so feeble was the power of drawing them out, that, in the opinion of all, the military efforts of the United States could not be exerted with a vigor suited to the exigency of the occasion, nor even with any thing more than a languishing inactivity, unless sustained by succours from their allies both in money and supplies for the army. The sentiments of Washington, communicating the fruits of his knowledge, experience, and judgment, with the weight of his name, were thought essential to produce a just impression on the French cabinet. He wrote a letter to Colonel Laurens, remarkable for its appropriateness and ability, containing a clear and forcible representation of facts, with arguments in support of the application of Congress, which was first presented by that commissioner to Dr. Franklin, and afterwards laid before the ministry and the King. The influence of this letter, in procuring the aids solicited from the French government, may be inferred from the circumstance of the loan being accompanied with the suggestion, that the money to be appropriated for the army should be left at the disposal of General Washington. The existence of an army, and the prosecution of war, depend on the power of the civil head of a nation, as well as on its resources. So loose were the ties by which the confederacy was bound together, so limited was the control exercised by Congress over the States, and so little inclined were the parts to unite in a consolidated whole, that, from imbecility on the one hand and public apathy on the other, Washington became more and more fearful of the consequences. "The great business of war," said he, "can never be well conducted, if it can be conducted at all, while the powers of Congress are only recommendatory. While one State yields obedience, and another refuses it, while a third mutilates VOL. I. DD and adopts the measure in part only, and all vary in time. and manner, it is scarcely possible that our affairs should prosper, or that any thing but disappointment can follow the best concerted plans. The willing States are almost ruined by their exertions; distrust and jealousy ensue. Hence proceed neglect and ill-timed compliances, one State waiting to see what another will do. This thwarts all our measures, after a heavy though ineffectual expense is incurred." And he adds, on the point of vesting Congress with competent powers; "Our independence, our respectability and consequence in Europe, our greatness as a nation hereafter, depend upon it. The fear of giving sufficient powers to Congress, for the purposes I have mentioned, is futile. A nominal head, which at present is but another name for Congress, will no longer do. That honorable body, after hearing the interests and views of the several States fairly discussed and explained by their representatives, must dictate, and not merely recommend and leave it to the States to do afterwards as they please, which, as I have observed before, is in many cases to do nothing at all." These sentiments he often repeated in letters to his friends, but more as an expression of his wishes than in the confidence of hope. The time for establishing a firm and united government had not come. Nor indeed was it to be expected that the States, jealous of their rights, and each possessing within itself the substance and the forms of a separate commonwealth, would resign without great caution these positive advantages for the doubtful security of a new and untried system. It is remarkable, however, that Congress assumed and exercised certain powers implying the highest prerogatives of sovereignty, while they neglected to use others of a subordinate kind, which were less likely to be abused, and were even more necessary to move the great machine of government. They made war, declared independence, formed treaties of alliance, sent ministers to foreign courts, emitted a paper currency and pledged the credit of all the States for its redemption, and on more than one occasion conferred dictatorial powers on the commander of their armies. These acts of supreme power they hazarded without scruple or hesitation, without consulting their constituents or the fear of displeasing them; but they ventured only to recommend to the States to raise troops, levy taxes, clothe and feed their naked and starving soldiers, and to execute the laws for the purposes of internal government; shrinking from the responsibility of enforcing their decrees, or even of advising compulsory measures. This seeming contradiction is not inexplicable. Their course was prudent, perhaps necessary. The first series of acts here enumerated did not bear immediately upon the people. Alliances might be entered into, a foreign minister might come or go, an army might be voted or the credit of the nation pledged, and no individual would feel any present inconvenience; whereas, if a man was required to be a soldier, to pay a tax, or give up part of his substance, he would begin to think of himself, talk of his rights, complain of hardships, and question the authority that demanded obedience. The difficulty of exacting such obedience by force, and the danger of the attempt, are equally obvious. The British general seems not to have meditated any offensive operations in the northern States for the coming campaign. His attention was chiefly directed to the south, where such detachments as could be spared from his army at New York were to coöperate with Lord Cornwallis. Sixteen hundred men, with a pro |