a private army, he borrowed money on the public revenues, and he lived luxuriously himself and amassed considerable private treasure. He died without issue, and Lord Dalhousie annexed the province, to the horror of English Liberals. Lord Dalhousie pointed out that by annexation he got a large increase of land-revenue for the public, he got rid of a troublesome interior customs' line, and he was enabled to reduce the Imperial army after he had disbanded the private army of Berar. The alternative to these Imperial advantages was to allow one of the prince's wives to adopt some child and give him these public reve

nues.

Lord Dalhousie never hesitated for one moment. He held that the private treasure of the prince had been accumulated out of public funds therefore Lord Dalhousie seized it, allowing the ladies of the family 12,000l. a year maintenance. On the other hand, Lord Dalhousie held that the prince had no authority to saddle the province with a public debt, and that the high interest which the advancers had taken was in contemplation that the British Government might step in and cut the subsidiary prince's career short; hence the Imperial Government never acknowledged or paid interest on the debt. These measures of Lord Dalhousie were undoubtedly of a thorough character: annexation was never carried out with more unsparing severity; but was not this severity the path of duty and conscience for the Governor-General ? A man in such a position as Governor-General of India must feel that he has no right to allow private feelings of commiseration to induce him to swerve one line from the path of strict duty. He may be generous from his private purse, never from the public revenue.

The idea that the land-tax of a province can be private property is a thoroughly English one. Among Hindus the idea that land-revenue can be anything but public property

6

seems inconceivable. The Bengalee zemindar to this day never speaks of my tenants,' but of my subjects:' he does not transact his rentcollection in a business office, but in a 'cutcherry,' i.e. a building standing out as a public court of justice, and supposed to be homologous with the collector's cutcherry in the station. He does not collect rent by mere land-stewards, but by his 'officers,' as he calls them; and though to English eyes he is a mere landlord, in the eyes of his ryots he is a Government High Officer, a collector of revenue. Very curious deductions from these premisses can be seen in Bengal Act X., the ultimate principle of which is that the British Government shall in the last resort decide what is the 'fair and equitable' rent for every piece of land in Bengal.

We have in India alienated an estimated 11,000,000l. land-revenue (but probably much more) to subsidiary princes, who spend this money in such a way as to entail on us extra heavy military expenditure. We spend an enormous sum in the Public Works Department, and the cry is still more railways, more irrigation. Now it appears that India cannot afford such a system, and there is a deficit, said by some to be 4,000,000l., by others 2,000,000l.

"

The popular folly in India is exhibited by raising an outcry against 'Dustoorie Dick (Sir R. Temple) and the Bounding Brothers (Strachey) for their manipulation of the figures in the Financial Department. But the real cause of a deficit is the system. People in England still lie in such a slough of ignorance regarding the subsidiary princes that the Government in India feels it hopeless to propose any reform in that system. The Indian Government, therefore, applies itself to meet the deficiency-first, by an increase of taxation; second, by retrenchment in all departments; thirdly, by attempting to shift some of the charges now incident upon

the Imperial Treasury on to the Provincial Governments.

I will say a few words on these measures, assuming that the 'system' is not to be changed. I will then explain what a change of system might possibly do.

First. The increase of taxation is an increase in the Income Tax. There is one grand objection to the Income Tax in India, viz. that owing to our inability to carry out the assessment and collection faithfully, it is wretchedly unproductive. A property tax on all real fixed property could be more justly assessed, and would prove more productive-simply a national rate. The only other feasible increase of taxation that has been suggested by anyone is that of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, viz. to increase the excise on salt in Bengal. The population of the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal is now nearly 60,000,000, and if we could, by an increase of the salt monopoly, raise but a shilling per head per annum it would give us 3,000,000l. The objection to the increase of the salt tax is that it lays a tax on the wrong people, and that a poll-tax (which is what the salt excise amounts to) is the most unequal of all taxes. In reply it is said. that a very small poll-tax is not an unjust tax. Moreover, as Ricardo shows, nearly every tax falls on the lowest class ultimately. And in Bengal our income tax falls directly on the ryots, for when the ryots are satisfied that Government has increased the charge on their zemindar they are prepared, without murmur, to pay an extra percentage of rent; and the efforts, nay, violent plunges, of the philanthropic Government of Bengal to prevent this are little better than ludicrous. It is just one of those things that, with all our power, we are powerless to check.

It was proposed, fifteen years ago, to commute the fixed money landtax of Bengal into rice, exactly on the principle of the commutation tithe in England. Had this then

been done the Government landrevenue from Bengal would have been now much larger in rupees than it is. At present the Government land-revenue in Bengal is rapidly diminishing in value owing to the fall in the value of money. The landlords are assuredly not entitled to any advantage thence. Even now a commutation is worth consideration, for the value of money has yet probably a good deal to fall; but it would give no immediate relief to the Imperial Financer, and no man high in office in India cares for more than the next five years.

Secondly. We have retrenchment in all departments. This, perhaps, has rather a healthy odour about it in England; retrenchment, like reform, connotes an idea of improvement. But it really means in India the repression of all enterprise for years. It must be recollected that in India there is hardly any private enterprise new speculations of every kind have to be supported, at least at first, by Government. In India a strict repression of Government expenditure involves somewhat the same unhealthy stagnation that 10 per cent. discount at the Bank of England implies at home.

Thirdly. We have the persistent endeavour of the Imperial Government to throw the cost of roads, education, &c., on the Provincial Governments, and compel these Provincial Governments to invent local taxes to pay this cost. This is a measure which clearly gives no real relief whatever to the people; however extensively carried out, it only sets up two classes of taxation instead of one, like the Federal and State taxes in America. The principle of small separate taxes is a very dangerous one in India, where the percentage cost of assessment and collection is so enormous, and where the people are already more harassed by the variety of our taxes than by their amount.

In short, I believe the LieutenantGovernor of Bengal is wholly in the

right when he says he could levy a million extra from salt with less practical oppression on the people than he could raise 100,000l. by a new local direct cess. And I am quite sure the people of Bengal would like the payment of the million on that wise better than the payment of the 100,000l. There is nothing for India like taxes few in number, but of productive amounts; and when the Government of India tries merely to shuffle off responsibility in this manner, it can be only accepted as an unmistakable indication that they are at their wits' end to make both ends meet. And that is the honest, simple truth of the whole matter.

I will now, finally, sketch a policy for India as it may be.'

Suppose we determine that we will support no more tyrants and no more tyrannies in India, and that we resolve that our subsidiary princes shall be constitutional sovereigns. Take Hyderabad as a first example, as there the Treasury is presided over by European officers now. Suppose we insisted on the entire disbanding of the private Mussulman and Arab army-that we then abolished our subsidiary force, and kept only a division of the Queen's forces in occupation of Hyderabad. In place of a triple army we should have one, and we should make the Hyderabad revenues pay for the British division in occupation. Suppose next we set aside a Civil List for the Nizam's personal maintenance, and took care, through our European Treasury officers, that not another rupee of public money reached his pocket. This Civil List might be ample, on a larger scale compared to revenue than that of the Autocrat of All the Russias. The administration of the province might still be left entirely in the hands of the Nizam and his native Ministers. The state revenues, minus his own salary and the cost of the British division of occupation, would be large, and would be dis

posable for the administration of justice, police, education, tanks, irrigation, railways, roads, canals, letterpost, telegraphs, forest conservancy, agriculture. The disposable revenue in states thus circumstanced would be very large; and if the subsidiary prince was once thoroughly relieved from his notions about a private army, there is every reason to believe he would take up some of these healthy forms of Government expenditure. Some of the Madras subsidiary princes do now.

Suppose a similar state of things were established in Scindia's territory, and in all the subsidiary territories lying within our ring fence. A careful distinction between the annexation of an island enclosed in our own area and the conquest of an outlying state like Nepal or Birmah should be preserved. At present Scindia spends nothing except on his army or on his own pleasures. Possibly he might not care to do the work of a constitutional sovereign; but if he would not, I would let him sink into a landholder.

Supposing these reforms carried out, instead of 55,000 English and 150,000 native troops, we should require about 65,000 English and 60,000 native troops; but about 10,000 of the English and 15,000 of the native troops would be paid for by the local subsidiary states they occupied. I do not propose that a man of the native army should be disbanded, but that recruiting should be absolutely stopped till the reduction required was reached. The time has arrived for a consolidation of the Empire; and if the abovesketched change in policy were carried out, it would be looking our deficit fairly in the face.

of which I give two-one proceeding on theoretic grounds, the other on practical.

The most differentiated (i.e. the most improved) organism is also the most differentiable (i.e. improvable). There was a certain gap between the Englishman and the Hindu in 1770 -what progress have the English nation made in the past century, and what have the Hindu? Think of arts, manufactures, science, the progress of public opinion in every subject. The Hindu is virtually unaltered. Whatever gap there was between the nations in 1770, there is thrice as great a one in 1870, and there will be ten times as great a one in

1970.

Secondly. There is the practical proof. Suppose the Queen's Government and troops were withdrawn tomorrow, who would govern the country? The Hindus? No: the English reader knows better than that, and says the Mussulmans. But does the Englishman who has never been out of Europe reflect that there are tens of thousands of English who are denizens in India, who are reconciled to the country, whose whole fortunes are bound up in the country? What would they do were Britain to abandon India? They would have a committee meeting in Calcutta, take volunteers from the departing regiments or from merchant seamen, they would slip into the Government of the country without the slightest disturbancethe ordinary natives would never understand what had happened any better than they did the transfer from John Company to the Crown. A large section of the English in India would be very glad to see England abandon India to-morrow, for they think they could manage the country far better without home interference. This talk about educating and abandoning India is reproduced in Calcutta, and reported by baboos who have visited England as the really adopted theory there. But no harm

is done: the Bengalee has come to think that the English are nearly as great at talking high sentiments and beautiful feelings as he is himself, and he knows that the real sentiment and feeling of every Englishman in India is -With our own good sword we took the land, and with that sword we will hold it, come pandy, Russian, or devil.

However this question of the ultimate future of India be regarded, it will be no reason for not transforming our subsidiary tyrants into subsidiary constitutional sovereigns. Those who believe in educating India up and then abandoning her should surely, above all others, approve the policy advocated in this article.

The Liberal party in England are very tender over subsidiary princes, no one more so than worthy John Bright; and they have no scruple about multiplying taxes on the people in order to maintain these puppet vassals, and to supply to them the means for great personal extravagance and for keeping a turbulent soldiery. The income-tax, the salttax, the customs, the court fees and local rates, that is to say our most objectionable taxes, ought to be regarded as supplying directly part of the cost of the Nizam's and Scindia's hordes. The Liberal mind of England may perhaps consistently continue to regard this system as true liberality and real generosity towards the peoples of India. Residents in India will rather regard it as a vain and empty pluming of ourselves on being liberal and generous with trust property placed in our hands. English Liberal writers, from Lord Macaulay downwards, have attacked the great Indian heroes of last century for their treatment of conquered princes. But it may fairly be asked, Did not these great men see their true duty to the people of India more clearly than we do? If we had a Warren Hastings in power but for six months, we should hear no more of the Indian deficit.

IN

N the spring last year a sketch with the above title appeared in this Magazine. The Irish Land Bill was under discussion in the House of Commons. English prejudice and English ignorance were busy with the reputation of the unfortunate country, clamorous with despair of its amendment by that or any other measure. I thought that at such a time a record of my own experience in Ireland might contribute, if infinitesimally little, towards setting her condition in a truer light -towards showing how among the darker features there were redeeming traits of singular interest and attractiveness. Pleased with my own performance and intending to continue it, I trusted that if my friends in Kerry did not approve of all that I said, they would at least recognise my goodwill. How great was my surprise to find that I was regarded as an intruder into business which was none of mine, affecting English airs of insolent superiority, and under pretence of patronage turning the county and its inhabitants into ridicule! Struck by the absence of petty vices among the peasantry, their simplicity of habit, and the control for good which was exercised over them by the priests, I had said rashly that religion in Kerry appeared to me to mean the knowledge of right and wrong, and to mean little besides. What dark insinuations the writer never dreamt of may be discovered in an unguarded word! By 'little besides I had myself intended to imply that no Fenian sermons were to be heard in the chapels there, that no hatred was preached against England or English landlords there, the subjects believed on this side St.

George's Channel to be eternally inculcated in Catholic pulpits. Our excellent priest at Tuosist-I take this opportunity of apologising to him-declared in the county papers that he was cut to the heart; that he had suffered many wrongs in lif but never one that had afflicted hin, so deeply as the insinuation that his . flock learnt nothing from him but the obligations of morality. He must excuse the English stupidity, the English preference for the practical results of religion, which betrayed me into forgetfulness of its mysteries. He was able, as will appear in the sequel, to punish me with kindness, and to show that at least I had not overrated his practical authority.

But this was the least of my offences. I had stirred a hornets' nest. In describing the manners of a past generation I had sketched the likeness of a once notorious character in the neighbourhood. To avoid mentioning his real name I looked over a list of Irish chiefs, three centuries old, and called him at hazard Morty O'Sullivan. A dozen living Morty O'Sullivans, and the representatives of a dozen more who were dead, clamorously appropriated my description, while they denounced the inaccuracy of its details.

More seriously, I had used expressions about the Liberator' for which I was called to account by a member of his family. 'The Liberator,' I conceive, made himself the property of the public. I do not think he was a friend to Ireland. If he cast out one devil in carrying Catholic Emancipation he let loose seven others, which must be chained again before England and Ireland can work in harmony.