Statement of the Case.

sentence defendants sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the Territory, and the judgment was affirmed, September 1, 1896. 46 Pac. Rep. 349. The order of affirmance was set aside September 4, and a rehearing granted, and thereupon the Territory suggested diminution of the record and prayed for a certiorari, which was issued. On the ninth of September, Judge Laughlin convened a special term of the District Court in and for the county of Santa Fé, to be begun September 21, for the term of two consecutive weeks, or such further time as might be deemed necessary, "for the purpose of hearing and determining all causes that may be pending in said court, both civil and criminal, and any business pending in said court or that may come before it in the usual course of business of said court will be taken up and acted upon and disposed of in the same manner as at a regular term of said court and as provided by law."

On September 22, 1896, in the said special term, Judge Hamilton presiding, the motion of the Territory of New Mexico for an order directing the clerk "to make a proper and sufficient entry in the records of the proceedings of this court had on the 23d day of April, 1895, of the arraignment in said court at said time of the said defendants above named, upon the indictment in said cause, and of their respective pleas of not guilty thereto," came on to be heard, and it appearing to the court from evidence adduced, the recollection of the presiding judge, and certain notes and memoranda deposited with the clerk in pursuance of law, that the record "is not a full and correct record of the proceedings had in said court upon said date in said cause," in that the record failed to show the arraignment of the defendants and their respective pleas of not guilty, it was ordered "that the said proceedings be entered now upon the records of this court in this cause as of the 23d day of April, 1895, according to the facts thereof"; and the arraignment and pleas were set forth in said order. This order, together with the order convening the special term at which it was entered, having been returned to the Supreme Court of the Territory, that court on September 24, 1896, the cause coming on to be heard

Opinion of the Court.

on the rehearing, "and upon the amended record," again affirmed the judgment and sentence of the District Court, and fixed a day of execution. 46 Pac. Rep. 361. Thereupon the defendants, plaintiffs in error, on the same day filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, among other things, that they were unlawfully restrained of their liberty pursuant to the judgment of the District Court of the first judicial district of New Mexico sitting within the county of Santa Fé, inasmuch as the District Court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment, the verdict and judgment thereon being coram non judice, because the special term of the District Court at which they were rendered overreached and conflicted with the regular terms of the court; the record did not show that defendants had been arraigned and the amendment was improperly made; the judge of the fifth judicial district court had no power or authority to preside over the first judicial district court, and that his acts, while so presiding, were absolutely null and void. The writ of habeas corpus was issued, and on consideration of the sheriff's return to the writ, and the petitioners' answer thereto, it was ordered that the writ be discharged and the petitioners remanded to custody to be dealt with in pursuance of the judgment, conviction and sentence. From this order petitioners prayed an appeal, which was denied for reasons then stated. In re Gonzales, 46 Pac. Rep. 211. Subsequently an appeal was allowed by one of the justices of this court.

Mr. Solicitor General, Mr. John P. Victory, Solicitor General of New Mexico, and Mr. H. L. Warren for the motion to dismiss or affirm.

Mr. Thomas B. Catron, Mr. Samuel Field Phillips and Mr. Frederick D. McKenney opposing.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that

Opinion of the Court.

appeals will not lie to this court from final orders of the Supreme Courts of the Territories on habeas corpus; and a motion in the alternative to affirm the final order sought to be reviewed because so manifestly correct that the appeal must be regarded as taken for delay only.

In Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, it was held that we had no jurisdiction over the judgments of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in this class of cases. The statutes in relation to habeas corpus were there reviewed, and it is not necessary to go over them again in detail.

By section 763 of the Revised Statutes it was provided that an appeal to the Circuit Court might be taken from decisions on habeas corpus: (1) In the case of any person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any law or treaty of the United States; (2) in the case of the subjects or citizens of foreign States, when in custody, as therein set forth. By section 764 an appeal from the Circuit Court to this court might be taken in "the cases described in the last clause of the preceding section."

Section 705 of the Revised Statutes read: "The final judg ment or decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in any case where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the value of one thousand dollars, may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal, in the same manner and under the same regulations as are provided in cases of writs of error on judgments, or appeals from decrees rendered in a Circuit Court."

Section 846 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia was as follows: "Any final judgment, order or decree of the Supreme Court of the District may be reëxamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal, in the same cases and in like manner as provided by law in reference to the final judg ments, orders and decrees of the Circuit Courts of the United States."

On February, 25, 1879, an act was passed which provided: "The final judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of the

Opinion of the Court.

District of Columbia in any case where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the value of twenty-five hundred dollars, may be reëxamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error or appeal, in the same manner and under the same regulations as are provided in cases of writs of error on judgments or appeals from decrees rendered in the Circuit Court." 20 Stat. 320, c. 99, § 4.

By act of Congress of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 437, c. 353, § 764 of the Revised Statutes was so amended as to remove the restriction to the second clause of § 763, and restore the appellate jurisdiction of this court from decisions of the Circuit Courts in habeas corpus cases as it had existed prior to the passage of the act of March 27, 1868. 15 Stat. 44, c. 34. But this did not have that effect as to judgments of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in those cases for the reasons given in In re Heath, 144 U. S. 92; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82.

On the same third of March, A.D. 1885, Congress passed an act "regulating appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and the Supreme Courts of the several Territories." 23 Stat. 443, c. 355. The first section of this act provided "that no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, or in the Supreme Court of any of the Territories of the United States, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars"; and the second section, that the first section should not apply to any case "wherein is involved the validity of any patent or copyright, or in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United States; but in all such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute." We have repeatedly decided that this act did not apply, in either section, to any criminal case, and that it was only applicable to judgments and decrees in suits at law or in equity in which there was a pecuniary matter in dispute.

Opinion of the Court.

Hence, that, as it was well settled that a proceeding in habeas corpus was a civil and not a criminal proceeding, and was only availed of to assert the civil right of personal liberty, the matter in dispute had no money value, and an appeal would not lie. Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82; Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104; United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 320; Washington & Georgetown Railroad v. District of Columbia, 146 U. S. 227; In re Lennon, 150 U. S. 393, 397; In re Chapman, Petitioner, 156 U. S. 211, 215; In re Belt, Petitioner, 159 U. S. 95, 100; Chapman v. United States, 164 U. S. 436; Perrine v. Slack, 164 U. S. 452.

The Supreme Court of New Mexico declined to allow an appeal in this case because of the rule laid down in Cross v. Burke and in In re Lennon, supra, and it may be admitted that the view that an appeal would not lie might well have been entertained. But we think that the legislation in respect of the review of the final orders of the Territorial Supreme Courts on habeas corpus so far differs from that in respect of the judgments of the courts of the District of Columbia that a different rule applies.

It will be perceived that the revision of the final judgments or decrees of the Supreme Court of the District depended on the provision that they should be so reexaminable in the same cases and in like manner as the final judgments of the Circuit Courts of the United States, and that there was no special provision in relation to the review of final orders of such courts on habeas corpus.

Sections 702 and 1909 of the Revised Statutes are as follows:

"SEC. 702. The final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of any Territory, except the Territory of Washington, in cases where the value of the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, to be ascertained by the oath of either party, or of other competent witnesses, exceeds one thousand dollars, may be reviewed and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court, upon writ of error or appeal in the same manner and under the same regulations as the final judgments and decrees of a Circuit Court. . .