Opinion of the Court. 4, 1894, it would appear that Mohun died after the case had been carried to the Court of Appeals and before it was finally decided. It will scarcely be claimed that a judgment in his favor lapsed by his death, and that no one could be authorized to make it available or collect it. As no one had been appointed to succeed him, and the receivership had, in fact, terminated by the sale of the property and the installation of the purchaser, it would seem that, from the necessities of the case, the right to collect this judgment must have passed to the personal representatives of Mohun. Beyond this, however, one third of the decree was for his own services, and to that extent, at least, his executrix was entitled to represent him, and was properly made a party. While his powers and duties as receiver would not devolve upon his personal representatives, a judgment entered in his favor for his own. compensation, and for an indebtedness, for which he had assumed an individual liability, would pass to such representatives, and might be enforced by them. It is impossible that the court should be called upon to appoint a successor for that purpose. That the receiver had in fact assumed a personal liability for the bills contracted by him in the conduct of his business is evident from the very fact that he made claim for the same against the plaintiff Cake and his surety Moses under their undertaking of December 4, 1891. The question whether a receiver has assumed such personal liability or not is one to be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. Ryan v. Rand, 20 Abb. N. C. 313; People v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (30 Hun), 142; Ferrin v. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315; Rogers v. Wendell, 61 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (54 Hun), 540; Schmittler v. Simon, 114 N. Y. 176. See also Cowdrey v. Galveston, Houston &c. Railroad, 93 U. S. 352, 355. 2. That the receiver exceeded his authority in incurring the indebtedness mentioned in the auditor's report Admitting to its fullest extent the general proposition laid down by this court in Cowdrey v. Galveston, Houston &c. Railroad, 93 U. S. 352, that a receiver has no authority, as such, to continue and carry on the business of which he is appointed Opinion of the Court. receiver, there is a discretion on the part of the court to permit this to be done temporarily when the interests of the parties seem to require it. Under such circumstances, the power of the receiver to incur obligations for supplies and materials incidental to the business follows as a necessary incident to the receivership. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, 135; Thompson v. Phenix Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 287, 293. In the case under consideration the receiver was expressly authorized by the court "to carry on and manage the business of keeping said hotel in substantially the same manner as it has heretofore been carried on"; and by a subsequent order, was authorized to borrow, not to exceed $8000, for the purpose of paying the rent and other necessary and urgent debts incurred, or to be incurred, on account of the running expenses of the hotel. In view of the fact that the closing of the hotel, even temporarily, would have soon become known to its patrons, and would probably have been attended by a serious loss to the good-will of the business, we think the court did not exceed its authority in directing the receiver to keep it open during the pendency of the suit. Beyond this, however, appellants are in no condition to make this objection, since in their undertaking of December 4, 1891, they agreed to pay the receiver such sums of money as the court should thereafter find to be due him on account of his indebtedness or expenditures as receiver, or on account of his compensation as such receiver. 3. The assignment that it was error to find that Cake, the plaintiff in the suit, was personally liable for the expenditures and indebtedness of the receiver, is fully met by the abovementioned undertaking which Cake was obliged to give before taking possession of the property. Had he refused to give this undertaking, it would have been perfectly competent for the court to have required enough of the purchase money to be paid in cash to discharge the expenses of the receivership, and to compensate the receiver. It is true that Cake might not have been personally liable in the absence of this undertaking, but, as he chose to assume this responsibility in order Opinion of the Court. to obtain immediate possession of the property, and to avoid the payment of any part of the purchase money into court, he is in no condition to set up this defence. 4. The only assignment that strikes us as entitled to any weight is that wherein complaint is made of the amount allowed to the receiver for his compensation, which was itemized by the auditor as follows: Allowance of ten per cent on the receipts of the business... Allowance of five per cent on the amount received from trustees and paid to George J. Seufferle.. Allowance of five per cent on disbursements of indebtedness Total Counsel fee $2510 81 31 05 251 93 $2793 79 500 00 In view of the fact that the receiver had never been in the hotel business; that he employed a manager at $125, and part of the time at $150 à month, and required of him a bond for the faithful performance of his duties; that he was not prevented from giving his usual attention to his private business, and ordinarily spent only his evenings at the hotel, we are bound to say that, if it had been an original question, we should have fixed his compensation at a considerably less amount. Upon the other hand, however, as it appears that the hotel was kept open during the summer months at a very considerable loss; that the receiver was obliged to raise money to pay the rent and meet a deficiency each month; that the position was attended with considerable anxiety; that he retained it apparently against his own inclinations and in compliance. with the wishes of the parties in interest; that proprietors of other large hotels in Washington testified that $5000 a year was a fair compensation, and there was no evidence to the contrary; that the auditor, upon full consideration of all the facts of the case, made the allowance; that it was subsequently approved by the learned judge of the Supreme Court Opinion of the Court. of the District, and, upon appeal, by the three justices of the Court of Appeals, we are not disposed to disturb it. Great consideration will be paid to the concurring views of the auditor or master and the courts respecting a mere question of amount. High on Receivers, $3 781 to 786. It has been said in a number of cases that an allowance of five per cent upon the receipts and disbursements of the business was a fair compensation to receivers, Stretch v. Gowdey, 3 Tenn. Ch. 565; but in view of the facts above stated and the further fact that no compensation was allowed him for the custody and responsibility of the large amount of personal property that came into his possession, we are not prepared to say that the allowance was so excessive as to justify us in reducing it. The reasons given by the auditor for the allowance of $500 counsel fee are full and satisfactory. "The record shows that the receiver was frequently called into court either to answer the call of other parties in the cause or to ask instructions or authority from the court to meet emergencies arising in the business. It is evident that wise and capable advice was needed to protect him in the proper discharge of his duties, both as affecting himself and his responsibility, and as affecting the property entrusted to his charge. In view of what is disclosed in the record and proceedings, I consider the sum so allowed to be reasonable and fair." High on Receivers, § 805. This disposes of all the errors assigned, and, upon the whole, we think the judgment of the court should be Affirmed. Statement of the Case. CITIZENS' BANK v. CANNON. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. No. 58. Argued and submitted October 21, 1896. - Decided November 30, 1896. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a Circuit Court of the United States, by joining in one bill against distinct defendants claims, no one of which reaches the jurisdictional amount. In proceedings under a bill to enjoin the collection of taxes for a series of years, where the proof only shows the amount of the assessment for one year, which is below the jurisdictional amount, it cannot be assumed, in order to confer jurisdiction, that the assessment for each of the other years was for a like amount. Although, as a general rule, an appeal will not lie in a matter of costs alone. where an appeal is taken on other grounds as well, and not on the sole ground that costs were wrongfully awarded, this court can determine whether a Circuit Court, dismissing a suit for want of jurisdiction, can give a decrce for costs, including a fee to the defendants' counsel in the nature of a penalty; and it decides that the decree in this case was erroneous in that particular. When a Circuit Court dismisses a bill for want of jurisdiction it is without power to decree the payment of costs and penalties. IN March, 1893, the Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, a banking corporation created by the legislature of Louisiana, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana, against several defendants who were sheriffs respectively of a number of parishes in that district, seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the payment of taxes alleged to be due from the bank on lands owned by it in the several parishes. The main allegation of the bill was that the bank was by the terms of its charter exempt from taxation of every kind on its capital and property, and that certain specific and subsequent statutes of the State of Louisiana, by virtue of whose. provisions the defendants were proposing to enforce the payment of taxes, would, if carried into effect, operate to impair the contract between the bank and the State, contrary to the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the |