being antichrist, and concerning St. Paul's expectation of living until the general judgment. With regard to the prophecies, he is said to have been the first interpreter of Scripture (though some are inclined to doubt this priority) who endeavoured to prove that the greater part of the prophecies of the Old Testament had a double sense, and have received a double accomplishment. He maintains that the predictions even of the evangelical prophet Isaiah, related in their primary and literal sense to the times and circumstances of the Jewish people, but that they respected the Messiah in a secondary and allegorical sense. It is unnecessary to inform such of our readers as are acquainted with the history of theological controversy, that these notions have met with able opponents both in the churches of Rome and England, and it is perhaps as unnecessary to add that they sufficiently account for the general suspicion entertained of Grotius's religious principles, as well as for the various systems to which his friends or enemies wished, or suspected him to be at one time or other attached.

The late bishop Hurd's mode of accounting for the parent inconsistencies in the religious principles of Grotius, is the most favourable we have yet seen, and not improbable. "Grotius," says that learned prelate, "is justly esteemed among the ablest and most learned men of an age that abounded in ability and learning. Besides his other shining talents, his acquaintance with history was extensive; and his knowledge of Scripture profound. And yet with two such requisites for unlocking the true sense of the prophetic writings, this excellent man undertook to prove in form, that the pope was not antichrist. The account of this mischance is as extraordinary as the mischance itself. The moral qualities of Grotius were still more admirable than his intellectual; and in these qualities we shall find the true spring of his unhappy and misapplied pains on the subject before us. He was in his own nature just, candid, benevolent, to a supreme degree; and the experience of an active turbulent life had but fortified him the more in

a love of those pacific virtues. He was, on principle, a sincere and zealous Christian; and consequently impressed with a due sense of that exalted charity which is the characteristic of that religion; but he had seen and felt much of the mischiefs which proceed from theological quarrels ; and thus every thing concurred to make him a friend to peace, and above all, to peace among Christians. An union of the catholic and protestant churches seemed necessary to this end; and the apparent candour, whether real or affected, of some learned persons, whom he had long known and valued in the church of Rome, drew him into the belief that such a project was not impracticable. Henceforth it became the ruling object of his life; and permitting himself too easily to conclude that the protestant doctrine of antichrist was the sole or principal obstruction to the union desired, he bent all the efforts of his wit and learning to discredit and overthrow that doctrine. Thus was this virtuous man betrayed by the wisdom and equity of his own character; and I know not if the observation of the moral poet can be so justly applied to any other

Insani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,

Ultra quam satis est, virtutem si petat ipsum.

"The issue of his general scheme was what might easily be foreseen; and of his arguments I shall only say thus much, that the Romish writers themselves, for whose use they might seem to be invented, though they continue to object his name to us, are too wise to venture the stress of their cause upon them."

It seems universally allowed that Grotius's treatise "On the Truth of Christianity" is the most valuable of his theological writings. This has been translated into almost every European, and into some of the Eastern languages, and is still used at schools and universities as a text book. In English we have at least five translations of it. But the work on which his fame principally rests is his treatise “De Jure Belli ac. Pacis," in which he first reduced the law of nations to a system. It was by the advice of lord Bacon and Peiresc that he undertook this arduous task. "Few works," says an elegant modern writer, "were more celebrated than that of Grotius in his own days, and in the age which succeeded. It has, however, been the fashion of the last half century to depreciate his work as a shapeless

compilation, in which reason lies buried under a mass of authorities and quotations. This fashion originated among French wits and declaimers, and it has been, I know not for what reason, adopted, though with far greater moderation and decency, by some respectable writers among ourselves. As to those who first used this language, the most candid supposition that we can make with respect to them is, that they never read the work; for, if they had not been deterred from the perusal of it by such a formidable display of Greek characters, they must soon have discovered that Grotius never quotes on any subject till he has first appealed to some principles, and often, in my humble opinion, though not always, to the soundest and most rational principles.

"But another sort of answer is due to some of those who have criticised Grotins, and that answer might be given in the words of Grotius himself. He was not of such a stupid and servile cast of mind, as to quote the opinions of poets or orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges, from whose decision there was no appeal. He quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of morals. On such matters poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses; for they address themselves to the general feelings and sympathies of mankind; they are neither warped by system, nor perverted by sophistry; they can attain none of their objects; they can neither please nor persuade if they dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their readers. No system of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature and the according judgment of all ages and nations. But where are these feelings and that judgment recorded and preserved? In those very writings which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundation of all true philosophy.

"If this were merely an objection of taste, I should be willing to allow that Grotius has indeed poured forth his learning with a profusion that sometimes rather encumbers than aderns his work, and which is not always necessary to the illustration of his subject. Yet, even in making that concession, I should rather yield to the taste of others than speak from my own feelings. I own that such richness and splendour of literature have a powerful charm for me. They fill my mind with an endless variety of delightful recollections and associations. They relieve the understanding in its progress through a vast science, by calling up the memory of great men and of interesting events. By this means we see the truths of morality clothed with all the eloquence (not that could be produced by the powers of one man, but) that could be bestowed on them by the collective genius of the world. Even virtue and wisdom themselves acquire new majesty in my eyes, when I thus see all the great masters of thinking and writing called together, as it were, from all times and countries, to do them homage, and to appear in their train.

"But this is no place for discussions of taste, and I am very ready to own that mine may be corrupted. The work of Grotius is liable to a more serious objection, though I do not recollect that it has ever been made. His method is inconvenient and unscientific. He has inverted the natural order. That natural order undoubtedly dictates that we should first search for the original principles of the science in human nature; then apply them to the regulation of the conduct of individuals; and lastly, employ them for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise with respect to the intercourse of nations. But Grotius has chosen the reverse of this method. He begins with the consideration of the states of peace and war, and he examines original principles only occasionally and incidentally as they grow out of the questions which he is called upon to decide. It is a necessary consequence of this disorderly method, which exhibits the elements of the science in the form of scattered digressions, that he seldom employs sufficient discussion on these fundamental truths, and never in the place where such a discussion would be most instructive to the reader. This defect in the plan of Grotius was perceived, and supplied by Puffendorff, who restored natural law to that superiority which belonged to it, and with great propriety treated

the law of nations as only one main branch of the parent stock," &c.

Of the surviving sons of Grotius, Cornelius and Diederic followed the profession of arms, and Peter was bred to the law, and became pensionary of Amsterdam and deputy of the states-general. His brother William was a Jawyer and a man of learning, and was the correspondent and confident of Grotius during his whole life, and it was to him he addressed the last letter in his collection, dated a few months before his death.'

GROTO (LEWIs), an Italian poet, commonly called, from his misfortune, CIECO D'ADRIA, was born Sept. 7, 1541, in the ancient town of Adria, which gives name to the gulph called the Adriatic. His parents were of a noble but decayed family. He lost his sight a few days after his birth, and never recovered it. Yet this did not check his proficiency in learning; able masters were provided, under whom he made astonishing progress, although we may conceive with considerable difficulty to his instructors. He says, indeed, in one of his orations, that when a new master visited him, he used to say, "you must teach me how I am to teach you." His talents and acquirements, however, procured him very early fame, and such was his natural eloquence, that at the age of fourteen he was chosen on two very solemn occasions, the one when the queen of Poland visited Venice, and the other on the election of the Doge Lorenzo Priuli, to give a public harangue in that city, where Casa and other orators had been so much celebrated, and acquitted himself with the greatest credit. His youth and his blindness might probably procure him favour, but according to his biographer, he was received with equal applause at other times and places, and under other circumstances. Having an early turn for poetry as well as oratory, he attempted to write for the stage, and although inferior to the other dramatic poets who then flourished at Ferrara, Rome, and Florence, he became a favourite with the people of Adria. In other cities to which he was invited as a public speaker, at Ferrara, Bologna, and Rovigo, he was received with every mark of distinction. Several princesses, as Laura of Este, and Laura Gonzaga, who patronized genius, frequently visited him, and made

1 Burigny's Life of Grotius.-Gen. Dict.-Mr. (now sir James) Mackintosh's "Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations," 1799,-Hurd's Sermons on the Prophecies. Saxii Onomast.