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Largely theory must govern consideration; to any and every solution practical objections can be found. Granting that consideration of political interest impels Italy to move; and granting, as is practically assured, benevolent consideration by the Holy See, what guaranty of his sovereign liberty and independence will the Pope consider satisfactory? That is the point on which no one can prophesy. What is quite certain is, that there is no moral obligation on him to claim the old guaranty, the old Temporal Power as it used to exist; but he must claim something, and something satisfactory, in its place.
Before leaving the subject a passing note must be made of that very remarkable phenomenon of the times, the rush of civil governments to Rome. Before the war the Holy See had diplomatic relations with a dozen states; now it has such relations, either sending a representative or receiving one, or, in the large majority of cases, both sending and receiving, with twenty-five. Quality, too, has increased, as well as quantity. Before the war Rome sent to foreign powers only five nuncios, including those of the second class, and two internuncios; it received only two ambassadors and twelve ministers, of foreign states. Now it sends out nineteen nuncios and five internuncios, receiving eight ambassadors and seventeen ministers.
Governments which had no
relations have established them. Governments which had broken off relations have restored them. Governments which had second-class relations have raised them to first class.
In the first category the British Empire is noticeable. It sent a minister on special mission at Christmas, 1914, for the announced purpose that its policy, reasons, aims, intentions, and conduct in the war might be rightly understood at the Holy See. Now that war is over, it has converted its special mission into a permanent legation, by reason of the proved value of representation there. Holland, in the spring of 1915, carried through Parliament the proposal to send a representative to the Holy See, on the ground that it was the country's special and vital interest that peace should be brought about as soon as possible, and that it was to Holland's interest to coöperate with the Vatican. Now that peace has come, Holland has made its relations permanent, receiving a separate internuncio instead of a subordinate share in the Nuncio at Brussels. In this category, too, come all the states-Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the rest that have risen from the war. In the second category, France is the outstanding figure. The third is very numerous: the German Embassy replacing the Prussian Legation; Belgium, Chile, Brazil, Peru raising their legations to the full rank of embassies.
And it is remarkable how this phenomenon has come about without objective effort on the part of the Holy See: the civil governments have approached Rome, not Rome the civil governments, though, of course, she has extended to them the most cordial welcome. If, indeed, one regards the simple objective historical facts, appearing on the surface, affecting the Holy See in relation to the war, the phenomenon seems more remarkable still. The Papacy
proclaimed its neutrality and impartiality; the Pope announced his policy of doing everything possible: first, to relieve suffering; second, to bring about peace. On the first count his success was amazing, showing to the world in a really remarkable manner the unique character and power of the institution of the Papacy. On the second count he seems, to all outward appearances, to have failed completely. A clause in the secret agreement of April, 1915, by which Italy entered the war, a clause which was, under the resulting circumstances, valueless,-prohibited him from having anything to do with the Peace Conference whenever and however that might come about. It was valueless because the Holy See always envisaged peace by agreement, and would never have taken part in a peace imposed by conquerors on conquered; whereas the Allies always held that there could be no just and lasting peace such as the Holy See itself desired -unless founded on the defeat of the party responsible for the war and the consequent recognition by Germany that war does not pay.
That was always the fundamental difference between the Pope and the Allies in their outlook on peace. President Wilson's reply to the Papal Peace Note of August, 1917, with which the Allies associated themselves, brought that point out clearly. Strive as he would for peace, the Pope seemed to have no success at all. Yet we now have the striking procession of the nations of the world toward the Vatican, which, on the face of things, seems to have failed utterly to do what it set itself to do. There is the contradiction; but there is the actual, evident fact, from which there is no getting away, of the position of increased prestige and power occupied by the Holy See to-day.
It is certainly one of the great historical phenomena to be noted among
the results of the great war. But to prophesy as to future historico-political possibilities arising from it would be premature, particularly in view of the very sudden way in which it has come about. There is a point, however, which rivets the attention. No one, in considering to-day's phenomenon, can help thinking of old times, when the Pope had relations and agreements with all the powers of the world the historico-political world that counted then: Europe. Such relations were between temporal sovereigns of states and the Pope who also was temporal sovereign of a state, but at the same time supreme spiritual sovereign of the Catholic princes with whom he had relations.
There is a varied history of the vicissitudes of those relations. But, as the Pope has said more than once lately, times have changed. If we run down the list to-day we find His Most Catholic Majesty of Spain the only remaining sovereign of the class of the olden days; we find states which may be called, in regard to their peoples, Catholic: Poland, Belgium, Bavaria, even France, and others; but Rome's diplomatic relations with the world to-day are not with Catholic princes, but with 'democratic' states, represented by parliaments and prime ministers. It has been said in disparagement of limited companies that they have 'no souls to be saved or bodies to be kicked.' In the old days of Catholic princes and of the Temporal Power, both these conditions stood. Such entities to-day have the first half of the phrase only in the measure of righteousness of feeling expressed in the policy of the nation influencing the Government; and the second half stands only in the lessened and entirely changed measure of adjustment of diplomatic differences. In truth, to-day, Rome's aspect in its relations with the world flocking to it must be very differ
Vatican are still turned, the more so in view of its evidently increased prestige and objective and subjective importance and that is the one country which is not joining in the rush to Rome. The United States receives a purely religious representative of the Pope in the person of an Apostolic Delegate, but it has no diplomatic relations with the Holy See. That, too, is a policy as to which future students of history, at the Vatican and in America, will have opportunity for noting results and forming judgment.
ent from that of olden days. How it will align itself will be matter for interesting study by future students of history.
And it is for the future students of history, not for a passing note-maker of the time, to comment on another striking phenomenon. There is one great country to which the Pope's eyes turned specially in every crisis of the war; which, up to the very last minute, he believed never would come in; to which his eyes turned all the same after it had done so; to which the eyes of the
THE LABOR SITUATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY A. SHADWELL
THE editor of the Atlantic has requested me to explain the labor situation in Great Britain to American readers, and has propounded several questions, which I will try to answer in the course of this essay. He asks for an interpretation, rather than a résumé, of the facts, and I will therefore assume that the reader has a certain knowledge of outstanding events. My task is, as I understand it, to explain the broad meaning of what is going on in England without entering into too much detail. This, of course, involves matters of opinion, and a preliminary word on my own standpoint is due. I write as a detached observer, who has for many years studied social conditions and industrial movements from the life in many countries, without any partisan predilections of any kind, political, financial, or theoretical; with friends and acquaintances in every camp, from
the Duke of Northumberland to John Maclean, and with no interest to serve but the truth. If I am wrong, it is due to lack of judgment, not to bias, or to want of study.
Let me begin with the summary statement that so far we have passed through inevitable troubles and trials better than we had any sound reason to expect. We are by no means through with them yet; but as each successive corner is turned, the prospect improves.
This view may cause some surprise and be set down as 'optimistic'; but optimism has nothing to do with it, as I shall show. It is based on a reasoned anticipation, formed during the war from past and current conditions, of the industrial situation likely to arise after it, and on a broad survey of the actual course of events since the Armistice.
True, it runs counter to popular opinion; but popular opinion was, and is, ill informed in two ways. The public was first led into false anticipations, and then disillusion was unduly heightened by a one-sided view of the actual facts.
The war was generally expected to lead straight into a sort of Utopia, in which the lion would lie down with the lamb and the prophecy contained in the eleventh chapter of Isaiah would be at least on the way to fulfillment. There was no substance in this sanguine vision; it was simply a nebulous hope, born of war-excitement and fed by platform phrases, such as 'a land fit for heroes to live in' and the blessed word 'reconstruction.'
I can remember no such prolific begetter of nonsense as this idea of reconstruction. All the socialists, visionaries, and reformers saw in it their opportunity, and interpreted it in their own way; politicians hung their promises on it, and simple folk rose to it like trout to a fly in May. It proved an irresistible lure and was in everyone's mouth. It created a fool's paradise, in which every wish was to be gratified. Under its influence grandiose schemes were hatched and all sense of proportion was lost. The alluring prospect took a thousand forms, but the general idea was that everyone was going to have a much better time after the war than ever before. In particular, industrial conditions were to be improved out of recognition; the standard of living was to be raised; men were to work less and earn more; strife between employers and employed was to be banished; peace and prosperity were to reign; and all this immediately. The illusion was too popular to be resisted; protest was useless.
The currency obtained by these notions is shown by the frequent references in recent disputes to the falsifica
tion of promises and expectations. But good judges were not taken in by the rosy visions of reconstruction. More than five years ago ten months before the first Russian revolution and eighteen months before the arrival of Bolshevism - I predicted, in the Nineteenth Century and After, great trouble after the war. I said that it would be a severer trial than the war itself; that the prospect was full of menace; and that everyone in a position to judge, with whom I had discussed the question, was of the same opinion. This reading was based on solid facts, which I elaborated a year later in the same review. I gave reasons for anticipating 'revolutionary changes, not effected without much tribulation and a period of adversity.'
I recall this, not to vaunt my prescience, which was shared by everyone who knew the real conditions and was not blinded by illusions, but to show that there is nothing obscure or mysterious about the present situation. It is due to forces recognized and understood years ago. Those forces have since been stimulated by events at home and abroad. Bolshevism; high prices; the spectacle of war-fortunes attributed to profiteering and held to be the cause of high prices; successive increases of wages extracted by demonstrations of force; the rapid growth of trade-unionism; artificial prosperity created by inflation of currency; war-time restrictions, especially of drink; revolutionary propaganda all these have had their effect, and superficial observers have freely attributed the present situation to the influence of one or another of them.
That is a mistake. The trouble is more deeply rooted in the past and cannot be rightly understood without a knowledge of the historical evolution of labor movements, which can be indicated here only in brief outline.
During the nineteenth century the growth of industrialism was accompanied by the periodical appearance of an active ferment among the wageearners, at regular intervals of about twenty years. The outstanding dates, marking the rise of active movement, are 1831, 1851, 1871, 1889, and 1911. It will be observed that but for 1889, which a little antedated the lapse of twenty years, the succession has been remarkably symmetrical. To enumerate the signs of this ferment at each appearance would occupy too much space. I can say only that it took both political and industrial forms, sometimes one and sometimes the other predominating, with a sort of oscillating movement. It issued broadly in legislation and in the advance of trade-unionism in numbers, organization, legal status, and privileges. There were collateral and associated movements, both practical and theoretical; but I am concentrating attention on the points of greatest activity.
What is the explanation of this periodicity? The state of trade has something to do with it. Each successive time of ferment was associated with an upward movement of trade, following a depression; but this alone will not account for the phenomenon. For in each period of twenty years there have been intermediate terms of rising trade, during which no corresponding advance in the labor movement has occurred. In some of them a certain amount of response was perceptible; but it was very small compared with the activity of the fermentative years enumerated. These were followed in each case by a period of apparent exhaustion, during which strength was gathered for a fresh advance.
The chief explanation of this, in my opinion, is to be found in the natural
procession of the generations, by which the old gradually give place to the young. The latter know nothing of the struggles and exhaustion of the past; they are fresh, full of energy and fight. More than that, their standpoint is different, their outlook wider, their aspirations higher-or, if not higher, more purposeful, because nearer to practical attainment. They start where the previous generation left off. This development has been particularly noticeable in recent years. It is the result of the many educative influences that have been brought to bear, and of the whole process of social change that has permeated the population.
The notion that class-differences have widened is quite erroneous. In Great Britain, whatever may be the case in other countries, there has been a great and multiform approximation of classes. I have witnessed it going on all my life and at an increasing pace. Those who do not know it are either bad observers or too young to be able to compare the present with the past. The contemplation of figures showing the extremes of nominal wealth and poverty is misleading. It hides the approximation in real conditions. To take the most visible thing, no one even thinks of building either the palaces or the hovels that once regularly represented the extremes. The hovels are abolished, the palaces are being abandoned, the extremes have come much nearer together, and the same process is going on in all the things that matter. There has been a great diffusion of real wealth in comforts and conveniences, a great diffusion of knowledge and the means of self-improvement, a great diffusion of political power and administrative functions. Men of all classes meet on level terms in the council chamber and on the magisterial bench; all classes mingle on the railway platform, where millionaires not infrequently betake