man has a right to draw from the existence of the grant itself." "It would, therefore, be extremely unreasonable," said the court, "to avoid the grant in any court for irregularities in the conduct of those who are appointed by the government to supervise the progressive course of the title from its commencement to its consummation in a patent;" but there were some things so essential to the validity of a contract, that the great principles of justice and of law would be violated did there not exist some tribunal to which an injured party might appeal, and in which the means by which the elder title was acquired might be examined, and that a court of equity was a tribunal better adapted to his object than a court of law; and it added that "there are cases in which a grant is absolutely void; as where the State has no title to the thing granted, or where the officer had no authority to issue the grant. In such cases the validity of the grant is necessarily examinable at law." So the court held that proof that no entry had been made in the office of the entry-taker in the county where the lands patented were situated, prior to the cession to the United States, was admissible under the ninth section; for without such entry they would not be within the reservation mentioned in the act of cession. In other words, proof was admissible to show that the State had not retained control over the property, but had conveyed it to the United States.

In Patterson v. Winn, reported in 11th Wheaton, this case is cited, and after stating what it decided, the court said: "We may, therefore, assume as the settled doctrine of this court, that if a patent is absolutely void upon its face, or the issuing thereof was without anthority, or was prohibited by statute, or the State had no title, it could be impeached collaterally in a court of law in an action of ejectment, but in general o her objections and defects complained of must be put in issue in a regular course of pleading in a direct proceeding to avoid the patent."

The doctrine declared in these cases as to the presumptions attending a patent has been uniformly followed by this court. The exceptions mentioned have also been regarded as sound, although from the general language used some of them may require explanation to understand fully their import. If the

patent, according to the doctrine, be absolutely void on its face it may be collaterally impeached in a court of law. It is seldom, however, that the recitals of a patent will nullify its granting clause, as, for instance, that the land which it purports to convey is reserved from sale. Of course, should such inconsistency appear, the grant would fail. Something more, however, than an apparent contradiction in its terms is meant when we speak of a patent being void on its face. It is meant that the patent is seen to be invalid, either when read in the light of existing law, or by reason of what the court must take judicial notice of; as, for instance, that the land is reserved by statute from sale, or otherwise appropriated, or that the patent is for an authorized amount, or is executed by officers who are not intrusted by law with the power to issue grants of portions of the public domain.

So, also, according to the doctrine in the cases cited, if the patent be issued without authority, it may be collaterally impeached in a court of law. This exception is subject to the qualification, that when the authority depends upon the existence of particular facts, or upon the performance of certain antecedent acts, and it is the duty of the land department to ascertain whether the facts exist, or the acts have been performed, its determination is as conclusive of the existence of the authority against any collateral attack, as is its determi nation upon any other matter properly submitted to its decision. With these explanations of the exceptions, the doctrine of the cases cited may be taken as expressing the law accepted by this court since they were decided: Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 7 Wheat. 212; Boardman v. Lessees of Reed, 6 Pet. 328; Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Id. 436; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530.

In Johnson v. Towsley the court had occasion to consider under what circumstances the action of the land department in issuing patents was final, and after observing that it had found no support for the proposition offered in that case by counsel upon certain provisions of a statute, said, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, that the argument for the finalty of such action was "much stronger when founded on the general doctrine that when the law has confided to a special tribunal

the authority to hear and determine certain matters arising in the course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal, within the scope of its authority, is conclusive upon all others." "That the action of the land office," the court added, "in issuing a patent for any of the public land, subject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise, is conclusive of the legal title, must be admitted on the principle above stated, and in all courts and in all forms of judicial proceedings where this tit'e must control, either by reason of the limited powers of the court or the essential character of the proceeding, no inquiry can be permitted under the circumstances under which it was ob tained;" and then observed, that there exists in the courts of equity the power to correct mistakes and relieve against frauds and impositions; and that in cases where it was clear that the officers of the land department had, by a mistake of the law, given to one man the land which, on the undisputed facts, belonged to another, to give proper relief. The doctrine thus stated was approved in the subsequent case of Moore v. Robbins.

The general doctrine declared may be stated in a different form, thus: A patent, in a court of law, is conclusive as to all matters properly determinable by the land department, when its action is within the scope of its authority; that is, when it has jurisdiction under the law to convey the land. In that court the patent is unassailable for mere errors of judgment. Indeed, the doctrine as to the regularity and validity of its acts, where it has jurisdiction, goes so far that if, in any circumstances under existing law a patent would be held valid, it will be presumed that such circumstances existed. Thus, in Minter v. Crommelin, reported in 18th Howard, where it appeared that an act of Congress of 1815 had provided that no land reserved to a Creek warrior should be offered for sale by an officer of the land department unless specifically directed by the secretary of the treasury, and declared that if the Indian abandoned the reserved land it should become forfeited to the United States, a patent was issued for the land, which did not show that the secretary had ordered it to be sold, and the court said: "The rule being that the patent is evidence that all previous steps had been regularly taken to justify making of the patent, and

one of the necessary steps here being an order from the secretary to the register to offer the land for sale because the warrior had abandoned it, we are bound to presume that the order was given. That such is the effect, as evidence of the patent produced by the plaintiffs, was adjudged in the case of Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, and is not open to controversy anywhere, and the State court was mistaken in holding otherwise."

On the other hand a patent may be collaterally impeached in any action, and its operation as a conveyance defeated, by showing that the department had no jurisdiction to dispose of the lands; that is, that the law did not provide for selling them, or that they had been reserved from sale or dedicated to special purposes, or had been previously transferred to others. In establishing any of these particulars the judgment of the department upon matters properly before it is not assailed, nor is the regularity of its proceedings called into question, but its authority to act at all is denied and shown never to have existed.

According to the doctrine thus expressed and the cases cited in its support-and there are none in conflict with it— there can be no doubt that the court below erred in admitting the record of the proceedings upon which the patent was issued, in order to impeach its validity. The judgment of the department upon their sufficiency was not, as already stated, open to contestation. If in issuing a patent its officers took mistaken views of the law or drew erroneous conclusions from the evidence, or acted from imperfect views of their duty, or even from corrupt motives, a court of law can afford no remedy to a party alleging that he is thereby aggrieved. He must resort to a court of equity for relief, and even there his complaint can not be heard unless he connect himself with the original source of title, so as to be able to aver that his rights are injuriously affected by the existence of the patent; and he must possess such equities as will control the legal title in the patentee's hands: Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 363. It does not lie in the mouth of a stranger to the title to complain of the act of the government with respect to it. If the government is dissatisfied it can, on its own account, authorize proceedings to vacate the patent or limit its oper ation.

This doctrine as to the conclusiveness of a patent is not nconsistent with the right of the patentee, often' recognized by this court, to show the date of the original proceeding for the acquisition of the title, where it is not stated in the instrument, as the patent is deemed to take effect by relation as of that date, so far as it is necessary to cut off intervening adverse claims. Thus, in a contest between two patentees for the same land, it may be shown that a junior patent was founded upon an earlier entry than an older patent, and, therefore, passes the title. Such evidence in no way trenches upon the ruling of the department upon matters pending before it. Nor is the doctrine of the conclusiveness of the patent inconsistent with the right of a party resisting it to show, if an entry is not stated in the instrument, that no entry of the land was made as an initiatory proceeding, where a statute, as was the case in North Carolina, mentioned in Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, declares that proceedings for the title, when such entry has not been made, shall be adjudged invalid. A statute may in any case require proof of a fact which otherwise would be presumed. Except with reference to such anterior matters and others of like character, no one in a court of law can go behind the patent and call in question the valid ity of the proceedings upon which it is founded.

The case at bar, then, is reduced to the question whether the patent to Starr is void on its face; that is, whether, read in the light of existing law, it is seen to be invalid. It does not come within any of the exceptions mentioned in the cases cited. The lands it purports to convey are mineral, and were a part of the public domain. The law of Congress had provided for their sale. The proper officers of the land department supervised the proceedings. It bears the signature of the President, or rather of the officer authorized by law to place the President's signature to it, which is the same thing; it is properly countersigned, and the seal of the general land office is attached to it. It is regular on its face, unless some limitation in the law, as to the extent of a mining claim which can be patented, has been disregarded. The case of the de. fendants rests on the correctness of their assertion that a patent can not issue for a mining claim which embraces over one hundred and sixty acres. Assuming that the words "more