understood, to commence his celebrated | North it seems to be an ill-timed and un speech on Foot's Resolution, in reply to Mr. Haynes, by requesting the Secretary to read the resolution under discussion. Everybody recollects the beautiful and appropriate figure of the mariner tossed about for days in the open seas without chart or compass, by which he illustrated the digression. This happened more than twenty years ago, when, it may be supposed, demagoguic influences were less common than at this day. And, indeed, if a speaker were to rise in his seat, now-a-days, and deliver a speech of twenty or thirty minutes length, confined solely to the topic of debate, without once calling to his aid irrelevant party issues, he would be stigmatized by reporters and lobby members as emptyheaded and stupid. Discursive and inappropriate discussion has grown so common, that it may now be regarded as a settled precedent in Congressional economy. No more cogent illustration of the truth and justice of the above general remarks may be cited, than the history of the debates in Congress on the Wilmot Proviso. A discussion of the power of Congress to prohibit or regulate slavery in the Territories of the United States has opened, in the course of the debate, the entire question of slavery, in all its points, and placed it in every conceivable attitude. Prominent among these irrelevant issues is one of very startling moment, not because of its complexity or obscurity, but because of the petty and contemptible jealousy which pervades both sections of the Union concerning its permanent adjustment. It will, of It will, of course, be inferred that we allude to that of the powers of Congress over slaves and the subject of slavery within the District of Columbia. On this point, all candid and discriminating minds must admit that, in discussing the question, the South has claimed more than is just and constitutional, and that the North has chosen an ill time and showed an improper and intolerant spirit in asserting and claiming what is doubtless just and constitutional. We cannot think that true patriotism or devotion to right and justice, have had any influence with the majority in the introduction or discussion of this subject. The governing influences, in both cases, we fear, have been of a different and far less meritorious character. On the side of the worthy attempt to wreak its prejudices upon an institution which, to say the least, is recognized, if not by name, at least de facto, and protected from invasion by the federal constitution. On the part of the South it has been an unwary and hazardous attempt to make political capital at home of a question that embodies elements of the most dangerous nature, as regards the welfare of the Union, and to feed a flame, of which the calmest and most moderate politician may stand in dread. But it has been our pride and pleasure to observe that, in both sections of the Union, the conservative national whig party, as a body, has asserted and maintained a course of conduct unquestionably conservative and national. By moderation and dignity, by wisdom and true patriotism, the party has well sustained its ancient and honorable character. In a like spirit, it is trusted, and with a mind beset on eliciting and expressing the truth, we now proceed to present, in a condensed and summary shape, our views and opinions. The true opinion, as we conceive, may be best arrived at, by first propounding, and then endeavoring to answer two leading questions; which, it is believed embrace the entire matter of debate: 1st. Has Congress the right, under the Constitution of the United States and deeds of cession from the States of Maryland and Virginia, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia? 2d. Has Congress the right or power, under the same instruments, to pass laws of a Municipal or Police character concerning slaves, and to regulate or prohibit the slave traffic in said District? The first of these questions we do not at all hesitate to answer in the negative, and shall state briefly the reason and grounds on which that answer may be founded. The abolition of slavery in any State, District, or Territory, within the limits of the United States, cannot be a matter of legislation, because it involves rights of persons and of property which existed previously to the establishment of the government, and which not only constitute a principal element in the government of all, but are beyond the reach of legislative majorities. The legislature of a State ought not to decree the abolition of slavery. It concerns the subject of regulating slavery in the District of Columbia, are not at all analagous to the powers of the same body as applied to the Territories of the United States. Conceding the power in the one case does not and cannot necessarily embrace the other. In the first, the power is explicitly given and is clearly derivable from all the sources where it ever belonged in law. In the last it is not to be found in any bond, compact, or conveyance of any description, and must be left to vague inference, and ever remain an obscure and vexed question. The power to regulate the slave traffic in any or in all its branches, (save one perhaps,) is a matter entirely of police, and belongs properly to legislative bodies in their capacity of police conservators. Even in our State legislatures a wide discretion is claimed and often exercised on this subject. But no one who takes the trouble to examine the Constitution of the United States, defining the special powers of Congress, or the deeds of cession from the States of Maryland and Virginia, can justly or successfully question the unlimited discretion of Congress concerning all police regulations of slavery within the District of Columbia. The ten miles square is ceded not to the United States, as are the territories, but to the is a body of limited powers, limited and defined, too, by an instrument which is formed by the Sovereign power in convention. This Sovereign power is the people. The legislature would have no more right or authority, unwarranted or unempowered by any previous form of assent from the people, to pass a law modifying the entire social system, than it would have to pass a law establishing or abolishing the Christian or Jewish form of worship, or the tenures of land, or the right of self-defence, or the right to bequeath or to inherit. These are all inherent properties and elements of government, and belong, under our system, to that class of powers and natural rights which are of none the less force and effect because partly unwritten and undefined in the original compact, and which are removed beyond the reach of Assemblies whose powers are limited and differently intended. Slavery, as it exists in the separate States, is equally entitled to be thus classed. The power, therefore, abruptly to abolish such an institution, cannot belong to a state or national legislature. It is essentially a prerogative of the sovereignty of the people themselves. It is in the province of a convention of that power from which emanates the constitutions both of federal and state governments. A contrary action or decision, vesting such power either in Congress as regards the District of Columbia, or in any of our State legislatures, would be to create a linquished by any of the States, or acquirruinous instability in property in both in-ed by purchase, the conveyance has ever stances. It would be committing the most cherished and sacred of all rights, namely, that of modifying the fundamental relationship of man to man, to a bare majority in Assemblies notoriously impulsive, and fluctuating in opinion, and always affected by local prejudices, and educational predilections. It would be placing individuals and entire communities at the mercy of partizans and fanatics, of opposite opinions, looking neither to justice or reason or to any thing beyond their own ambitious aims and violent purposes. The second question must be regarded by all candid and dispassionate persons in a widely different sense, inasmuch that it involves matters and issues of a very different character, and which are totally ir relevant to the first. We hold that the powers of Congress as Congress and Government of the United States." Where territories have been re been to the United States and for their "benefit," and, in the first instance, a parenthesis has always been made "including" the State which thus cedes. Territories acquired by conquest are conveyed by treaty to the Government of the United States, and thus become the property alike of all the communities which form that government. In none of these cessions is Congress a specified party. But, on the other hand, "the Congress" is a joint and specified party with the "Government of the United States" in the ownership of the District of Columbia. Now, as all must very well understand, the Government of the United States is made up of three coordinate branches or departments, each separately defined, and charged with separate and distinct functions. Of these, Congress is only the legislative power-subject in its action, within certain limits, to the check of both the Executive and Judicial departments. Yet "the Congress" is placed independent of, and as a joint and equal partner with the "Government of the United States" in the ownership of the District, and its majority is thus the "full and absolute" arbiter and conservator in all legislative functions, excepting only in so far as restrained by the provisos and stipulations of the original cession. This proposition may impress some persons as being rather outré and metaphysical, if not erroneous. But we venture to conceive, that when measured by the sense and words of the deed of cession from Maryland and by the same in the Constitution of the United States, the fair and legitimate inference will be in favor of its entire correctness. To this end we deem it advisable to transcribe the said deed of cession in full, as well as the language of the Constitution, concerning the powers of Congress in the District of Columbia. "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Maryland: That all that part of the said territory called Columbia, (as described in the previous section) which lies within the limits of this State, shall be, and the same is hereby acknowledged to be forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States in full and exclusive right and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States: Provided that nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, as to effect the rights of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall be transferred by such individuals to the United States." The italics in the above are our own; and now, we say, let that grant be considered as it may, the close and candid reasoner will be forced to infer that Congress is a separate and distinct party in the transaction, independent of its co-ordinate connexion with the Government of the United States. The laws of Congressional majorities as has been already intimated, are subjeet both to be vetoed and over-ruled by the other two departments, but these last are motionless until Congress shall first have acted. Being, therefore, an independent partner, as well as a partner by virtue of its co-ordinate connexion with the Government of the United States, and being also the active and motive branch of the Government, we safely conclude that Congress, thus doubly interested, is on rather more than an equality with the Government of the United States in the ownership of and jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, and is, in fact, the main arbiter and conservator of its destiny, civil and political. The difference between the two propositions thus submitted, is simply this, viz: that slavery being in existence as a domestic institution within the ten miles square when Congress accepted the deed of cession, the relation between master and slave was distinctly recognized; Congress is, therefore, fairly estopped from abolishing the institution without previously expressed assent from the people, or from passing any law to destroy the right of the owner in the property of his slave, as acknowledged by the acceptance. But, in the second place, the power so to regulate those relations as to abridge or prohibit the general and indiscriminate traffic in slaves, within the limits of the District, being essentially a matter of police and legislation, and being clothed with "full and absolute" power in legislating for said District, Congress has the undoubted right to interfere so as to modify or abolish such traffic, and that too without any appeal to the will or wishes of the State Governments. But, continuing our argument on the second proposition, the powers of Congress within the limits of the federal district are yet more explicitly defined than in the deed of cession above recited. The eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States declares: "That Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and by the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of Government of the United States. It must be admitted, we think, that this, literally, is a sweeping clause. It could not well have been framed so as to convey larger powers. It is not even qualified. It can be limited only by bringing the powers thus sweepingly conferred to the test of established precedent, and natural or pre-existing rights. In the first in stance, the deed is "full and absolute;" in the second, the acceptance carries along with it, under the supreme law of the land, "exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever." It is, indeed, a clause in which the most biassed and fastidious stickler will find little to restrict the discretion of Congress in any matter of legislation; and that the slave traffic is a matter of legislation no intelligent reader will venture to deny. It has been claimed as such, certainly, by every government in which slavery has existed, ancient and modern. That of Rome, which gave to the master the power even of life and limb over his slave, always claimed and exercised exclusive control over the slave traffic. But it could not destroy, by simple legislative majority, the relation between master and slave, nor deprive the first of the labor and value of the last. Greece, as a Government, was anxious to rid the country of the slavery of the Helots, long before the body of the people were either prepared for, or willing to favor such riddance. The Government, therefore, claimed and exercised the undeniable right of all governments to abridge and prohibit the indiscriminate and unnatural traffic in the unfortunate beings whom she had enslaved, but it dared not, even in that early age, to infringe the right of property by destroying the relation itself. Russia, al-ized society, though certainly and properly though a sombre and quiet despotism, where all legislative power is lodged with the Czar, would not venture, perhaps, by a peremptory ukase, to abolish serfdom within its limits; yet the slave traffic is entirely and most effectually prohibited, and the serfs go along with the land on which they were born, and all their local and family attachments are sacredly preserved. The rash and unjust exercise of the first power, even by the Autocrat of Russia, would kindle a flame of resentment that would spread quickly from the Don to the Vistula, and an insulted people would bring down vengeance on even that august head, which, they believe, wears its crown by divine right and will. In the exercise of the last power, however, which is conformable both to justice and custom, no opposition was encountered, and a general acquiescence evidenced its popularity. States and defined powers, Congress is entirely restricted from the exercise of this power, as concerns the States, but its power over the subject is "full and absolute," when applied to its "exclusive jurisdiction" over the District of Columbia. Neither Congress, nor State Legislatures, have the power to abolish slavery within their respective jurisdictions; but neither would be transcending their legitimate powers, as we humbly conceive, to pass such laws as could tend to prohibit indiscriminate traffic in slaves, without regard to number or social relations. It must be borne in mind that slaves, both under the Federal and State Constitutions, as well as by the laws of each, are considered as being something more than mere property. That they are (de facto) property, no one will venture to gainsay; but they are a peculiar species of property. They are not at all regarded as irrational animals, or perishable live stock, as horses, or swine, or cattle. Some have been weak enough to urge and advocate this fallacious point, assuming, with singular hardihood and pertinacity, that which no person of ordinary information will sanction. Under our Government of sovereign Slaves are regarded, both under the Constitution and the laws, as persons also, and, in some sense, as members of organ excluded from the dignity of citizenship, and from civil privileges. They are regularly apportioned, in accordance with the Federal Constitution, (in the true spirit of that great American system of protection and encouragement, which reaches and covers every species of labor, a system long upheld, and ardently cherished by the conservative Whig party of the Union,) for full representation in the Congress of the United States. They are entitled to protection, under the law, in life and limb, and are, individually, amenable for any infractions of the criminal code. They are shielded, by the law, from all cruel and unusual punishments at the hands of bad masters. In all these is exhibited very clearly the wide distinctions between negroes transferable, by sale, from one master to another, and all other kinds of property. This view of the subject is very ably and elaborately expounded by Mr. Madison in No. 54 of the "Federalist." He there expresses himself thus: "But we must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both of these characters. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied that these are the proper criterion. The slave is regarded by the law as a member of society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The Federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property." This leaves a clear inference that an indiscriminate traffic in slaves is not to be regarded as beyond the reach of legal interference and restriction, or as the same with that of horses and cattle. Congress may not posses the power to abolish slave dealing in all its branches, but it does not follow from this that the right to regulate and restrict the trade is prohibited. On the other hand, it is clearly within the legitimate province of Congress to do so, provided no legislative steps are taken to infringe the rights of resident owners in the property of their slaves. Congress, however, under the deeds of cession, is restricted, on this subject, only as regards resident owners. In the case of transient persons and traders, an arbitrary and perverse stretch of power might easily give a different aspect to these relations. We feel assured that no one will deny the power of Congress to prohibit a banking company from New York or Delaware from establishing a bank within the limits of the District, either by positive enactment to that effect, or by refusing them a corporate existence. How, then, can it be denied that the same body has the same sort of power to interdict a slave dealer from Maryland or Virginia from carrying on his odious traffic within the same limits? Or how, under the Constitution and law, can Congress be denied the authority and right to interfere even so far as to regulate or restrict the trade as between resident owners themselves? It must be remembered, that, unlike any other legislative assembly in the Union, Congress possesses here "full and absolute" power, and that its "jurisdiction" within the District limits is not only independent and unqualified, but "exclusive in all cases whatsoever." There is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prohibit the abolition of the institution by Congress, beyond the right of all citizens to claim protection for his property. Still less is there to be found any clause or enactment denying the right to abridge and restrict the traffic. Neither are such prohibitory or restrictive clauses to be found in the deeds of cession, for in these, except only as relates to owners of "soil," the power of Congress is totally unlimited. It is even a question, in view of the broad and unqualified powers thus conferred on the Congress within the District limits both by the Constitution and the deeds, whether the right to prohibit the trade in all its features can be successfully confuted or denied? But thus far we do not pretend to go in this article. But there are other views in which this subject may be argued. The ten miles square must be considered as belonging exclusively to the "Congress and Government of the United States," and not, as do the Territories, to the United States, over which Congress can only exercise trust powers. Against any improper or unequal, or discriminating, legislation by Congress as concerns the last, the States would have a right to protest. But as concerns legislation by Congress within the District, they are estopped. Resolutions, introduced before Congress, and intended to do away with the slave trade in the said District, are nothing to us of the South, in the capacity of States. We are unwilling to admit that our right of self-regulation can be thus endangered. We should as soon think of fearing the effects of the recent emancipation in the French West Indies: and we have about as much right to protest in the last case as in the first. On the contrary, we incline to believe that the interference by Congress with the slave trade in the District would result beneficially to the negro slave in the States. If the traffic was prohibited there, and those loathsome and disgusting depots of degraded and distressed humanity were effectually broken up within the District limits, it would force the Southern slaveholding States to protect themselves by adopting similar laws, or else their soil would be |