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which man stands to God, and these are subject to the law of the miraculous. Thus miracles are a part of God's original plan; they have ever had their place in the world, like other phenomena, and are equally capable of a rational explanation. They are not to be regarded as an after-thought, but as begining with the creation of man, and continuing so long as he has his place in this world.

The point of view we are advocating will give a rational account of two difficulties which are very formidable under the old theory. First, we can account for what Mr. Mozley terms the 'running miraculous.' It is a remarkable fact, as Mr. Mozely has pointed out, that miracles have ever formed part of the inmost life of humanity. Belief in them has prevailed in all ages of the world, and among every class of mankind. Heathens and Jews, as well as Christians, have had their miracles; and even in modern times science has supplied material for them, which has given rise to spiritual ism. The old theory cannot account for this remarkable phenomenon. It is obliged to characterize this faith as a delusion, and the hankering after such things as a morbid want,' the product of curiosity, imagination, misery, helplessness, and indolence' (p. 204).

But how can that be a morbid want,' which has vindicated for itself a universal position in humanity? which has flourished successively on heathen, Christian, and scientific material; because, in truth, it is neither heathen, nor Christian, nor scientific, but human?' Its universality proves that it is not a morbid,' but a legitimate want. What is universal is also necessary: and if it is the former it must have its ground in a necessity of human nature. And, in truth, if the point of view we are advocating is correct, it must be so. So soon as man awakens to the consciousness of a personal existence, he experiences the necessity of the Divine relation, and miracles as the results and evidences of that relation. If this want is not gratified in a legitimate way, it will seek its gratification by illicit means. In contemplating the records of the running miraculous we must allow a large margin for delusion. But Scripture undoubtedly contemplates along with delusion a measure of truth. We know not how far the Spirit of God may have revealed Himself among the heathen; nor how far evil powers may have been permitted to delude mankind.

The other difficulty to which we alluded is the cessation of miracles. The old theory

creates an impassable gulf between our age and the age of the Bible. While the latter was the age of the supernatural, the present is the age of the natural. Why should there be this unnatural chasm? Why should miracles have ceased? You can give no reason on the old theory which will not be signally refuted by an appeal to fact. It is sometimes said that revelation having been proved by the aid of miracles, they are not now required. But how inappropriate is such a remark in an age of unbelief like the present? What an immense impulse to Christian faith would not a revival of miracles give? But, in truth, the real import of the difficulty is not sufficiently stated by simply saying miracles were, and miracles are not. The difference between an age of miracles and an age without miracles implies a difference in the relation in which man stands to God. It implies in the one case that God is very near to man, that He guides, rules, assists him, and makes His presence felt. It implies in the other that God has receded from this near relation; that man may call to Him, but He will not answer, nor vouchsafe a sign that He is near. We judge of the present by the past, but to a soul agonizing with this frightful doubt, is there not a great temptation to judge of the past by the present? If all signs of God's presence now are to be set down as delusion, why should it not be the same in times past? It is true, even from our point of view, we have to account for the fact that miracles like those of Christ no longer take place. But if we relieve our views of the supernatural from the unnatural twist which they have received from the evidential theory, will not a simple consideration of the facts supply a sufficient answer? Great miracles like those of Christ no longer take place, because the Gift residing in Christ is no longer in the world. But the working of Providence, and the gifts of the Spirit, still remain the latter, it may be, not in such large measure as in Apostolic times (which is, perhaps, our own fault), but the same in kind.

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We have now to look at the question in its philosophical aspect; or, in other words, to consider how we are to view the supernatural in its relation to the natural. On the view we take in this matter will depend, whether we are to assign as the differential character of the miracle, that it is a violation of suspension or a law of nature. Now, if we adopt the definition of the miracle which we have given, it is evident that such. a differential character is not needed. If miracles are the direct result of that perma

nent relation in which man stands to God, considered obnoxious. He would even go then, to all intents and purposes, the super- so far as to maintain that a miracle, when natural is brought within the sphere of the judged of on the scale of the universe, is natural, if by the natural we mean the sphere not contrary to, but in accordance with, of human experience. More especially is law. But, while maintaining this accordthis the case in reference to the miracles of ance with higher law, he at the same time Christianity. The Divine power in Christ, maintains the opposition of the miracle to during His earthly sojourn, certainly formed that set of laws which comes within the a part of nature; for it was hypostatically cognizance of our experience' (p. 361). one with His human nature, which every Now, if by 'that set of laws' Mr. Mozley one allows was natural. In the same way means every other set but the miraculous one, a charisma of powers, imparted to an indi- then miracles are contrary in the sense exvidual member of His Body, must be viewed pressed. But just in the same way if we put as natural; for in this case, although the apart any other sete.g. the rational acts union is not the same, yet we know that the of mankind-from the bundle which we miraculous power resides in the individual comprehend under the name of nature or as a permanent gift. The providential re- experience, then we might just as truly say lation is somewhat different; it is certainly that they are in opposition to that set of the introduction of supernatural power laws which comes within the cognizance of within the sphere of nature, and as such our experience.' might be characterized as different from, or at variance with, nature; but being a continued agency, not limited to the sphere of humanity, and being essential to the very existence of nature, it practically forms a part of this system of things.

On these grounds we held, and still hold, that the mark of contrary to nature as a differential character of the miracle is not needed. Miracles are a class of facts within human experience, and as such are in a parallel position with every other class; and they difference themselves in a similar way. It is to be observed that every class of facts must be contrary to the rest of nature; for in no other way could they establish themselves as a class. The organic phenomena for instance, or the rational acts of mankind, must be at variance with every other kind of phenomena. And in this sense, and no other, do we allow that miracles are contrary to nature. If there is any sense in which miracles are more contrary to nature than other classes of phenomena, let it he pointed out. If there is not, why attach to them an obnoxious and unnecessary mark which will give rise to endless dispute and confusion? *

Mr. Mozley, while doing us the honour to quote our remarks on this subject, takes occasion to dissent. He is, indeed, willing to resign the expressions-violation, or suspension of a law of nature, if they are

* Dr. Hannah, with his usual ability and clearness, has specified the three elements necessary to the definition of a miracle-its eficient, its formal, and its final cause. With regard to the efficient cause we are at one with him. His formal cause, as will be seen, we admit or reject according to what is meant by nature. With regard to the final cause, we have already shown in what respect we differ from the evidential theory. (See Contemporary Review, July, 1866, p. 303.)

We

And this brings out the real difference between Mr. Mozley and ourselves. are not so much divided upon the relation of the miracle to nature, as upon the prior question · What is a miracle? The dif ference will come out in answer to the question, - Do miracles as a law or class of phenomena form part of human experience? In his view they do not; in our view they do. In his view they are past and exceptional acts on the part of God; in our view they are parts of a vast system now going on. While he believes that the resurrection of Christ and the Apostolic charismata stand separate and altogether apart from us, we believe that the same power which accomplished these marvels as a law or system, is even now at work among us, and is part of our experience.

We thus maintain that the mark of contrary to nature as a differential character of miracles is not needed. But it is a mark which, from peculiar circumstances which we will now point out, is not only dangerous but fatal to theology; and on this ground ought to be rejected. We have hitherto spoken of nature as identical with the sphere of human experience: but in doing so we are using language which, although common, when it comes to be examined will sound strange in the ears of common sense. Common sense will ask, Is not nature altogether independent of human experience? Did the visible world, which geology tells us existed so many ages before man, only in reality begin to be, when the human eve was created to behold it? Do mountains and valleys, do John and Thomas vanish into nothingness when they are not seen? If they do not

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and common sense is pretty sure they

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ence of a noumenal world: the more moderate would allow that it may exist, but would maintain that we can never know it: the common-sense philosophy would maintain that it does exist, and that, although we cannot know it positively, yet the fact of its existence is assured to us by an indelible conviction impressed upon the mind.

then is nature not identical with | causæ et substantia, a corresponding noumehuman experience: it has a separate and in- non. The extreme sense-philosophy, as redependent existence. And upon this ground presented by Hume, would deny the existcommon sense will construct its theory of nature in relation to the supernatural. The material world with its gradations of beings, rising in a vast chain from the lowest existence up to man, forms one sphere of existence the sphere of nature: and above this, invisible to us, there is another sphere of existence heaven. It is peopled by spiritual beings and departed souls. We know very little about it; but we know that in respect of our spiritual nature we belong to it, while in respect of our bodily nature we belong to the world of nature. Both these spheres of existence, the natural and supernatural, are united in the over-ruling providence of God.

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The effect of this distinction is that it cuts the popular idea of nature in two. In the days of Bishop Butler, the term nature included both the noumenal and phenomenal world people were not at that time aware of the distinction. Nor do we think there ought to be any other than a logical distinction: for noumenon and phenomenon as existing in nature are really one, -or rather noumenon is that which really exists, and phenomenon is the impression or knowledge which we have of it. But in modern science and in the sense-philosophy the distinction is made a very real one. That class of scientific men represented by Professor Tyndall and Mr. Grove, and sense-philosophers, such as Stuart Mill, exclude altogether from consideration the noumenal half of nature, and limit their views entirely to the phenomenal. The position they take up is thus stated by Stuart Mill:

Now, if this conception, which we believe to be philosophically accurate, and which prevailed down to the end of last century, were universally recognized in modern science and philosophy, there would be no difficulty in our definition of miracles. We might safely allow the differential character of contrary to nature. In fact, Bishop Butler's definition: A miracle in its very notion is relative to a course of nature, and implies somewhat different from it,' would hit the mark. For miracles would be the breaking in of the higher world upon the lower; and they would establish themselves as a class by their opposition to nature as a "I premise, then, that when in the course of whole, just as every other class of pheno- this inquiry I speak of the cause of any phemena in nature have some mark of opposi-nomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not it

tion to the rest.

But nature, in modern science and philosophy, is taken in a sense which is not only different from, but has literally no analogy whatever to the above popular sense. In fact, a great revolution in human thought was effected by Kant's polemic against Hume. The line of argument which Kant took up, was that of a distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal world. This distinction, we may truly say, formed a new era in human thought: and its solidity is established by the fact that it has been adopted into all philosophies, and has found its way downwards into the conceptions and reasonings of science. It is commonly expressed by the phrase, the relativity of human knowledge,' and it is equally contended for by the sense-philosophy, as represented by Mill, and the common-sense, as represented by Hamilton. According to this distinction, all that is objected to the senses, or in other words, all that we experience, is only phenomenon; but behind this there is, or there is not, as veræ

self a phenomenon; I make no research into adopt a distinction familiar in the writings of the ultimate ontological cause of any thing. To the Scotch metaphysicians, and especially of Reid, the causes with which I concern myself, are not efficient, but physical causes. They are causes in that sense alone, in which one physical fact is said to be the cause of another. Of the efficient causes of phenomena, or whether any such causes exist at all, I am not called upon to give an opinion. The notion of causation is deemed, by the schools of metaphysics most in vogue at

the present moment, to imply a mysterious and does not, exist between any physical fact on most powerful tie, such as cannot, or at least which it is invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its cause; and thence is deduced the supposed necessity of ascending higher, into the essences and inherent constitution of things, to find the true cause, the cause which is not only followed by, but actually produces, the effect. No such necessity exists for the purpos doctrine be found in the following pages. But es of the present inquiry, nor will any such neither will there be found anything incompatible with it. We are in no way concerned in the question. The only notion of a cause which the theory of induction requires, is such a no

tion as can be gained from experience. The Law of Causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar of inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature, and some other fact which has preceded it; independently of all consideration respecting the ultimate mode of production of phenomena, and of every other question regarding the nature of things in themselves.'"* -Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 338.

It is to be remarked that the class of thinkers who take this line are the most popular at the present day; and that their conception of nature is gradually supplanting the older one. People's minds are becoming more and more habituated to think of nature as a mere succession and co-existence of phenomena. It is in our view a false idea of nature, but we have to face the fact that it not only prevails, but is the dominant one. To a scientific mind imbued with it, the natural world is the world of phenomena, the supernatural (if it has any existence) is the world of noumena. To such a scientific mind, man considered as a person ie. a noumenon, is as much a supernatural being as are the angels.

What now will happen if in face of this view we maintain the opposition of miracles to nature? We shall put them in a position in which they become quite incredible. The true opposition is that between the noumena of the supernatural world and the noumena of the natural; the opposition is not to a succession of natural phenomena.

This is all very well for Mr. Mill and those scientific men who think with him. But do they not, after this programme, stand self condemned, if they ever presume to draw an ontological inference? For instance, with regard to Divine Providence. That is a question which literally turns upon the existence or non-existence of a noumenal world. If

there are true causes and substances in nature, that is, beings who have a created and permanent exist ence, then general providence or general law is the result of the relation in which they stand to each other. But, in addition to this, unless we dissever God altogether from His creation, there must be a special care exercised by Him, either immediately or, as the Bible gives us to understand, through the a system as the Bible teaches, and man instinctively ministry of angels. In a word, there must be such

feels when he kneels down to pray. But, if there is no noumenal world, if all that is but a mere coexistence and succession of phenomena, then to talk of a special providence, or for that matter of a God, in any real sense of the term, is simple folly. What shall we say, then, of men who tell us, A noumenal world may or may not exist - we do not choose to argue the point with you,' and who then draw an inference on the supposition that it does not exist? We must, however, except Mr. Mill from this condemnation. In his recent Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy' he has proved to his own satisfaction the non-existence of a noumenal world. Matter he finds but a permanent possibility of sensation, and mind but a series of feelings.

But if we maintain the character of opposition under this view, we must maintain it in the latter sense. The miracle thus becomes an unexplained break in a chain of It is a lusus naturæ. For phenomena.

modern science will admit no noumenal agency-neither the action of God, nor the action of a personal man.

For these reasons we think the character of opposition to nature ought to be discarded. Miracles are put in a better position, when they are presented as a system within human experience: a succession of spiritual phenomena parallel with other experiences. No doubt, even in this light, they will hardly become credible to such a scientific mind, but they will not needlessly repel it. And theology will gain this advantage, that freed from the ban of science, it can speak without impediment to those who are less imbued with the scientific prejudice. Nor if we adopt this view shall we set ourselves in opposition to Bishop Butler. When he opposed miracles to nature, it was in the former not in the latter sense. He would not have excluded the miraculous from the domain of experience. Possibly he might not with us have put the experience of the Divine life in the same category with the great miracles; but the reader must judge whether in doing so we have reason on our side.*

We have occupied so much space with the rationale of the miracle that we have little left for other matters; but we cannot pass over Mr. Mozley's admirable argument as against the objections of science. In entering, however, upon the consideration of it, we must relinquish the point of view for which we have been contending, and regard the miracle as an exceptional event. We must also pass over from the philosophi cal stand-point, which we have hitherto occupied, to the extreme position of the sense-philosophy. On the ground which

we occupy, in dealing with this argument, we are not entitled to speak of a personal relation as subsisting between man and is not a world of persons and things, but of God, for the world of the sense-philosophy

*I find no appearance of a presumption from the analogy of a nature against the general scheme of Christianity that God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ: and by Him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, i.e. render to every one according to his works, and that good men are under the influence of His Spirit. Whether these things are or are not to be called miraculous is, perhaps, only a question about words. (Analogy, part ii. chap. 2.) We do not contend for the word, but for the thing - the identity of our spiritual life with the phenomena manifested in Christ and His Apostles.

phenomenal succession. Looking, then, at miracles as exceptional acts, and at the world, in this point of view, what is the nature of the scientific argument brought against them? It may be stated thus: the world being made up of a chain of orderly succession, what you mean by a miracle is an interruption or variation of that order. But an immense accumulation of experience has proved the fact that the chain of succession is never broken or varied. And besides, invariability, as a principle, is so firmly fixed in the mind of every scientific inquirer, that he cannot even conceive the possibility of its failure. Or, to apply the argument to a particular case: You tell me of one or two dead men who have risen. I cannot believe it. An immense accumulation of experience has convinced me that such is not the order of succession in the case of dead men. Dead men continue dead: they do not rise again to life; and so firmly am I convinced that this law is verified in every instance, that I cannot even conceive the possibility of its failure. The only effectual way of meeting this argument would be on philosophical ground. We might, for instance, reply in this way: Your philosophy is all wrong. As a matter of fact, the world is not made up of co-existences and sequences. Matter is not, as Mr. Mill would persuade us, a permanent possibility of sensation, nor mind a series of feelings. There are in nature true causes and substances; and man is a being possessed of a personal existence. As soon as we allow this view of the world, the above argument falls to pieces. For events are not arranged on the principle of antecedents and consequents, but are dependent on the noumenal world of which they are the phenomena. Constancy of succession, therefore, is not an absolute law, as is postulated in the above argument.

cept the conclusion. Mr. Mozley has shown that we are under no such necessity. He has discovered a flaw in the reasoning. Accepting as he does the premises, he shows that the conclusion is by no means warranted; for more is collected in the latter than is at hand in the former.

In proceeding to his argument, Mr. Mozley first of all makes sure of what, on empirical premises, we mean by the order of nature. If the order of nature is defined to be the order in which physical events succeed each other, the definition will be true enough. But it will not bring out the point which occasions all the difficulty, and which especially needs to be elucidated. There can be no question about the order of past events: that every one allows to be fixed and invariable; and, so far as we can see, not even the fiat of Almighty God could change it. It is about the future as connected with the past that the whole difficulty arises. Our belief is that the future will resemble the past; that events which are at present hidden in the unknown future will succeed each other in the same order as they have hitherto done. Bodies have tended towards the earth; they will continue to do so. The sun has hitherto risen and set; he will rise and set. Men have been born, have lived, and died; such will be their fate hereafter. As a matter of fact, such is the belief of every man, and the instinctive faith of the brute creation. As a matter of fact, therefore, it must be accepted and dealt with by philosophy. We are not inquiring how the philosophy which we receive would deal with it; we are following Mr. Mozley in his explanation of it on the principles of empiricism. But before proceeding, let us mark the exact bearing of the point as now stated on miracles. It is on the strength of this faith that miracles or The succession variations in the order of succession are excluded. From our conviction that nature will go on as hitherto, it is argued that as a matter of fact it will do so; and retrospectively that it has done so. And thus all miracles, past and future (if we regard them as exceptional events): even the slightest variation from the worn grooves is excluded.

is only constant, so long as the noumenal relations remain the same. But in the case of a miracle these are altered; just as in the world of nature phenomena are continually varied by bringing new agents into play. In the case, for instance, of the resurrections spoken of, we know, on good grounds, that a power was present which produced the effect.

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It is obvious that this conclusion is deThis, however, is not the way in which pendent, on the mental character of this Mr. Mozley has met the argument. He has conviction. It is a trite remark — and the fought the sense-philosophy on its own opponents of miracles would be the first to ground. This, if we mistake not, is some- recognise it that the mere fact of human thing quite new. Hitherto the argument belief does not in itself imply truth in fact, has been as against two rival philosophies. for many beliefs are fallacious. It depends It had been taken for granted, that if we on the mental character of our belief, it deaccept the empirical premises, we must ac-pends on whether it has any ground in FOURTH SERIES. LIVING AGE. VOL. III. 50.

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