"CHEROKEE NATION, TAHLEQUAH DISTRICT.

"To any person legally authorized, greeting:

"You are hereby authorized to join in the holy bonds of matrimony and celebrate the rites and ceremonies of marriage between Mr. Fred. Rutherford, a citizen of the United States, and Mis' Betsy Holt, a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, and you are required to return this license to me for record within thirty days from the celebration of such marriage, with a certificate of the same appended thereto and signed by you. "Given under my hand and seal of office this the 28th day of August, 1894.

[Seal of Tahlequah district, Cherokee Nation.]

"R. M. DENNENBERG,

Deputy Clerk, Tahlequah District.

"This certifies that Mr. Fred. Rutherford, of Tahlequah district, C. N., I. T., and Mrs. Betsy Holt, of Tahlequah dist., Cherokee Nation, I. T., were by me united in the bonds of marriage at my home on the 4th day of October, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and ninety-four, conformable to the ordinance of God and the laws of the Cherokee Nation. "EVANS P. ROBERTSON, "Minister of the Gospel.

"S. E. ROBERTSON,

"Witness present at the Marriage.

"I hereby certify that the within certificate of marriage has this day been by me recorded on page 28, Record of Marriages, in the clerk's office in Tahlequah district, Cherokee Nation, this February 4th, 1896.

[Seal of the Tahlequah district, Cherokee Nation.]

"ARCH SPEARS, Deputy Clerk, Tahlequah District, Cherokee Nation."

The performance of the marriage ceremony was also proved by the minister, a regularly ordained Presbyterian preacher. T. W. Triplett was the clerk of the Tahlequah district at the date of this certificate. R. M. Dennenberg was his deputy,

Opinion of the Court.

but at the time of the issue of the license both the clerk and his deputy were absent, and the signature of the deputy was signed by John C. Dennenberg, his son. The clerk, the deputy and his son, each testified that the latter was authorized to sign the name of the clerk or the deputy in the absence of either, and that the business of the office was largely transacted by this young man, although not a regularly appointed deputy. He made quarterly reports, fixed up records and issued scrip, and his action in these respects was recognized by the clerk and the Nation as valid. No petition, as required by the statute, was found among the papers of the office, but there was testimony that all the papers of the office had been destroyed by fire since the date of the marriage license, and the younger Dennenberg testified that a petition was presented containing the names of ten citizens; that he could not remember the names, but, at the time, made inquiry and satisfied himself that they were all respectable Cherokee citizens. There was testimony also that Rutherford offered to vote at an election subsequent to his marriage; that his vote was challenged, and on inquiry it was ascertained that he was a Cherokee citizen, and his vote received. Upon these facts the question is presented whether Rutherford was a Cherokee citizen by adoption. The Circuit Court held that the evidence was insufficient to show that fact, and that therefore that court had jurisdiction.

With this conclusion we are unable to concur. The fact that an official marriage license was issued carries with it a presumption that all statutory prerequisites thereto had been complied with. This is the general rule in respect to official action, and one who claims that any such prerequisite did not exist must affirmatively show the fact. Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 70; Rankin v. Hoyt, 4 How. 327; Butler v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766; Weyauwega v. Ayling, 99 U. S. 112; Gonzales v. Ross, 120 U. S. 605; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617; Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138; Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U. S. 91, 97. In this last case it is said "it is a rule of very general application, that where an act is done which can be done

Opinion of the Court.

legally only after the performance of some prior act, proof of the later carries with it a presumption of the due performance of the prior act."

It is true that the younger Dennenberg, who signed the marriage license, was neither clerk nor deputy, but he was an officer de facto, if not de jure. He was permitted by the clerk and the deputy to sign their names; he was the only person in charge of the office; he transacted the business of the office, and his acts in their behalf and in the discharge of the duties of the office were recognized by them and also by the Cherokee Nation as valid. Under those circumstances his acts must be taken as official acts, and the license which he issued as of full legal force. As to third parties, at least he was an officer de facto; and if an officer de facto, the same validity and the same presumptions attached to his actions as to those of an officer de jure.

Again, it is evident that Rutherford intended to change his nationality and become a Cherokee citizen. He took the steps which the statute prescribed and did, as he supposed, all that was requisite therefor. He was marrying a Cherokee woman, and thus to a certain extent allying himself with the Cherokee Nation. He sought and obtained the license which was declared legally prerequisite to such marriage if he intended to become an adopted citizen of that Nation. That he also obtained a marriage license from the United States authorities does not disprove this intention. It only shows that he did not intend that there should be any question anywhere, by any authority, as to the validity of his marriage. He asserted and was permitted to exercise the right of suffrage as a Cherokee citizen. Suppose, during his lifetime, the Cherokee Nation had asserted jurisdiction over him as an adopted citizen, would he not have been estopped from denying such citizenship? Has death changed the significance of his actions? The Cherokee Nation not only recognized the acts of young Dennenberg as the acts of the clerk, but since the death of Rutherford it has asserted its jurisdiction over the Cherokees who did the killing-a jurisdiction which is conditioned upon the fact that the party killed was a Cherokee citizen.

Syllabus.

It appears, therefore, that Rutherford sought to become a citizen, took all the steps he supposed necessary therefor, considered himself a citizen, and that the Cherokee Nation in his lifetime recognized him as a citizen and still asserts his citizenship. Under those circumstances, we think it must be adjudged that he was a citizen by adoption, and consequently the jurisdiction over the offence charged herein is, by the laws of the United States and treaties with the Cherokee Nation, vested in the courts of that Nation.

The judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to surrender the defendants to the duly constituted authorities of the Cherokee Nation.

FORD v. DELTA AND PINE LAND COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI.

No. 25. Argued October 16, 19, 1896. - Decided January 4, 1897.

Exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed, and no claims for them can be sustained unless within the express letter or the necessary scope of the exempting clause; and a general exemption is to be construed as referring only to the property held for the transaction of the business of the party exempted.

The exemption from taxation conferred by the 19th section of the act of the legislature of Mississippi of November 23, 1859, c. 14, upon the railroad company chartered by that act, does not extend to property other than that used in the business of the company, acquired under the authority of a subsequent act of the legislature in which there was no exemption clause.

A clause in a statute exempting property from taxation does not release it from liability for assessments for local improvements.

It has been held in Mississippi not only that special assessments for local improvements do not come within the constitutional limitation as to taxation, but also that the construction and repair of levees are to be regarded as local improvements for which the property specially benefited may be assessed; and this rule is in harmony with that recognized generally elsewhere, to the effect that special assessments for local improvements are not within the purview of either constitutional limitations in respect of taxation, or general exemptions from taxation.

Statement of the Case.

Under authority granted by the act of March 16, 1872, c. 75, of the legislature of Mississippi, the auditor conveyed to the Selma, Marion and Memphis Railroad Company the lands in question here, by deeds which recited that they had been "sold to the State of Mississippi for taxes due to the said State," and that the company had paid into the state treasury two cents per acre "in full of all state and county taxes due thereon to present date." No reference was made in those deeds to levy taxes or assessments. Held, that those deeds were no evidence of the prior payment and discharge of such levy taxes and assessments.

It is well settled that the punctuation of a statute is not decisive of its meaning.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Green v. Gibbs, 151 Mississippi, 592, followed, as it was, by subsequent decisions of that court, is not only binding on this court, but also commends itself to the judgment of this court as a just recognition of the force of legislative contracts.

THIS was a bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, on February 27, 1889, by the appellants as complainants to quiet their title to certain lands therein described. Upon final hearing, on August 15, 1890, a decree was entered dismissing the bill, 43 Fed. Rep. 181, from which decree the complainants have appealed to this court.

Complainants' chain of title is as follows: 1st. A patent on March 13, 1853, from the United States to the State of Mississippi, under the act of September 4, 1841, c. 16, 5 U. S. Stat. 453, and September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 U. S. Stat. 519. 2d. Conveyances from the State of Mississippi made during the years 1853 to 1856, inclusive, to E. F. Potts and others, these grantees having entered the lands with scrip issued by the secretary of state, under the acts of March 15 and March 16, 1852, providing for the construction of levees upon the Mississippi River. Laws Miss. 1852, c. 14, pp. 33, 41. 3d. Deeds from the grantees of the State and their privies in interest, in the years 1871 and 1872, to the Selma, Marion and Memphis Railroad Company, made under the authority of an act of the legislature of the State, approved July 21, 1870, authorizing the conveyance of lands to such company in payment of subscription to its capital stock. Laws Miss. 1870, c. 220, p. 566. 4th. Deeds from the State of Missis