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rant both of theory and of practice. The adherence of the bulk of the regular officers to the Southern Confederacy is one of the many reasons which prevent foreigners from admitting that the secession is merely a lawless rebellion. Only the most inveterate propensity to vaticination can have survived

Experience alone can show whether lawyers be safely moved by generals who are ignoand local orators can, on short notice, acquire the art of commanding considerable armies. Mr. Lincoln evidently consults the wishes of his countrymen by distributing his principal commissions among well-known civilians. Mr. Banks, formerly a mechanic, and successively governor of his state and speaker of the House of Representatives, the surprises of the last six months. When becomes a major-general, like Mr. Sickles the secession began, Republicans and Demoand Mr. Butler, for the same reason which crats vied with each other in the offer of determined the choice of Charles I. and of concessions to the supposed demands of the the Tory Parliament in favor of peers or slave-owners. When it became certain that country gentlemen of influence. In default the Cotton States would withdraw, the most of special qualifications, it becomes necessary telling imputation against an opponent conto choose leaders who are accustomed, insisted in the charge that he entertained a other departments of public life, to command criminal desire to reclaim the seceders by respect and deference. In the civil wars, a force. The W: shington orators and the New gentleman might one month be a general, York and Boston journalists only discovered the next a justice of assize, and a few weeks that they had overdone their pacific profesafterwards he might accept a captain's com- sions when the attack upon Fort Sumter mission for the reduction of a neighboring suddenly roused the indignation of the manor-house. The war, consequently, inter- North. For about two months, the populafered little with the relative grades of civil tion of the Free States have been ostensibly life until its continuance had given time for unanimous in their determination to mainthe formation of a regular and veteran army. tain the sanctity and perpetuity of the Union. Under civilian officers, hostilities were car- Their armaments have since done credit to ried on almost at random, without definite the energy and patriotism of the nation; and plans or decisive results. A handful of if the North remains in its present frame of Royalist horsemen might be spreading ter- mind for some time longer, the seceders will ror through a district while the adjacent be exposed to a formidable attack. In Amerparishes were occupied in force by the par- ican affairs, it is unsafe to calculate either on liamentary militia. The contending parties the steadiness or on the variable character fought when they met, but their marches of popular feeling. It is only certain that, were determined by chance; and, except in whether peace or war is in fashion, England a few instances, the event of their skirmishes will be made the scape-goat of every blunder depended on courage, numbers, and chance, and misfortune. without any admixture of military skill. It It seems hard that foreigners should be is true that one country gentleman, adopt-accused of misunderstanding the constituing the profession of arms in middle life, tional questions at issue, when the first commore than supplied, by native force of genius, mencement of military operations has alall the defects of experience and of profes- ready brought about an insoluble conflict of sional education. jurisdiction. The chief justice of the SuIt has generally been thought that the preme Court issued a writ of habeas corpus conditions of success in modern war are more to bring up the body of one Merryman, who complicated than the military qualifications of had been arrested at Baltimore on the charge the seventeenth century. It may be doubted of destroying a railway bridge for the purwhether Cromwell himself, at the commence- pose of impeding the passage of the United ment of his career, could have handled fifty States troops. General Cadwallader refused thousand men, with a proportionate force of obedience to the writ, with the singular anartillery; and the Butlers and Cadwalland-nouncement that the President had given ers are probably by no means Cromwells, him authority to suspend the law of habeas although they may have been selected for corpus. The chief justice, in the presence their general ability and aptitude. General of superior force, abstained from requiring Scott, who is supposed thoroughly to understand his business, is, unluckily, between seventy and eighty. There is a national versatility and hardiness in the American character which favors to the utmost the extemporaneous assumption of untried duties and responsibilities; but the enormous levies which appear upon paper suggest doubts whether armies as large as Napoleon's can

the marshal to execute the writ, announcing that he should throw on Mr. Lincoln himself the responsibility of adopting or disavowing the conduct of his officer. There can be no doubt that civil process is incompatible with military operations in a hostile country, and. as Northern journalists say, inter arma silent leges; nor do they fail to add, with apparent truth, that Chief Justice Taney

is a Southern at heart. On the other hand, placed the satellites of his adversary on their it is certain that Congress alone has the thrones, and left the road open for the reright to determine whether it is necessary covery of her wider dominion. The peace that the writ of habeas corpus should be sus-had scarcely been signed when he permitted pended. Maryland is nominally considered the Italians to nullify its provisions, and enby the Government as a loyal portion of the gage in enterprises tending directly to the United States, and General Cadwallader is unity the treaty of Villafranca was intended not even acting under a proclamation of mar- to prevent. Thenceforward his policy was tial law. In England, a similar difficulty a tissue of apparent contradictions. He might be disposed of by a subsequent Act of suffered Cavour to seize the Marches, but Indemnity; but Congress itself legislates withdrew his ambassador from Turin'; reunder strict limitations, nor has it the con- joiced in the overthrow of the Neapolitan stitutional power to make good the defaults Bourbons, but protected their last strongof the Executive. The Supreme Court would hold against assault; sanctioned the unity disregard any irregular measure which might of Italy, but refused to withdraw French be passed, and in the event of a future re- troops from their ward of the Italian capivulsion of popular feeling, the President tal. And now, just as a frightful misfortune himself would be exposed, without defence, places the future of Italy once more in jeopto the risk of an impeachment. The Amer-ardy, he solemnly acknowledges the kingdom icans are too practical a people to be de- whose formation he has done so much to feated in a great national movement by constitutional technicalities; but if they were capable of justice to England, they might begin to appreciate the warning that their Constitution must suffer in a civil war. It is perhaps at present unsafe to remind them that their actual unanimity barely covers over the political divisions which seemed lately wider than ever. New York is now ostensibly unanimous in opposition to that extension of slavery which its Corporation, the majority of its voters, and its most notorious journal, have habitually defended and supported. Pennsylvania was Democratic until it sold itself to its country for a selfishly protective tariff. Even in New England itself, a considerable minority has always maintained the doctrine of state rights and the cause of the South. It may be that American party feeling, however violent, is too insincere to survive a great political crisis; but it seems premature for Englishmen to give in their adhesion to a creed which may in a short time become heterodox by a change in public opinion. The Government of the United States is fighting for an intelligible and justifiable object in denying the right of malcontent states to retire from the Union. How the seceders are to be reclaimed, and how, if reclaimed, they are to be governed, are questions not to be solved even by the simultaneous vociferation of twenty million throats.

advance-and to retard. Upon any of the
popular hypotheses his conduct is utterly in-
explicable. If he be really, as many observ-
ers believe, exclusively a French prince,
anxious only to carry out the opinions and
further the interests of France, why does he
permit Italy to become a Mediterranean
power? Every Frenchman of every party
dreads and detests the Italian unity which
the French autocrat intermittingly protects.
If, on the other hand, as many thoughtful
men believe, he is at heart an Italian, anx-
ious for the regeneration of the beautiful
land, and loathing the influence of the pa-
pacy, why does he, while acknowledging
Italy, support intrigue at Rome?
strong sentence from his pen would banish
the Bourbons to Bavaria, and terminate
outrages which in their horror and their
uselessness resemble rather the outbreaks of
slaves than the movements of a European
party. The third theory, that the emperor
is overrated, that he is a man without plans
beyond the exigencies of the hour, vacillat-
ing in will and short-sighted in design, is,
we think, equally untenable. Europe does
not quail before imbeciles, nor would Rome
declare war upon a man it might be possible
to cajole.

One

There is, we believe, but one view upon which it is possible to reconcile the strange contradictions which from the day of Villafranca have distinguished the Italian policy of the emperor. His object from the first has been, not the good of Italy, but the conFrom The Spectator, 22 June. tentment of Italians, to concede all things NAPOLEON IN ITALY.

rather than face the Revolution. Filled with Of all the puzzles now presented to poli- the idea then universal in Europe, that Italy ticians the conduct of Napoleon in Italy is asked freedom rather than unity, he fancied perhaps the most profound. After expend- his true object secured at Villafranca. The ing thirty millions of treasure and ten thou- Austrian dominance at an end, Lombardy sand lives in the effort to expel Austria from made Italian, Venetia promised a separate Italy the emperor made a peace which re-administration, the duchies gratified by a

bounds, and the emperor informs Europe that Italy must be acknowledged if order is to be maintained.

free but separate existence, he imagined averted the one struggle he was deterItalians would be reasonably content. Po- mined to avoid. A settled state is the best litical disappointment seldom points the instrument to keep the Revolution_within daggers political oppression has always had to fear. The result undeceived him, and half the world besides. The Italians desired unity as well as freedom, a nationality of There are those who see in this last contheir own as well as exemption from the cession the settlement of the difficulty of Austrians, and the sullen cry of discontent Rome, but we think with insufficient reaonce more changed the policy of the Tuiler- son. That the "Roman question " will soon ies. Northern Italy organized herself in the reach its solution we also believe; but the face of a French treaty without interference recognition of Italy does not of itself involve from the French. Then followed the attack the extinction of the temporal power. Noon Naples an attack in itself perhaps grate- body denied, before the recognition, the ful to one with whom the house of Bourbon right of Italy to Rome. The power of the is of necessity permanently at war. France monarchy to take its capital in defiance of might, however, have resisted, but the Rev- the world is not increased by a diplomatic olution, unmenaced by France, had an ob- form against which the papacy continues to ject on which to depend its energy, and the protest, nor is the interest of France in the emperor made no effort to close the valve. occupation of Rome lessened by its having Naples conquered, it became clear that Italy become a diplomatic irregularity. The emwould not suffer the Roman States to inter-peror, we believe, would gladly retain a post vene between Naples and Turin; that if which enables him, in all serious questions, France guaranteed the States of the Church, to direct the action of a power hostile to the the emperor had still to reckon with the unity of Italy. He would gladly retain a Revolution, and Count Cavour was accord-grip over the Frankenstein he has helped ingly permitted to annex all save the actual to create, but still regards with fear. So residence of the pope. All this while the emperor had no real wish for an Italy too strong. If Italians could be contented with less, he would gladly have hailed a compromise not involving the birth of a sixth power. He therefore protected the last Bourbon, defended Gaeta from the sea, and protracted the civil war for months in hopes of a new solution of his difficulty. Had Naples asked for Murat, or declared for Garibaldi, or contented itself with any ruler short of Victor Emmanuel, the emperor's end would have been gained. Garibaldi, however, after a moment's hesitation, declared for unity; the faces of Italians again grew menacing, and once more the emperor retired from the one danger which he dreads. The Two Sicilies were united with Northern Italy, and the Revolution again surrendered power into the hands of a free but regular administration. Still the emperor refused to acknowledge the result he himself had sanctioned, and Italy still remained a power outside the protection of European law. The votes of the Liberals in the Legislative Corps, the earnest advice of England, the eager importunities of Prince Napoleon, even the hostility of Rome were powerless to change the determination of the emperor. He even swerved slightly towards the priests, as the only power which could still impede the full growth of the Italian monarchy, when Cavour was put to death by his physicians. Instantly the emperor saw the Revolution let loose once more, and for the fourth time a concession

long as the occupation of Rome is injurious only to Italy, only impedes good government, only paralyzes the attempt at strong administration, he will gladly incur an expense which, in return, leaves him before Europe master of the situation. But even for Rome he will not encounter the revolution from which he and his have sprung. In the hour when Italy demands her capital as the price of continued quiescence, the papacy will be left to the guardianship of an excommunicated sovereign and an "irreligious" army. That is not the result the emperor would desire, but it is preferable to the only visible alternative. Meanwhile, Napoleon exhausts diplomacy in the effort to discover a third course, which shall content the Italians yet leave Italy divided. A Piedmontese instead of a French garrison for Rome, a papacy limited to the Leonine city, a papacy unprotected by treaty, any suggestion is preferred to the simple issueRome for the capital of Italy, the pope for the first subject of her kings. All suggestions are baffled by the resolve of the Romans, to accept the Revolution rather than the pope. Over this resolution even Cavour could exercise no power, though the Romans, on all other points, trusted, obeyed, and would have perished for him. At any moment an order from Cavour would have hurled the Roman populace on the bayonets of the French. But even the great premier was incompetent to make Romans obey the pope, and before this determination all notion of compromise has gradually disap

COMMON SENSE APPLIED TO THE AMERICAN QUESTION.

peared. Rome or Revolution is the Italian decision, and now, as after Villafranca, before Gaeta, and by the death-bed of Cavour, the chief of the Revolution must give way. We have said nothing of the design attributed to the emperor, and mentioned openly by his cousin, of uniting Italy and France in a coalition against Germany, for, true or false, it has little influence on the unity of the peninsula. Napoleon could lead disunited Italy more easily than Italy raised to the rank of a great power. Naples under Murat, and Northern Italy under Victor Emmanuel, would have been far more obedient allies than Italy united is at all likely to become. With Venetia still in Austrian hands, Italy can be relied on for any policy tending to weaken Germany; but that temptation removed, it is not in France that the united kingdom, to which the freedom of the Mediterranean must be a necessity, will find her natural ally. Divided Italy would, we believe, be more acceptable to Napoleon than any existing arrangement; but divided Italy means Italy discontented, and Napoleon would sooner strive with Eu rope than encounter the Revolution face to face.

From The Liverpool Journal.

253

recognize the South as belligerent could only benefit the South. The queen's neutrality proclamation supported this inference, and the despatch of troops and material to Canada and the West Indies gives it potency. The North and South accept it in that way. There is no use in vindicating the proceeding as right, because many things most unjust and impolitic are done within the law. The effect of the proceeding is to be estimated in reference to the suspicion excited.

A notion prevailed, and still prevails, in this country that the secession is a fact— a permanent fact. Government obviously thinks so, otherwise it would never have talked of neutrality; for neutrality was out of the question as long as the seceders were to be considered rebels. Regarded as a fact, what have we to gain or fear? Nothing to fear territorially from the war, be it short or long; for if we do not interfere with the parties they will not interfere with us. What have we to gain? A diminution of the strength of the Union, and a more desirable tariff with the North and South-with the North, because it would not be the interest of the North to maintain a tariff which would give us the Southern market; with the South, because it would want cheap goods.

But is not all this a gross misconception A LITTLE COMMON SENSE APPLIED TO -a fearful miscalculation ? Either the South THE AMERICAN QUESTION. will accomplish its independence by its own MISCONCEPTION and mistake attend on efforts or by aid of ours. Choose which alevery novel question. The secession move-ternative you like, and our loss is certain. ment is a novel question, and it is to a great extent misunderstood in this country. Too much partisanship prevails on the merits of the dispute; the South has numerous friends on the Liverpool Exchange, and the North very few admirers. To be impartial is to give offence, perhaps to make enemies; and our file at this moment is loaded with letters of remonstrance on the supposition that we are unduly friendly toward the Northerns. Yet we have only endeavored after impartially giving a free hearing to the advocates of both sides. We never sacrificed to partiality of any kind; and if we have preferred any interest apart from humanity and civilization it was that of Liverpool and Great Britain. Not as a proof of our independence, but as a matter of serious thought, we are about to apply a little common sense to the American question.

It is open to our Government to take action on this question. It may avail itself of the dispute to weaken the Union, and punish the Northerns for their hostile tariff by at once recognizing the independence of the Confederation. All its recent proceedings tend in that way. The disposition to

No one who knows the world, or who is acquainted with the teaching of history, will believe for a moment that the South, unaided, can effect a separation from the Union. To suppose such a thing is to outrage common sense. The North has men, money, an army and a navy. It is a concentration of forces-the South is the reverse. The army and navy of the States, though small, are perhaps the most perfect in the world. The best treatises on both have been written by American officers, and Mr. Russell's letters testify to their efficiency; compared with the army and navy of the South their strength is potent. Mr. Russell's letters are perfectly reliable-the only letters that are reliable. In war popular feeling must be obeyed. The feeling of the North is for the war, and it would be insanity to suppose that the North will abandon the war until the South succumbs.

It is useless to speak of the Southerns as desperate, as dying before surrendering, for those who see in this character a power of resistance forget that they are describing the Southerns as men hardly within the pale of society or civilization. The war will, there

fore, be short or protracted; the shorter the better for us, and therefore the less we do short of interference to protract it the better, for then the trade to America would resume its usual channels, and all be prosperity. The proceedings of our Government, however, in their effect on the North and South, are directly calculated, by inspiring hope in the South, to prolong the war. If hostilities continue for only a year, the loss to us may be counted in millions.

from her at home and abroad. We will always be in a condition to master her, however big she grows. This we intend to make apparent by and by.

Our inferences fairly are: First, that our Government is grossly wrong in doing any thing to encourage the South to persevere, and would be terribly wrong to aid a separation. Any attempt of this kind would quickly involve the ministry in ruin. The mercantile mart in this case is not the kingdom, for no matter what the commercial world may say, the country would reprobate any aid given to slaveholders in their attempt to malign the principles of liberty. Driven to extremities, the North would let loose the slaves-and, then, what? The slaves, according to Mr. Russell, are, inland and on the borders, watching the dispute for their own benefit.

Should we in deference to a large national policy, interfere, recognize the independence of the South, and afford aid, what then? That is the question which, we suspect, has not been properly considered by those who wish to see secession prosper; but it is a question in which are involved very serious considerations. We could do it, are able to do it, but what would be the immediate effect the inevitable consequence? The first With every possible respect for the geneffect would be a war with the Northern tlemen on Change who have honored us States. We could not conquer these, we with their advice, in the form of remonwould not attempt it, but we would impov- strance, we beg to solicit their attention to erish them; but in proportion, for the time, our dispassionate view of the case. Their as we injured them we would injure our-views, we are satisfied, if acted upon, would selves. Lancashire, as it did before, would produce a calamity not experienced in Engbe reduced to a state of ruin; trade would land since the days of the Orders in Counlanguish, distress would be universal. The cil. people might, in the absence of imported breadstuffs from America, be exposed to famine or famine prices, and national discontent would enable designing men to sow sedition. This is not a fancy sketch. What would we have done this year without breadstuffs from America?

THE DAY'S DUTY.

IF any thinking man will take a retrospective view of the last seven months; will contrast the events of the day and the attitude of the country in the last weeks of June with There interposes another consideration. the events and the situation of affairs in the What would France do? Profit by the op- last weeks of December; will compare the portunity to humble England. Join the state of the public mind then, vacillating, Americans, arouse the French Canadians weak, timorous, and unenlightened, to the and the Irish ultramontanes, and, peradven- bold, determined, vigorous, and intelligent ture, tax the valor of our volunteers by in- purpose that now animates it, he will see a vading our coast. There is in all this not change more remarkable than any thing else one statement that is improbable; they pos- in our history, and far more portentous than itively assume the form of facts. We could the boldest prophet would a year ago have beat them all, France and America, but at ventured to foretell. It is possible that we what a cost, and all for what? For results have not yet exhausted all the wisdom that that could never take place. The South, may be gathered from that six months' exsuccessful, would have to enact a tariff prac-perience; it is possible that, marvellously tically more prohibitive than that now of the rapid as the sequence of events has been, North, reprehensible as that is, for the South unexpectedly as effects have followed causes, could support a separate government only in two ways-duties on exports or duties on imports. There is nothing else available for revenue. Her whole cotton produce would hardly suffice for the expense of a government. She would have to build ships, to create an army, and where would the money come from?

The fear of the growing strength of the Union is an idle one. She has more to fear from us on her own continent than we have

they are to be matched, perhaps more than matched, by events that are yet to come. Hitherto the providence of God has been visible in the progress of affairs, and he has ruled the weakness, the short-sightedness, and the selfishness, as well as the wrath of man to praise him. The pillar of fire by night and the cloud by day were not more visible to the Hebrews as they fled from Egyptian bondage, than the hand of an overruling Providence leading this people, for

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