 | Peter Achinstein - 2004 - 448 Seiten
...to produce the resultant gravitational force. Doing so would violate Newton's Rule I, which urges us "to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances". In the second case, using Rule 3, from the fact that the law of gravity is satisfied... | |
 | Yacov Y. Haimes - 2005 - 862 Seiten
...Philosoph)" [Newton, l952]. These rules prov ide foundations for any holLstic systems thinking: Rule t: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are hoth true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Rule H: Therefore to the same natural effects... | |
 | Julian Seifter, David Sloane, Austin Ratner - 2005 - 694 Seiten
...possible explanations or diagnoses, in keeping with Isaac Newton's first rule of philosophical reasoning: "We are to admit no more causes of natural things...such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.") The plan may also include treatments to reduce or control symptoms. Once a likely explanation... | |
 | George Anastaplo - 2005 - 918 Seiten
...interpretation is the approach indicated in "Rule 1" of Isaac Newton's "Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy": We are to admit no more causes of natural things than...such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in... | |
 | Jong-Ping Hsu, Dana Fine - 2005 - 664 Seiten
...references in this, and his occasions, shall require. RULES OF REASONING IN PHILOSOPHY, RULE I. We are i'o admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in... | |
 | Jose Wudka - 2006 - 307 Seiten
...characteristic elegance he described this procedure in terms of the following four simple rules: RULE 1: We are to admit no more causes of natural things...such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. RULE 2: Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the... | |
 | Robert Nola, Gürol Irzik - 2005 - 512 Seiten
...editions of the Principia the rules differ. But commonly they are the following four Rules. Rule I: We are to admit no more causes of natural things than...such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Rule 2: Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the... | |
 | Laura J. Snyder - 2010 - 386 Seiten
...four methodological rules in book 3 of his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (namely, that "we are to admit no more causes of natural things...such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances"). This brings up a second difference between the views of Ricardo and Malthus relevant... | |
 | Barton E. Dahneke - 2006 - 692 Seiten
...preferred." Aristotle's form was "Nature operates in the shortest way possible." Isaac Newton's form was "We are to admit no more causes of natural things...such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances." A common form used today is "Scientific concepts are not to be complicated beyond necessity."... | |
 | W. Jerry Chisum, Brent E. Turvey - 2006 - 616 Seiten
...most be eager to factor it into their reconstructions of crime. Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) wrote, "We are to admit no more causes of natural things...such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances." Ernst Mach, an Austrian physicist and philosopher in the early 1800s, advocated this... | |
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To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes. 
