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Opinion of the Court.

he has not created it, or created the necessity for it by his own wrongful, deadly or dangerous conduct-conduct threatening life. It must be an act where he cannot avoid the consequences. If he can, he must avoid them, if he can reasonably do so with due regard to his own safety."

It is clear that to establish a case of justifiable homicide it must appear that something more than an ordinary assault was made upon the prisoner; it must also appear that the assault was such as would lead a reasonable person to believe that his life was in peril. Wallace v. United States, 162

U. S. 466.

Nor is there anything in the instruction of the court that the prisoner was bound to retreat as far as he could before slaying his assailant that conflicts with the ruling of this court in Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 550. That was the case of an assault upon the defendant upon his own premises, and it was held that the obligation to retreat was no greater than it would have been if he had been assailed in his own house. So, too, in the case of Alberty v. United States, 162 U. S. 499, the defendant found the deceased trying to obtain access to his wife's chamber through a window, in the night time, and it was held that he might repel the attempt by force, and was under no obligation to retreat if the deceased attacked him with a knife. The general duty to retreat instead of killing when attacked was not touched upon in these cases. Whart. on Homicide, & 485.

6. The fourteenth assignment is to the following language of the court upon the subject of the flight of the accused after the homicide: "Now, then, you consider his conduct at the time of the killing and his conduct afterwards. If he fled, if he left the country, if he sought to avoid arrest, that is a fact that you are to take into consideration against him, because the law says unless it is satisfactorily explained - and he may explain it upon some theory, and you are to say whether there is any effort to explain it in this case-if it is unexplained the law says it is a fact that may be taken into account against the party charged with the crime of murder upon the theory that I have named, upon the existence of this monitor

Opinion of the Court.

I called conscience that teaches us to know whether we have done right or wrong in a given case.”

In the case of Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408, 422, where the same question, as to the weight to be given to flight as evidence of guilt, arose, the court charged the jury that "the law recognizes another proposition as true, and it is that 'the wicked flee, when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion.' That is a self-evident proposition that has been recognized so often by mankind that we can take it as an axiom and apply it to this case." It was held that this was error, and was tantamount to saying to the jury that flight created a legal presumption of guilt, so strong and conclusive, that it was the duty of the jury to act on it as an axiomatic truth. So, also, in the case of Alberty v. United States, 162 U. S. 499, 509, the court used the same language, and added that from the fact of absconding the jury might infer the fact of guilt, and that flight was a silent admission by the defendant that he was unwilling or unable to face the case against him, and was in some sense feeble or strong, as the case might be, a confession. This was also held to be error. But in neither of these cases was it intimated that the flight of the accused was not a circumstance proper to be laid before the jury as having a tendency to prove his guilt. Several authorities were quoted in the Hickory case, (p. 417,) as tending to establish this proposition. Indeed, the law is entirely well settled that the flight of the accused is competent evidence against him as having a tendency to establish his guilt. Whart. on Homicide, § 710; People v. Pitcher, 15 Michigan, 397.

This was the substance of the above instruction, and although not accurate in all its parts we do not think it could have misled the jury.

7. In the fifteenth assignment exception is taken to the following instruction: "You will understand that your first duty in the case is to reject all evidence that you may find to be false; all evidence that you may find to be fabricated, because it is worthless; and if it is purposely and intentionally invoked by the defendant it is evidence against him; it is the basis for

Opinion of the Court.

a presumption against him, because the law says that he who resorts to perjury, he who resorts to subornation of perjury to accomplish an end, this is against him, and you may take such action as the basis of a presumption of guilt." There was certainly no error in instructing the jury to disregard evidence that was bound to be false, and the further charge that false testimony, knowingly and purposely invoked by defendant, might be used against him, is but another method of stating the principle that the fabrication of testimony raises a presumption against the party guilty of such practice. 1 Phillips' Evidence, 448; State v. Williams, 27 Vermont, (1 Williams,) 724; 3 Russell on Crimes, 6th ed. 358.

8. The sixteenth assignment was to the refusal of the court to charge the jury that where there is a probability of innocence there is a reasonable doubt of guilt. In the case of Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 452, it was held that a refusal of the court to charge the jury upon the subject of the presumption of innocence was not met by a charge that they could not convict unless the evidence showed guilt beyond a reasonable doubt..

In the case under consideration, however, the court had already charged the jury that they could not find the defendant guilty unless they were satisfied from the testimony that the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. That this meant, "first, that a party starts into a trial, though accused by the grand jury with the crime of murder, or any other crime, with the presumption of innocence in his favor. That stays with him until it is driven out of the case by the testimony. It is driven out of the case when the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime as charged has been committed, or, that a crime has been committed. Whenever the proof shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of a crime, then the presumption of innocence disappears from the case. That exists up to the time that it is driven out in that way by proof to that extent." The court having thus charged upon the subject of the presumption of innocence, could not be required to repeat the charge in a separate instruction at the request of the defendant.

Opinion of the Court.

9. The seventeenth and eighteenth assignments were taken to instructions given to the jury after the main charge was delivered, and when the jury had returned to the court, apparently for further instructions. These instructions were quite lengthy and were, in substance, that in a large propor tion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. These instructions were taken literally from a charge in a criminal case which was approved of by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, and by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in State v. Smith, 49 Connecticut, 376, 386.

While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by conference in the juryroom. The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury-room with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of men who are equally

Syllabus.

honest and intelligent as himself. There was no error in these instructions.

Several other assignments were made, to which it is unnecessary to call attention.

For the reasons above stated the judgment of the court below will be

Affirmed.

WILLARD v. WOOD.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 61. Argued October 26, 27, 1896. Decided November 30, 1896.

Remedies are determined by the law of the forum; and, in the District of Columbia the liability of a person by reason of his accepting a conveyance of real estate, subject to a mortgage which he is to assume and pay, is subject to the limitation prescribed as to simple contracts, and is barred by the application in equity, by analogy, of the bar of the statute at law. The covenant attempted to be enforced in this suit was entered into in the District of Columbia, between residents thereof, and, although its performance was required elsewhere, the liability for non-performance was governed by the law of the obligee's domicil, operating to bar the obligation, unless suspended by the absence of the obligor.

If a plaintiff mistakes his remedy, in the absence of any statutory provision saving his rights, or where from any cause a plaintiff becomes nonsuit, or the action abates or is dismissed, and during the pendency of the action the limitation runs, the remedy is barred.

Courts of equity withhold relief from those who have delayed the assertion of their claims for an unreasonable time; and this doctrine may be applied in the discretion of the court, even though the laches are not pleaded or the bill demurred to.

Laches may arise from failure in diligent prosecution of a suit, which may have the same consequences as if no suit had been instituted. In view of the laches disclosed by the record, that nearly sixteen years had elapsed since Bryan entered into the covenant with Wood, when, on March 10, 1890, over eight years after the issue of the first subpoena, alias process was issued against Bryan and service had; that for seven years of this period he had resided in the District; that for seven years he had been a citizen of Illinois as he still remained; that by the law of Illinois the mortgagee may sue at law a grantee, who, by the terms of an absolute conveyance from the mortgagor, assumes the payment of the mortgage debt; that Christmas did not bring a suit against Bryan in Illi

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