take her place amongst the great powers, | signy had actually suggested to the English and Savoy and Nice should of their own ac- Government that it should take the initia. cord ask to be united to France, I will not tive, and should itself propose that Savoy say that we should not consent to consult should be annexed to France. It is somethe wishes of their populations. But this what curious that these assertions should not will be your work: we would never agree to have received any denial or explanation. a compulsory cession or an exchange." There was this tacit understanding, but no written agreement or bargain. It was known everywhere in Europe, except, it would appear, in the English Cabinet, that France would claim the two provinces if the war ended in the aggrandizement of Piedmont by the addition of Lombardy and Venetia. No French government was likely to do otherwise. It was its traditional policy.* When the Duchies, the Legations, and Tuscany, in defiance of remonstrances and threats, persisted in rejecting his scheme for an Italian confederation, the emperor insisted upon the cession of the two provinces. Cavour resisted the demand on the grounds that Venetia had not been added to Piedmont, and that the annexation of the new territory was effected by the populations themselves, not only without the aid, but in spite of France. He hoped at first in the generosity of Louis Napoleon, and, when that hope was gone, in the decided expression of public opinion in England, which he believed would prevail with the emperor. By a comparison of dates† it will appear that until the middle of Feburary, 1860, Cavour had stated to the English Government that the king had entered into no engagement either "to cede, exchange, or sell Savoy and Nice to France." The declaration of the Governor of Cham The peace having left Venetia to Austria, the emperor renounced for the time his claim. That such was the case the following anecdote will show. So great was the agitation at Milan after Villafranca, that the authorities feared a manifestation of hostile feeling against the emperor on his public entrance after Solferino. Although an actual demonstration was prevented, the attitude of the population was too significant to escape his notice. In expressing to the governor of the city his surprise at their ingrat-bery to the same effect to the deputation of itude, he used these words: "It is true that you have lost Venice, but you have saved Savoy and Nice." Still he had not abandoned his design. To the astonishment of the Piedmontese Government their generous ally claimed at Zurich sixty millions of francs as an indemnity for war expenses. It was hinted at the same time that, if the money were not ready, the two provinces would be accepted as an equivalent. But the pecuniary claim was admitted, and, to the disappointment of France, paid. Savoyards was made on the 1st of the month. Up to the 5th no decision had been come to in France on the question, although it had been discussed for some time previously. On the 9th the emperor, in a conversation with Lord Cowley, for the first time intimated his intention of "claiming a proper frontier for France." On the 24th M. de Thouvenel, in a despatch to M. de Talleyrand containing the new French scheme for the settlement of the Italian question to be submitted to the Sardinian Government, formally puts forward the demand for the cession of the two provinces. The negotiations for this purpose made so little progress, owing to the determined resistance of Ca Our readers will recollect that on the 8th of July, 1859, Count Walewski stated to Lord Cowley that the emperor had abandoned all idea of annexing Savoy to France The French Government has, however, dis-vour, that the emperor, in order to be in tinctly asserted, that between July and December of that year the intention of France to demand that province and Nice, in case of any considerable increase of the territory of Piedmont, was formally notified to the English Ministry. M. de Thouvenel goes even further, and declares that M. de Per*Despatch from M. de Thouvenel to the Count de Persigny of Feb. 4, 1860. ("Documens Diplomatiques," published by the French Government. Paris, 1861.) time for the opening of the French Chambers, sent to Turin M. Benedetti, who enjoyed his complete confidence, and had the reputation of being a sterner and perhaps more unscrupulous diplomatist than M. de Talleyrand. A hint from him that the emperor, in the event of Cavour still persisting * "Documens Diplomatiques," p. 70. †The facts above stated will appear clearly by a comparison of the various despatches and documents on the subject laid before Parliament. in his refusal, had determined to withdraw | over, too poor to contribute much to the rethe French troops from Italy through Tus- sources of the kingdom. Cavour had often cany-or, in other words, that he intended declared that she was the Ireland of Italy. either to occupy that state or to replace the It was unquestionably to the king "the sacriGrand Duke-brought the negotiations to fice most painful to his heart" to surrender an end. On the 1st of March the emperor "the cradle of his race"-a sacrifice which, announced, in his speech to the Legislative it must be remembered, the Houses of Assembly, the approaching rectification of Orange and Lorraine had not hesitated to the French frontiers, and two days after- make under similar circumstances before him; wards Cavour in a despatch to the Sardinian but henceforth the House of Savoy was to be Envoy at Paris admitted the right of the lost in the king of Italy, and he was prepopulations of Savoy and Nice to express pared to make it. their wishes as to annexation to France, but still declares that the king will never voluntarily consent to cede or exchange either province. 66 Cavour's consent to the farce of an appeal to universal suffrage, instead of simply surrendering the provinces, has been considered a grave political error. It was evident that It would be unfair to overlook the enor- the populations could not refuse a consent demous difficulties with which Cavour had to manded by France and not opposed by Piedcontend in this question. He had to choose mont. But the emperor insisted upon an between assent to the emperor's demand, appeal to them" to justify his usurpation in however unjust and ungenerous, and the the eyes of Europe. Cavour, on the other sacrifice of his great scheme so near its accom- hand, with his usual sagacity, foresaw that by plishment for the liberty and unity of Italy. acceding to it he established a precedent Had he refused to make the sacrifice, and had which the emperor could scarcely refuse to the hopes of Italy been rudely disappointed, acknowledge when the time came for the anwhat would have been the feelings of the nexation of further Italian territory to PiedItalians themselves? Would they not have mont. That he felt most deeply and bitterly looked upon him as a traitor to the national the sacrifice he had been compelled to make, cause? They were willing to pay the price no one who knew him has ever doubted. But demanded by the emperor. There was no his position was equally difficult and delicate. voice raised from one end of Italy to the In defending himself in the Chambers he had other against Cavour for acceding to it. to justify his policy, and to clear his own Even in the Chambers scarcely any but the character whilst precluded from making disdeputies of the province of the Nice protested closures which could alone place them in against it. The strategical importance to their true light, but which might have ofFrance of the ceded provinces, so much fended the "susceptibilities" of the emperor. dwelt upon in England, was denied in Italy. He never spoke of these unhappy events They might be useful to France for defence, without a pang, so apparent that his friends but not for attack. In case of a war with refrained from touching upon a topic so painthat power, it was urged, Savoy would have ful to him. He had a settled conviction that to be abandoned at once. Seventy or eighty Italy would one day regain her lost provinces. thousand men could not be left on the other Whatever may be thought of the conduct side of the Alps, with the risk of being driven of Cavour in this matter—and it is our coninto a corner, or of being cut off by a success-viction that he is not to be charged with ful descent on the Italian coasts. Savoy, it double-dealing, but that, resisting to the last, was true, had furnished valuable troops to Piedmont; but, as Cavour had pointed out, if Italy is to rise again, she must rely upon the valor of her own sons. In the Chambers the Savoyard deputies had steadily opposed his liberal policy, and, under the influence of a bigoted priesthood, had ever been in opposition to the measures of progress and im- The state of Italy was now such, that no provement which had raised Piedmont to her man with less influence, less wisdom, and less high position in Europe. Savoy was, more-courage than Cavour, could have carried her he only yielded to pressure which it was impossible to withstand-the baseness of the French Government has left a stain upon its character which will never be removed. It has already brought its own punishment by detroying the confidence of Europe in the word and honor of the emperor. through her difficulties. At the conclusion of decided that the Piedmontese army should : invade the Marches and join the Garibaldian forces now held in check by the line of defences occupied by the king of Naples. The result of this bold policy was the annexation to Piedmont of all the remaining territory of the pope, except that protected by the actual presence of French troops, and the transfer of the Neapolitan dominions to Victor Emmanuel. interest may override the law of nations and furnish an excuse for acts otherwise altogether indefensible. It appeared very clearly to Cavour that this was such a time. The triumph or the defeat of the democratic party would have been equally fatal to the redemption of Italy. Cavour therefore resolved to prevent either the one or the other, and to retain in his own hands the control of the destinies of the Peninsula. That the course he pursued is a further proof of his genius as a statesman will not be disputed. the war the democratic party had again obtained importance through the success and reputation of Garibaldi, who unfortunately allowed himself to be guided by their evil counsels. Urged onwards by them, he had, in the autumn of 1859, planned an invasion of the Marches. His adherents, if not himself, had even gone so far as to tamper with the Piedmontese army. An outbreak at Bologna was only prevented by the firmness and courage We have expressed in a former article an of Farini, who threatened to place Garibaldi opinion upon the policy of Count Cavour in himself under arrest. The personal influence these transactions. It might be impossible of the king restrained the impetuous chief for to justify it upon any moral ground, or by a time but in the spring of the following year any maxim of international law. To attempt an abortive rising in Sicily was the signal for to excuse it upon the pretence that the pope a general movement on the part of the had refused to disband his mercenaries, was Mazzinians. Garibaldi publicly announced an error. Its only justification could be the his intention of going to the aid of the Sicilians, existence of an overwhelming political neand an expedition was prepared at Genoa. cessity. There are times when paramount The king and his government would have considerations of public safety or of national willingly prevented it. Cavour knew full well that the time for adding the Neapolitan dominions to the rest of Italy had not yet come. The newly formed kingdom required peace and leisure to consolidate its strength, to develope its resources, and to recover from the struggle in which it had been recently engaged. He foresaw that if the expedition failed, he would be accused of sacrificing its leader; but that if it proved successful, Garibaldi would reap the glory, leaving to him the far greater difficulty of dealing with the liberated states. But the feeling was so strong in The task of governing the newly acquired favor of the Sicilians, that desertion threat- territories was as difficult as Cavour had ened to become general in the Sardinian foreseen it would prove to be. Even the army. Cavour yielded, not without extreme short rule of Garibaldi had involved the reluctance, to the less of the two evils, and whole administration of the Two Sicilies in after having taken the only measures in his the utmost confusion. Great as was his power to prevent the sailing of the expedi- genius as a soldier, he was wanting in the tion. He was probably not without expecta- qualities of a statesman. He was surrounded tions that it would fail in its objects. by a number of unprincipled adventurers Within almost a few days Garibaldi by and desperate politicians, who took advanhis daring and genius had conquered a king-tage of the simplicity and honesty of his dom. With the exception of two great for- character to effect their own selfish and distresses, nothing remained to the Bourbon honorable ends. family. The difficulties foreseen by Cavour The only men who have played a part in now commenced. Garibaldi and his follow- the great events which have taken place in ers, elated by success, were prepared to ad- Italy against whom there is any charge of vance upon Rome in defiance of the French corruption, of tampering with the public army. Again the cause of Italian freedom money, and of turning their political power was at stake through the rash and hopeless to their own private advantage, are the folschemes of the democratic party. Cavour lowers and friends of Mazzini and Garibaldi. did not hesitate as to the course he should, Large sums, partly subscribed in this counpursue. In order to forestall Garibaldi he, try, have never been accounted for. Con cessions of railways and public works were shamelessly demanded and recklessly conceded. The most noisy and uncompromising patriots profited most. A disgraceful waste of public money and a flagrant abuse of public patronage marked their short hold of power, and even contributed to render more corrupt the already polluted atmosphere. No one has ever accused Garibaldi himself of having been privy to the abuses committed in his name. He was, on the contrary, ever ready to disavow them when they were pointed out to him in their true light. He himself passed through some of the greatest temptations that could surround a man without a stain upon his character. His conduct offers a noble contrast to that of many of the men by whom he was surrounded, and under whose influence he unfortunately too often acted. After leaving Naples Garibaldi unhappily again fell under the control of the Mazzini party. His boundless influence had rendered him a most dangerous subject. Disdaining, as a representative of the people, to urge his grievances in a constitutional way, he constituted himself an irresponsible power in the state. He had even called upon the king to dismiss his ministers, to whom he bore a morbid hatred on account of the surrender of his native province to France. Cavour determined to grapple with the danger, and his triumph was complete. Urged onwards by some of the most reckless of his adherents, and by the fatal applause of the galleries, Garibaldi made in the Chambers, on the 18th of April, a most intemperate and ungrounded attack upon the ministry, and especially upon its head. One of his followers, General Bixio, in a soldier-like speech, appealed to him and to Cavour not to sacrifice, by their differences, the holy cause in which they were both, with equal patriotism, engaged. He was supported in a few noble words by Ricasoli. Cavour, amidst enthusiastic and prolonged applause, accepted the appeal, and declared that he had already forgotten what had passed. Garibaldi, too, declared himself satisfied, and a reconciliation took place; but by some hasty and ill-judged remarks at the end of the sitting he further impaired the influence and respect he had before en THIRD SERIES. LIVING AGE. 750 joyed in the Chambers and with the moderate party in Italy. The government of Naples now principally occupied Cavour's thoughts. He had been greatly disappointed with those Neapolitans upon whom he had chiefly relied for aid and advice, feeling the truth of Machiavelli's maxim that the worst rulers of a state are those who have returned from exile. The people with whom he had to deal were debased by a long oppression and misrule, and were consequently yet incompetent to understand or to enjoy the blessings of freedom. He was urged on all sides to place the Neapolitan territories in a state of siege, as the only means of suppressing disorders fomented by the intrigues of the priesthood and of the fugitive king at Rome. His earnest love of legality made him reject indignantly all such suggestions, and he bitterly complained that he could obtain no better advice.* *Amongst the last letters he ever wrote were two on the subject of Naples, so characteristic of his noble nature that we give the originals :posta a repentaglio perchè non ho voluto ammettere ora, in via eccezionale, nelia marina un giovane che dava la sua demissione e se ne stava a casa quando i suoi compagni si battevano, bisogna dire ch' essa è talmente delicata da non potere durare "CARA LADY,-Se la costituzione dell' Italia è tre mesi. "Sapete perchè Napoli è caduta si basso? Si è perchè le leggi, i regolamenti non si eseguivano quando si trattava di un gran signore o di un proaderenti. Sapete come Napoli risorgerà? coll' aptetto del Re, dei Principi, dei loro confessori od plicare le leggi severamente, duramente, ma giustamente. Così ho fatto nella marina; così farò nell' avvenire, e vi fa sicura che fra un' anno gli equipaggi Napolitani saranno disciplinati come gli antichi equipaggi Genoesi. Ma per attenere questo scopo, credete alla mia vecchia esperienza, bisogna essere inesorabile. "CARA LADY,-Ho ricevuto la vostra replica; ve ne ringrazio; vi ringrazio specialmente della vostra insistenza, e delle vostre energiche censure. sincera amicizia. Le considero come prova della vostra stima e Non mi avete convinto, sul caso speciale; ma mi avete persuaso che vi è molto a fare per Napoli. di quelle provincie-ma poichè non potete governarle, piaciavi continuare ad illuminarmi sulla loro misera condizione. "Se foste uomo ed Italiano, vi affiderei le sorte Nella settimana uscirà il nuovo ordinamento della marina: verrà costituito un consiglio composto di un numero pari di Napoletani e di Italiani del relativa agli antichi uffiziali della marina BorboniNord: a questo sottoporrò le questioni di massima ca. Se il suo voto sarà per l' indulgenza, lo secon On the 30th of May, while dressing, Count | things in the Neapolitan dominions, and the Cavour was seized with a slight shivering fit, conduct of the Neapolitan Deputies in the which he attributed to indigestion. His full Chambers, caused him much anxiety and irrihabit had long led him to dread an attack of tation. He insisted upon seeing M. Nigra, apoplexy. He sent for his physician, and, ac- who had recently returned from Naples, and cording to his usual custom, had himself bled, an exciting conversation took place between -an operation which was repeated on the fol- them, which lasted two hours, and was only lowing day. During the night the bandages interrupted by a relation, who, entering the came loose, and he lost much blood., Next room, insisted that it should cease. The exmorning, however, he felt better, and his ac- ertion and the excitement caused a relapse. tive mind returned to business. The state of Again and again, as he became weaker, he derò. Credo essere il mio dovere di mostrarmi sewas bled. His physicians have been blamed, vero, e di lasciare ai miei subordinati la parte della especially in this country, for resorting to a mansuetudine. Spero così di mutare lo spirito che practice condemned by modern medical informava l'amministrazione Napoletana; spirito fatale che corrompeva gli uomini i più distinti, e le science. migliori istituzioni. Forse questa mia dichiarazione non mi giustificherà ai vostri occhi, ma spero che varrà a conservarmi la vostra stima e la vostra amicizia. "C. CAVOUR." "DEAR LADY,-If the Italian Constitution is jeopardized because I have declined to admit into the navy, in an exceptional manner, a young man who resigned and remained at home whilst his companions were fighting, all I can say is that it is too delicate to last for even three months. But it is but just to them to state that Cavour himself insisted upon it, and would only employ such as would follow his own prescriptions. Still no uneasiness was felt until the morning of the 4th. Every attempt had then failed to check the fever, and he seemed to be sinking. Those who were about him now became seriously alarmed, and their anxiety was shared by the population of "Do you know why Naples has fallen so low? Turin, which gathered round his house, and It is because the laws and regulations were not ex-awaited with eager looks every report from ecuted when a great man, or a protégé of the king or princes, their confessors and followers, was con- the sick chamber. The king desired that Dr. cerned. Do you know how Naples will rise again? Riberi, the physician of the royal family, By executing the laws severely and rigorously, 1 justly. I have done so in the navy, I will do so in should be called in. When left alone a short future; and I promise you that within a year the time, whilst the medical attendants were in Neapolitan crews will be as well disciplined as the consultation, Cavour asked whether they had old Genoese crews. But to attain this end, trust abondoned him. to my long experience, you must be inexorable. "Adieu, dear lady; I grieve to be unable to follow your advice on this occasion, but it is for the politician a hard necessity to listen to the voice of reason whilst he stifles that of the heart. "C. CAVOUR." but I "DEAR LADY.-I have received your reply. thank you for it; I thank you especially for your perseverance, and for your energetic censures. I fook upon them as proofs of your esteem and of your sincere friendship for me. You have not convinced me as regards this particular case, but you have persuaded me that there is much to do for Naples. "If you were a man and an Italian, I would confide to you the destinies of those provinces; but as you cannot govern them, be kind enough to continue to enlighten me as to their miserable state. "It is of little matter," said he, laughing; "I shall leave them all to-morrow morning." Up to this time he had seen and conversed with many persons, amongst them the English Minister, Sir James Hudson, who through all his political trials and difficulties had been his faithful friend and prudent counsellor. To no man did Italy owe more during her great struggle; no one has kept her more steadily in the path of moderation and of constitutional freedom-no one has exercised more influence for good amongst men of all parties. Cavour knew this, and esteemed him accordingly. "Next week the new regulations for the navy will be issued. A council will be formed composed of an equal number of Neapolitans and of His brother and others of his family were Italians from the north. I will submit to it the case of the officers formerly in the Bourbon navy. desirous that he should now receive the last If its decision be in favor of indulgence, I will sup- sacraments of the Church. He consented at port it. I believe it to be my duty to show myself once His parish church, the Madonna degli severe, and to leave it to my subordinates to be conciliating. I hope thus to change the spirit Angeli, belongs to the order of the Capuchin which has prevailed in the Neapolitan administra- friars. One of them, Fra Giacomo, had been tion-that fatal spirit which corrupted the ablest men and the best institutions. Perhaps this dec-employed by him in some negotiations upon laration will not justify me in your eyes, but still ecclesiastical matters. Cavour had often I hope that it will tend to preserve me your esteem asked him jokingly whether, in case of apand your friendship. proaching death, he would administer the "C. CAVOUR." |