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pointed to the first alternative; the fate of Marshal Bazaine was a warning against the latter. To retire was to fulfil the task allotted to the advanced guard of an army on the His mission was-not to run risks,-not to do brilliant exploits, but to delay the enemy, and cover the Colony, by every means possible; above and beyond all else, to keep touch with the fleet at Durban.

sea.

What considerations led to the action taken we do not know, and we have therefore no right to pass judgment upon it. We are not even sure that Sir George White was in this matter his own master-possibly he had definite orders from England. Still, in discussing the question, we cannot but remember that even generals are human, and it would be strange if he could be insensible to the knowledge that retirement would have been interpreted as admitted failure, and that it would have bitterly disappointed the Colony, irritated the British public (as yet blind to the state of the case), and roused the daily press to a fury of denunciation. What this would have meant to him as servant of a department which has ever made haste to endorse the popular verdict, right or wrong, we need not particularise. As a matter of fact, he made his decision. Ladysmith was isolated November 2nd, and soon afterwards the bridges of the Tugela passed into the possession of the Boers, after which the Natal Field Force as such ceased to exist, and was known only as the beleagured garrison of Ladysmith. What followed we know. Natal was raided almost to the suburbs of Maritzburg, and despite the gallant rally of the Colonists, and the efforts of tardy reinforcements from the Cape, the Boers had it much their own way in the British colony. Nor was this the whole of the misfortune. The investment of Ladysmith set free a portion of General Joubert's reserves, and Boer commandoes at once congregated on the Orange River, soon to pass Norvall's Pont into the Cape Colony. The sieges of Mafeking and Kimberley were pushed forward with increased vigour, and more activity was manifested on the Rhodesian border.

On the 30th Oct. Sir Redvers Buller arrived at Cape Town, followed, Nov. 9th, by the first batch of his Army Corps,

the remainder of which landed by driblets up to the end of the month. Meantime the military and political situation became daily more and more serious, and Sir Redvers was confronted with a dilemma more momentous even than that which had been forced upon Sir George White. It had been his intention to concentrate his army on the line De Aar-Naauwpoort, and from this as advanced base to have marched upon Bloomfontein, via Colesberg, along the main Midland railway. Had he adhered to this resolution, and waited for the assembly of his Army Corps complete, contenting himself with seizing and fortifying the bridges on the Orange River, he would have been able to take the field in December at the head of all his 30,000 men. One of two things might then have been expected:-1st. He might be unopposed. In that case he could occupy Springfontein Junction, and build a fort there-thus cutting off any commandoes in Cape Colony-and continue his advance when and how he thought best. 2nd. He might find an army in his path amounting probably to 40,000 men, but not more. Such an army, which could scarcely in the time available bring up tress or siege guns, could (judging by what had been done already) be probably defeated by 30,000 British in the open veldt ; or supposing it were too strongly posted to warrant the risk of a great battle, could be detained in a state of uncertainty just as long as seemed advantageous. In either of these cases, the mere presence of a large army would without fail raise the siege of Kimberley, and at the same time, by the withdrawal of Boers from Natal, give to the troops at Ladysmith an opportunity of breaking out. Thus a campaign in the Free State offered many direct advantages. It would moreover cover the line of communications, and deprive the enemy of further initiative; in other words, the Boers would have to dance attendance on the British, not the British upon the Boers.

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Another alternative offered, less ambitious but equally sound. This was to threaten an advance on Bloemfontein, but actually to go to the relief of Kimberley, not with a single division only, but with the bulk of the Army Corps, including

the Cavalry. The result of such a step is not difficult to forecast by the light of what afterwards took place. Following Lord Methuen's march we may be sure that the Belmont Kopjes would have been taken as they actually were, but with less loss to the British, and more to the Boers;-their entire force, in fact, would have been almost certainly killed or taken prisoners. Gras Pan would probably not have been defended, and the passage of the Modder River would have been more easily forced, not only because the British would have been stronger, but because the Boers would have had less time to prepare for their coming. Finally, the army once across the river, need not have waited there more than a single night, and next day the Spytfontein Kopjes, not yet artificially strengthened, would have probably been captured and Kimberley relieved.

Both of these plans were promising-Napoleon Buonaparte would certainly have adopted the first, our Iron Duke probably the second; but there were drawbacks. To begin with, either scheme would have necessitated a period of patient inaction, and while the troops were concentrating, the General in command must have hardened his heart to the appeals of Natal, and steeled his nerves against fears for Ladysmith. Granting for a moment that Sir Redvers Buller could have borne the tension of so trying a situation, would the public have done so? Most likely not, and Sir Redvers knew that he must move at once. Imagine what would have happened if Ladysmith had fallen with no effort to relieve it!

Still there remained a third course. It was to let Kimberley take its chance for a little longer, and to go in full force to the relief of Ladysmith. Judging, again, by immediate precedent, this movement would have succeeded-the passage of the Tugela would have been carried (though not without severe loss), and the united armies of the British at Ladysmith would have driven the Boers beyond the Biggarsbergen. Then if a retaining force only had been left on the Tugela, a rapid transfer of the remainder to Cape Colony might have been in time to sweep the north clear of Boers and rebels, and afterwards advance in force on Kimberley or Bloemfon

tein. This plan, however, would have exposed the Cape Colony for a long period to the chances of invasion and rebellion, exposed the lines of communication between De Aar, and the East Coast ports, and even endangered the great strategic points. Besides all this, to do nothing for Kimberley would have given almost as much offence as to do nothing for Natal, and an English general must justify his existence by pleasing everybody. Sir Redvers tried to do 80, and failed.

We know what actually took place. The fresh arrivals were hurried to the front to meet the requirements of the moment. Some went to Natal, where the Boers had isolated Estcourt and threatened Maritzburg; others were sent to De Aar, and the rest to points in the north-east of Cape Colony, where invasion and local risings compromised the railway communications. Bit by bit the great Army Corps, upon which so many hopes had been built, melted away, and its organisation by Divisions and Brigades was entirely lost. Eventually the available British troops were disposed of as follows:

Lord Methuen was despatched to the relief of Kimberley, with a divison and a half. Sir Redvers Buller went himself to Natal, where another division under General Clery had been assembled, General French, with the bulk of the cavalry, was told off to cover Lord Methuen, and to hold the base line from De Aar to Naauwpoort. General Gatacre was left, with the remainder of the infantry, to guard the communications from Naauwpoort to East London and to drive the enemy from the Stormbergen district.

The forces thus dispersed, though augmented largely by extra regular troops, by local levies, and by naval contingents, proved, as might have been expected, everywhere ineffective for the objects in view. Lord Methuen began his campaign by the three costly victories of Belmont, Gras Pan, and Modder Bridge, at none of which had he sufficient numbers to cut off the enemy's retreat, or, by rapid pursuit, to prevent them assembling in a fresh position. After the last of these battles, when within a few miles of Kimberley, twelve days were lost repairing the railway bridge and waiting for reinforcements,

during which time the Boers received large accessions of strength from the North, and from their army in Natal. Taking advantage of the inaction of the British, they fortified a series of kopjes, lying between the river and the town, and covered them with a network of entrenchments and barbed wire entanglements, so that when at length, on December 10th, an assault was delivered on the Magersfontein heights, the position was found to be impregnable, and the troops, after severe fighting, had to retire to camp with heavy losses. Thus it happened that on the very threshold of success the expedition was brought to a standstill, and Lord Methuen had to entrench on the Modder River, assuming the defensive, with only 12,000 men opposed to at least 15,000, posted in front of him, and no certainty about the number there might be at Jacobsdal, on the flank of his communications.

For the check thus experienced neither Lord Methuen nor the gallant soldiers under his command were in any way to blame; it was no fault of theirs that they had been assigned an impossible task, and they had, in fact, succeeded in doing what few troops in the world would have attempted in like case; all the same, the circumstance of their enforced idleness within sight of Kimberley played into the hands of the Boers exactly, by enabling them to complete the investment of the city, and neutralise the relief expedition with one and the same army.

Meanwhile General French, who was more or less tied to the base of Methuen's expedition, scoured the plains from De Aar to the Orange border without meeting any enemy bold enough to oppose his cavalry. He found himself, however, too weak in mounted infantry and artillery to dislodge the Boers from their laagers on the Colesberg-Naauwpoort line, and it was not till after the New Year had begun that he was able to co-operate with Gatacre's forces. These, again, were all along far too small to hold the front given them. The enemy was in force at Burghersdorp, and scattered in small. bodies broadcast within a radius of 100 miles. General Gatacre, hurrying hither and thither through the defiles of the Stormbergen, found it impracticable to out-manoeuvre a

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