and we have maintained it against the assaults of the greatest power upon the earth; and the question now is, whether we are to perish by our own hands, and have the epitaph of suicide written upon our tomb. The ordeal through which we are passing must involve immense suffering and losses for us all, but the expenditure of not merely hundreds of millions, but of billions of treasure will be made, if the result shall be the preservation of our institutions. us resolve that, come weal or woe, we will in life and in death, now and forever, stand by the stars and stripes. They have floated over our cradles,-let it be our prayer and our struggle that they shall float over our graves. They have been unfurled from the snows of Canada to the plains of New Orleans, and to the halls of the Montezumas, and amid the solitudes of every sea; and everywhere, as the luminous symbol of resistless and beneficent power, they have led the brave and the free to victory and to glory. It has been my fortune to look upon this flag in foreign lands and amid the gloom of an oriental despotism, and right well do I know, by contrast, how bright are its stars, and how sublime are its inspirations! If this banner, the emblem for us of all that is grand in human history, and of all that is transporting in human hope, is to be sacrificed on the altars of a Satanic ambition, and thus disappear forever amid the night and tempest of revolution, then will I feel-and who shall estimate the desolation of that feeling?-that the sun has indeed been stricken from the sky of our lives, and that henceforth we shall be but wanderers and outcasts, with naught but the bread of sorrow and of pen-selves, but for the spoiler, if this revoluțion ury for our lips, and with hands ever outstretched in feebleness and supplication, on which, in any hour, a military tyrant may rivet the fetters of a despairing bondage. May God in his infinite mercy save you and me, and the land we so much love, from the the doom of such a degradation. No contest so momentous as this has arisen in human history, for, amid all the conflicts of men and of nations, the life of no such government as ours has ever been at stake. Our fathers won our independence by the blood and sacrifices of a seven years' war, Could my voice reach every dwelling in Kentucky, I would implore its inmates,-if they would not have the rivers of their prosperity shrink away, as do unfed streams beneath the summer heats,-to rouse themselves from their lethargy, and fly to the rescue of their country before it is everlastingly too late. Man should appeal to man, and neighborhood to neighborhood, until the electric fires of patriotism shall flash from heart to heart in one unbroken current throughout the land. It is a time in which the work-shop, the office, the counting-house, and the field may well be abandoned for the solemn duty that is upon us, for all these toils will but bring treasure, not for our is not arrested. We are all, with our every earthly interest, embarked in mid-ocean on the same common deck. The howl of the storm is in our ears, and "the lightning's red glare is painting hell on the sky," and while the noble ship pitches and rolls under the lashings of the waves, the cry is heard that she has sprung a leak at many points, and that the rushing waters are mounting rapidly in the hold. The man who, in such an hour, will not work at the pumps, is either a maniac or a monster. Sincerely yours, J. HOLT. TO NATIONS EMBARRASSED IN DIFFICULTIES. As the French are about to vacate Syria, the Emperor Napoleon would feel obliged to any kingdom, whose affairs are temporarily embarrassed, and stand in need of a satisfactory settlement, to apply to him immediately, without reserve, as he is extremely anxious to give his army some fresh occupation.-Punch. AT IT AGAIN, YOU SEE!-The Wiscount is ever apt at an absurdity. A friend of his the other day was talking of America, and saying that to set the slaves all free without injuring their owners would be almost an act of magic. " Magic!" chirped the Wiscount. "Well, I don't see that exactly. But it might certainly be called an act of negro-mancy !"-Punch. From The Saturday Review, 13 July. AMERICA. MUCH interest will attach to the first proceedings of the North American Congress. There can be no doubt that all necessary supplies will be voted for the war, even if it is thought necessary to impose a direct tax as an aid and security for the projected loan. It is also certain that the Government will be supported by a large majority in all the measures which it has taken for providing an army and commencing the war. It is probable, on the other hand, that some opposition will disturb the temporary and factitious unanimity which has lately superseded all discussion on public affairs. There is undoubtedly a large party still favorable to peace, if not to the claims of the South, and it is said that the representatives of the Democratic city of New York will even propose the recognition of the Confederacy. The rumored negotiations at Washington have been denied with suspicious vehemence, and it is admitted that a memorial in favor of peace, drawn up by Southern agents, has received numerous signatures among the mercantile community. The New York Herald, long an organ of the pro-slavery party, and of late a furious advocate for a war of subjugation, has almost avowedly justified the suspicion that its rapid vituperation of England was intended to promote the interests of the seceders. Its impudent proposal that the belligerents should concur in a piratical attack on Canada is evidently intended to familiarize the public mind with plans for negotiation. Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward may perhaps not be disiuclined to encourage a revulsion of public opinion which would preclude the necessity of persevering in an interminable enterprise. The Government can scarcely fail to understand that no preponderance of military force will reduce a vast country inhabited by a population of English descent into permanent submission. The vigorous preparations which have been made for war may probably incline the Confederate Government to listen to reason, while the actual commencement of serious hostilities will only render the breach more utterly irreparable. The angry civilians who have undertaken to subdue the South already show a characteristic disregard for the customary laws or coutesies of war. Within a short distance of Washington, country houses are destroyed on the pretext that the owners are disloyal, and the Government is censured by the popular judgment for treating captured rebels merely as prisoners of war. If, contrary to all probable expectation, the campaign proceeds in earnest, the Southern States, although they will never be subdued, may be exposed to serious danger and suffering. Mr. Russell's lively description of his tour in the lower regions of the Mississippi represents a state of society which scarcely admits of being made worse by war; but the negro population, which constitutes or produces all the wealth of the country, will become a precarious property in the neighborhood of a hostile army. The blockade of the ports will interfere with the disposal of the future cotton crop; and although the higher classes will give their personal services more zealously than their equals in the North, it seems that they are already compelled to fill up their ranks with alien mercenaries. If the Free States persevere in their enterprise, the struggle may perhaps be fought out by two oppos ing Irish armies, under the command of American officers. The party, however, which stands on the defensive will contain a larger native element, inasmuch as the invaded planters will be fighting at home. Neither of the belligerents has any reason to count on English assistance or sympathy, for the slave-owners are as loud in their childish threats of withholding their cotton from its principal market as the Republicans of the North in their blustering denunciations of neutrality. A profound contempt for the coarse levity of American political language is perfectly compatible with a calm appreciation of the conflicting parties and of their prospects. The social condition of the North is safer and wholesomer than a system founded on slavery; and the Free States, with the probable addition of some of the border territory, will remain a great and prosperous nation. The wanton repudiation of the friendly feelings which Englishmen lately entertained to the United States will scarcely affect the bonds of commercial intercourse. In two or three years, the chronic animosity of American brawlers will probably have discovered some new pretext for noisy vituperation. The South will lose more than the North by the separation which it has precipitated, but its ultimate independence is apparently secure. No demagogue will be able to thwart the determination of cotton planters to sell their produce, and if no attempt is made to revive the slave trade, the Confederate Government may well maintain amicable relations with England. The military operations have thus far been so unimportant that even the newspapers have a difficulty in providing a supply of heroes and victories. A quarter of a million of men upon paper corresponds to a comparatively limited number of available soldiers. The regiments are undrilled, the officers are untaught, and the generals themselves, with all their indigenous handiness and versatil ity, are strangers to the art of war. Gen- be more abundantly gifted by nature than eral Scott, who is apparently a sensible man, private politicians, but responsibility and the and, in comparison with his subordinates, an necessity of action secure public functionaexperienced veteran, is evidently not anxious ries from the shallower class of illusions. to engage his troops in a distant campaign. Mr. Seward may have thought it expedient He probably understands that although the to talk for the multitude, but he can scarcely newly formed army might be trusted in a have failed to perceive that the popular destand-up fight, there is neither a commis- mand for conquest is chimerical and absurd. sariat nor a staff to organize an advance into The Government is prudent in arming while the enemy's country. According to some the country is excited, and it ought to emaccounts, the Federal troops, notwithstand- ploy the force which it derives from the gening the extravagant boasts of patriotic writ- eral enthusiasm in securing a just peace beers, are overmatched at the very outset of fore the agitation subsides. Mr. Lincoln the war on the territory of Northern Vir- is only pledged to recover the Federal propginia. Yet it may be doubted whether the erty from the seceders, and the object would Secessionists would provoke a battle, even be most effectually attained by a timely newith the certainty of immediate success. It gotiation. The anomalous and unconstituis their interest to keep the war at a distance tional position of Maryland and Virginia from the centre of their territory, but they will remind the Cabinet of the innumerable have probably abandoned their designs upon administrative difficulties which would ensue Washington, and a victory over the North- on a successful campaign. Experienced polern army might indefinitely postpone their hopes of peace. If the 4th of July passed without an attack on the Capital, it may be assumed that no serious collision will take place during the remainder of the summer. The Confederate army will make a stand either at Richmond or at some point farther south, and the Northern troops will be sufficiently occupied in improving their own discipline and organization. To the west of the Alleghanies, it is possible that a more active contest may take place between the Federal troops and the militia forces of Missouri and Tennessee. The weakness of the Central Government is proved by the practical recognition of the utterly illegal neutrality which has been proclaimed by Kentucky. If Massachusetts were conterminous with South Carolina, there would be every reason to anticipate a vigorous contest, stimulated by the mutual antipathy which divides the Puritans of New England from the planters of the South. But the actual war will be conducted on the comparatively neutral ground of the Border States, and it may be hoped that the stronger party will be satisfied with moderate success. Almost every impartial observer has, from the beginning of the quarrel, expressed a doubt whether a war without a purpose would be seriously waged under the influence of passion. It is possible that Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet may have been exempt from the sudden excitement which they have prudently countenanced and accepted. The most zealous promoters of the war are beginning to censure the slackness of the Government, and the Southern agents who have not been openly received have probably found numerous opportunities of suggesting terms of compromise. In America, as in Europe, Ministers of State may or may not iticians are not likely to be led away by the ostentatiously exceptional unanimity of the North. The opinions which prevailed four months ago may at any moment resume their supremacy, and the obvious expediency of allowing the South to separate in peace may prevail over the sudden clamor for an internecine war. From The Economist, 13 July. THREATENED FAMINE OF COTTON. It is impossible to predict the conduct of men from the most accurate knowledge of their interests, even when those interests are enormously strong and indisputably obvious. Men's passions are an "unknown quantity," and are influential enough and uncertain enough to upset the clearest and most careful calculations. Therefore, though we may feel very sure that it is unwise in both sections of the American people to fight at all, and will be utterly ruinous to them to fight for long, yet it would be rash to conclude that the deadly conflict which seems imminent will not take place, or that, once begun, it may not be continued for months, or possibly for years. We do not expect this ;—but no man can pronounce it to be improbable. We do not, indeed, think it likely that large armies will march southward, or that great land battles will be fought; but, considering the vast wealth and naval strength of the North, and the comparative weakness of the South, both in money and in ships, we may not shut our eyes to the fact that the blockade of the Southern ports may be made complete and effective, and may continue long enough to shut up for a year at least all their exportable produce. More than this is not likely: further than this we need not speculate. But the ports from which cotton can be shipped to Europe are few in number and can easily be guarded:-the ships of Western nations, we may assume, will not break the blockade, and the privateers of the Southern Confederation cannot. It is, therefore, undeniably possible and almost probable that for the space of a twelvemonth we may be deprived of the whole, or nearly the whole of our usual supply of the raw material from America. We have received all our share of last year's crop already; the next year's crop would not come forward in any quantity till the end of 1861 or the beginning of 1862. If the war be ended and the blockade raised by February next, we shall scarcely feel it at all. If it be prolonged till next summer, we may be about 2,000,000 bales short of our usual supply. This is the not improbable contingency which we have now to look in the face as calmly and to meet as sagaciously and energetically as we may. When we called attention to this matter in January last, it was a remote and merely conjectural possibility; it has now become an imminent and a far from fanciful danger. We trust it may yet be averted, but in the meanwhile let us look at our position and its chances without either foolish confidence or exaggerated alarm. rise so high, on the withdrawal of the American supply, as to stimulate the merchants and producers in every other quarter to send us every bag they can pick, purchase, and convey. The price will be such as amply to meet every conceivable cost of conveyance; in fact, it will be such a price as we have not seen in the lifetime of the existing generation. We may be certain, therefore, that at the very least, every country will send us as much as they have ever done in their best year in recent times. Now we find that The Brazilian growth has not increased, of late years, and perhaps that country will never send us more than she has done. The supply from Africa, Australia, and the Antilles is still insignificant and can only increase slowly. That of Egypt fluctuates greatly, but is capable of considerable augmentation. But, on the whole, it would not be safe to reckon on more than 400,000 bales from all these miscellaneous quarters. On India we must place our chief reliance. And, first, let us clearly fix in our minds She once, in 1857, (when the price of Surat that the conjuncture we have to meet is a reached 5 1-2d.,) sent us 680,000 bales. What temporary and an immediate one. If America she would send us under the unprecedented were sunk in the sea, or from any cause was stimulus of 12d. per lb. remains to be seen. about to cease forever to furnish us with cot- She is known (vaguely) to grow enormous ton, we should know at once what to do, and quantities of cotton. The question is, How should lose no time in doing it. We should much does she grow, and how much of that set about stimulating the growth of the needed growth could she spare us when goaded and article wherever it now exists, and planting allured by the high prices we could offer ? it wherever else soil, climate, and population We will not delude our readers with any afoffered any prospect of growing it with ad- fectation of correct figures where no such exvantage. But this is not our case. We have actness is attainable, but will content our-on our hypothesis-to provide against the selves with placing before them what is stoppage of our supply for one year, and that actually known upon the subject, and, in the the very next year. We want instant, not ulti- absence of positive knowledge, the most trustmate relief. We must, therefore, it is obvious, worthy opinions extant. First, then, nothing direct our exertions and confine our hopes to positive can be safely predicated as to the cotdrawing the greatest possible amount from ton crop of India. The quantity manufacquarters where it already exists and is the reg-tured there, exclusive of that exported, is ular staple production of the land. This and this only can save us from distress in 1862; by 1863 and 1864, when newly organized sources of supply would begin to tell upon our market, the vast crop of America (we may reasonably and confidently assume) will be again at our disposal. In 1860, we consumed 2,600,000 bales in all; but then 1860 was a year of singularly brisk and profitable trade. No one, looking at the condition of America and India, anticipates any thing like it this year or next. For 1861-2, then, we may assume that 2,300,000 will supply our current wants. The price may naturally be expected to variously estimated by General Briggs at less than 2,000,000 bales (of 400 lbs. each), by Dr. Wight at 7,500,000 bales, and by Dr. Forbes Watson, who is considered an authority, at upwards of 5,000,000 bales. The entire quantity grown Dr. Watson estimates at 6,000,000 bales. This may be a correct guess, but it is merely guess. We may, however, we think, safely conclude, from a comparison of these various opinions, that the cotton crop of India is at least equal to that of America, and that it is amply sufficient to supply our wants, if only the natives can be induced by the prices offered, and enabled by the means of transit provided or providable, to send us 440 what we require; i.e., to export it, instead of | ing at a loss so heavy that a resort to "short manufacturing it. There are two facts, and, so far as we are aware, only two, to be further stated as bearing upon our prospects; and neither of them is encouraging. The first is that, not only is our usual Indian supply drawn mainly from the districts comparatively near the coast and within easy means of transport (as might have been anticipated), but that any increased supply, which we suddenly need and call forth by high prices, comes not by draining remoter districts, but by more thoroughly exThus the annual suphausting the old ones. ply from Surat, Cutch, and Broach, which from 1852-55 only averaged 220,000 bales, sprung up under the stimulus of the high while the prices of 1857, to 500,000 bales; more inland districts (Candeish, Sattara, Dharwar, Kurnool, &c.), which from 1852-55, furnished on an average 210,000 bales, sent no more than 235,000 in 1857. The second fact is that the greatly increased supply which reached England from India in 1857 was furnished, to some extent at least, by diminishing the usual export to China and other quarters, rather than by interfering with the quantity retained for home consumption. It is impossible to say to what extent a very eager demand for export may induce so sagacious and money-making, but at the same time so routine, a population as the Hindoos, to change their habits for a year and sell their raw cotton, instead of spinning and weaving it as usual. It is equally impossible to calculate with any certainty what price will meet and repay the unknown cost of transporting the cotton (on bullocks) from new districts to the port of shipment. Yet upon these two elements depends, it is obvious, the answer to the inquiry, "How much more cotton than usual will the anticipated high prices bring us from those quarters?" All things considered, however, the unprecedented advance of prices which our hypothesis implies, and the considerable period during which this advance has been hanging over us for merchants to be guided by in sending agents and orders into the interior, we do not think it over sanguine to suppose that the 680,000 bales which India sent us in 1857 will be swelled to 1,000,000 in 1862. Our entire supply from all quarters, exclusive of America, would then be 1,400,000 bales, to meet a probable demand for 2,300,000. time" is already contemplated. Any fur- The diminution of demand, therefore, as But there is another and far more conjecBut will 2,300,000 bales be required? tural element to be allowed for, which may Scarcely, even at present prices; at the upset the most cautious and well-based calprices which will rule as soon as the idea of culations. We are satisfied that, if the price a withholding of the entire cotton crop of of cotton rises to a sufficient height, or to America has been fairly realized by our mer- such a height as would be indisputably warchants and manufacturers, assuredly not. ranted by the withdrawal of the American Even now a considerable proportion of the supply for even one year, it will attract mills in Lancashire and Cheshire are work-enough from other quarters to enable our |